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Introduction: Objective and Sources 
The fundamental endeavour of this study is to understand the relationship 
between the anti-Dogra struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the National 
Movement. There has been in vogue a trend of discussing the pre-independence political 
discourses in Kashmir exclusive of the impact of the all-India political milieu at that time, 
thereby neglecting the influences of the freedom struggle and the leaders of the National 
Movement on the liberation struggle of Jammu and Kashmir. The nature of the problem 
of post-independence Kashmir has often led the writers of Kashmir's modern history to 
continue to follow this approach. This approach portrays the resistance movement in 
Kashmir as if it had happened in a sandbox, detached from the world surrounding it. The 
present study is a modest attempt to reveal the existence of an evolutionary link between 
the freedom struggle of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian national movement in which 
the former not only drew considerable moral and ideological support from the latter but 
even formally affiliated itself with the latter in the fight against the British. 
An attempt has been made to cull information from the records of the Foreign 
Department, Foreign and Political Department, and Home Department of the British 
Government of India housed in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. I have 
explored official documents, reports, memoranda, and press cuttings from the records of 
the Political Department, General Department, Education Department, Vernacular 
Department, Old English Records and Publicity Department of the Government of 
Jammu and Kashmir available in the Jammu repository of the Jammu and Kashmir State 
Archives. Besides these, official correspondences used in this study have also been taken 
from the aforementioned archival storehouses. 
It is perhaps necessary to mention that in many cases the official documents 
presenting the official viewpoint of the events vary from the unofficial and dispassionate 
versions, and a fair degree of circumspecfion has been exercised while using the 
accounts. Moreover, to overcome the limitations of the official documents 1 have tapped 
extant but mostly unused contemporary sources like newspapers, pamphlets, booklets and 
diaries. These have been obtained from the Archives—sometimes existing individually 
and sometimes embedded within official files—as well as tlirough access to the digitally-
preserved pages on a few reliable online sites, such as the ProQuest and the Digital 
Library of India. The newspapers mostly used in this study are the Times of India 
(Bombay), the Muslim Outlook (Lahore), Siyasat (Lahore), the Tribune (Lahore), Young 
India (Ahmedabad), Al-Fazal (Qadian) and Hamdard (Srinagar). 
The pamphlets and booklets published by the All India States' People's 
Conference, such as Indian Princes as Their People See Them (1933), What do the 
Slates' People Want of the National Congress? (1934), Indictment ofPatiala (1939), and 
Kashmir (1939), besides being indispensable for a basic understanding of the conditions 
in different princely states, are essential to understand the attitude of the leaders of States' 
people's towards the nationalist leadership and the national movement as well as helpful 
for gauging the popular mind. 
For broader themes of economic structure, population and general conditions, I 
have relied on Gazetteers, Census Reports, and Administrative Reports, which are not 
only indicative of the official perceptions but also the indicators of the governmental 
policies. For ascertaining the chronology of events and the immediate events preceding or 
succeeding some particular incidents, I have also used several volumes of The Indian 
Annual Register. I have adopted an approach which is both chronological and thematic; 
chronology ensures continuity in discussing the occurrences while thematic 
considerations are useful in contextualizing them. 
In order to analyze the basic stand of leadership on significant issues and the 
interaction between different leaders, I have utilized the correspondences of the leaders of 
Kashmir with the national leaders, and of letters exchanged between the national 
leadership themselves. Among these sources mention may be made of the letters between 
Sheikh Abdullah, Prem Nath Bazaz, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. Collections 
like Sapru Papers, Moonji Papers and the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, as 
availed from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, have been of immense help. 
Besides, the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, containing his speeches, letters 
besides the information about different sessions and resolutions of the Congress. 
Ill 
A number of works written by contemporary leaders namely, Prem Nath Bazaz, 
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Pattabhi Sharamayya, Abul Kalam Azad and N. N. Raina have been used in this 
study to catch a holistic view of the important episodes in the freedom struggle, the 
perceptions of the leadership regarding the happenings and the applied line of action. 
For the later period of this study (mid 1930s and onwards) not many archival 
documents have been cited primarily due to their non-availability—or denial to 
researchers supposedly on security grounds—by the National Archives. It is also 
unfortunate, as well as surprising, that several significant and rare documents are 
available in the India Office Library, London but not in the Archives of our own country 
which makes it impossible for the researchers to go through them. Consequently, at many 
places in this dissertation facts have been quoted from some secondary works exactly as 
slated by their respective authors. For the later part, therefore, the reliance on the 
newspapers, documents of political organizations, and leaders' addresses at sessions, 
while passing over the official opinions, was inevitable. Even then, I have tried my level 
best to cross-check facts from the different sources accessible to me. 
Chapter 1 
First Phase of the Dogra Rule 
The foundation of the state of Jammu and Kaslimir was laid down in 1846 
A.D. when a number of principaHties, viz. Kashmir, Jammu and their adjoining hill 
territories,' otherwise possessing a disthictive geography, ethnicity, social and cultural 
backgrounds, were merged into a single political unit by an arrangement between the 
British East India Company and Gulab Singh, a vassal of Ranjit Singh who was in 
possession of Jammu and Ladakh at the time, and had a commanding influence in 
Kashmir after 1839 A.D.^ The Treaty of Amritsar, by which these territories were put 
together, was signed between the British Government of India and Gulab Singh, on 
March 16, 1846, after the British armies subdued the Sikhs in the First Anglo-Sikh 
War of 1845-46. Article 1 of the Treaty confen^ed upon Gulab Singh and heirs-male 
of his body the "independent possession" of 'all the hilly or mountainous country, 
with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the 
river Ravee, including Chumba and excluding Lahul...', subject to the payment of 
rupees seventy-five lakh [NanakshahP] and acceptance of the British suzerainty.'' 
The ensuing political instability, court intrigues at the Lahore Darbar, strained 
relations between the Sikhs and the British after the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh 
(in 1839), and the treacherous role already played against the Sikh state by Gulab 
Singh (during the 1^ ' Anglo-Sikh War, 1845) apparently made him the most 'suitable 
ally' of the British.^ In order to maintain their credibility among the Indian political 
' The other territories included Ladakh, Baltistan, Hunza, Nagar, Gilgit, Iskardo, Muzaffarabad, 
Poonch, Rajauri, Kotli-Mirpur, Bhimber, and Hazara. 
' For a detailed discussion on the founding of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, see Ali Mohd 
Pir & Ab. Rashid Shiekh, 'Formation of the Princely State of Jammu and Kaslimir: The Historical 
Pers]3cctives', Siisiigiilar: Journal of flisloiy Education and Historical Studies, Volume 1, No. 2, 
(2013), pp. 139-50. 
^ 7,500,000 Nanakshahi rupees = £750,000. 
•* C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and 
hSeighbouring Territories, Vol. IX, Calcutta, 1892, pp. 353-55. The Treaty was a sequel to the Treaty of 
Lahore (9 March 1846), the latter being signed between the Sikhs and the victorious British 
Government in the attennath of the First Anglo-Sikh war. The British demanded from the Sikhs a war 
indemnity of one and a half crore of rupees which the latter were not able to pay. In lieu of the amount 
of indemnity tiiey were made to cede to the British the Jalandhar Doab between the Beas and the Sutiej 
and ail the territories lying south of the Sutiej, and Kashmir, Hazara and other hilly regions between the 
Beas and the Indus. For the complete text of the two treaties, see pp. 40, 43-5, and 353-5. 
^ For an in-depth critical study of Gulab Singh's life and his relationship with the Sikhs and the British, 
see Bawa Satinder, The Jammu Fox: A Biography of Maharaja Gulab Singh of Kashmir (1792-1857). 
New Delhi, 1988. 
potentates and as a token for the recognition of Gulab Singh's "services", the hitherto 
Raja of Jammu was formally invested with the title of Maharaja by Lord Hardinge, 
the Viceroy, on 15"' March 1846 in Amritsar.*" 
The decision of the Colonial authorities to keep the newly acquired territories 
under the rule of their "loyal ally" instead of directly annexing them seems quite 
intriguing, more so because it coincided with the aggressive and annexationist 
'Forward Policy'. However, the creation of this new state was not simply, as 
previously believed, an outcome of the services rendered by Gulab Singh to the 
British during the first Anglo-Sikh war but seems to be a result of the greater British 
strategy which they had formulated for the safety of the frontiers of their empire. A 
number of reasons, predominantly economic and political, seem to have collectively 
dictated the policy adopted at that time. The Company at that time faced serious 
financial crisis owing to a number of military expeditions, especially the recent 
Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842),^ and it could hardly bear the economic liability of 
administering the 'mountainous and largely barren regions' of the state. Hardinge 
also sensed the possibility of a clash with the ferocious hill chiefs in case the 
territories were annexed.'^  Punjab still had a large army and it could have hampered 
the consolidation of direct British rule in Punjab and Kashmir alike."' Besides, 
according to Hardinge, one of the great impediments in the direct annexation of 
Kashmir was the stationing of troops there, 300 miles away from Sutlej. 
More importantly, the maintaining of a 'buffer' state against the supposed 
threat from Russia, and the consequences of the recent involvement of the British in 
Afghanistan seems to have ruled out any chances of a direct annexation of the 
'' J. D. Cunningham, A History of the Sikhs, 2"^ " edition, London, 1853, p. 324. 
^ C. Hardinge, Viscount Hardinge, Oxford, 1891, pp. 132-33. The Afghan Wars of 1839-42 alone cost 
the Company about £10 million. See, C.H. Philips, East India Company, 1784-1834, Manchester, 
1940, pp. 261-2 and 302. Also see, C.A. Bayly, The New Cambridge History of India, II, i. Indian 
Society and the Making of the British Empire, Cambridge, 1988, p. 128. 
^ Not surprisingly, the eastern hill areas of Kulu, Langra, Nurpur and Mandi were not included in the 
state as they were considered strategically more important and economically much beneficial. 
Governor General to Secret Committee, March 4, 1846 as Appendix 11 in Diwan Kirpa Ram, Gulab 
Nama, Eng. tr. S.S. Charak & A.C. Billawaria, Srinagar, 2005, pp. 425-6. 
" Ibid. 
"^  'The Sikh army has been repulsed, but not destroyed; and, although we have won a great battle, we 
have only begun the war', The Times, March 2, 1846, p. 4, quoted in Bawa Satinder, 'Raja Gulab 
Singh's Role in the First Anglo-Sikh War', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1971), pp. 35-59; 
Henry Lawrence's Letter, dated June 2, 1846, quoted in K.K. Datta, (ed.) A Comprehensive History of 
India, Vol. 11, New Delhi, 1985, p. 28. 
" Hardinge, p. 133. 
territories. All these factors collectively led to the handing over of Jammu and 
Kashmir to Gulab Singh, of course, on the payment of Rs. 7,500,000. It was expected 
that Gulab Singh would 'act as a counteq^oise against the power of [the] Sikh Prince 
[Daleep Singh]', and on the other hand, both the Dogra and the Sikh kingdom taken 
together would 'have a common interest in resisting attempts on the part of any 
Mahomedan power to establish an independent State on this side [of] the Indus or 
even to occupy Peshawar.''^ The hope that the newly-created Maharaja would act as a 
'loyal ally' soon echoed in the British political circles at home. The Times wrote: 
'As an enemy his power of attack, with the divided forces of an irregular 
army, would have proved intolerably injurious; as a friend we may hope 
to find in him a steady adherent of that qualified British ascendancy to 
which he owes his rise.' 
With the conclusion of this "sale deed"'"* the dynastic rule of Dogras 
commenced in the state and lasted for next hundred and one years under the auspices 
of British Imperialism. During this period, the state underwent drastic changes 
ranging from the reshuffling of the administration at all levels with an eye to 
consolidate Dogra power and a policy of maximizing the revenues that led to the 
emergence and growth of political consciousness among the people and uUimately the 
resistance and struggle for freedom. This needs to be seen in the context of the greater 
British colonialism in India, for the perpetuation of the Dogra rule in the state 
depended indispensably on the survival of colonialism in India. No less important is 
revisiting the freedom struggle in British India which had direct and indirect bearing 
on the people's resistance movements in Princely States, Kashmir not being an 
exception. 
Governor General's Despatch to Secret Committee, 19 March 1846, Foreign Department 
Proceedings, National Archives of India, New Delhi (hereafter NAI), 1846, File No. 8. See also, Walter 
R. Lawrence, The India We Served, London, 1928, p. 124. 
'^  Times, dated May 21, p. 4, quoted in Bawa Satindcr, Jammu Fox, p. 120. 
'" It is an oft-used term symbolizing the sale of Kashmir to Gulab Singh on which most of the writers 
of modem Kashmir history are unanimous with the exception of a few. For a contesting view, see U. K. 
Zutshi, Emergence of Political Awakening in Kashmir, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 20-3. Zutshi challenges 
the notion of 'sale of Kashmir' but chooses to ignore the transaction for which Gulab Singh certainly 
made the payment and which placed Kashmir under the rule of Dogras without any reference to the 
wishes of the people. 
An understanding of the liberation struggle launched in Kashmir during the 
early thirties of the twentieth century needs an analysis of the factors that led to the 
resistance against the Dogra raj in the state. This is what follows below. 
The Treaty of Amritsar overnight transformed the hitherto petty chief of 
Jammu into a maharaja; the Valley—purchased and conquered—came to be treated 
by him as an 'investment' from which he sought to gain as much returns as possible. 
The subsequent Dogra rulers carried on this legacy and divested the cultivators from 
rights in land, whatsoever, except the right to cultivate. The state seriously infringed 
upon the rights of cuhivators over land by seizing their occupancy rights, and 
reducing them to mere tenants, who could be evicted by the state or the landlord at 
any time. However, the compelling conditions later on forced the state (through the 
Land Settlement of 1889-90) to restore the occupancy rights to the cultivators, with 
the exception of right to alienate land.'^ 
The extant records reveal that the revenue was realized at exorbitant rates 
from the masses. Theoretically, the land revenue was fixed in kind at the rate of one-
half of the annual produce of the land'" but during the period of Gulab Singh's rule 
the state "legally" sanctioned the exaction of additional cesses like trakee and obwabs 
by the officials at the rate of 16 percent of the produce. The cultivator was, thus, left 
with less than one-third of the produce. Over and above the state's demand {qaul), 
and their 'legal' share, the revenue officials used to extort their 'personal' charges 
(rasum)}^ (This would be evident from Tables 1.2 and 1.3 given at the end of the 
chapter). The figures given in the tables pertain to those numerous taxes which the 
state and the officials used to extract from the people. In this particular case, in 1883, 
the actual revenue to be collected from a specimen village at the rate of half of the 
produce was Rs. 1,038.5 chilki^'^ (given that the total revenue of the village was Rs. 
2077). The addition of Rs. 293.8 as trakee and abwabs increased the payable amount 
'^  Walter R. Lawrence, Valley, London, 1891,p.433-5L 
"" ILM. Lawrence, Transfer of ihe Govemmeni to Maharaja Gulab Singh, 28 January 1848, Section C, 
J&K State Archives, Jammu {Hencefortli JKA), 1848, File Nos. 33-34. 
" Diwan Kirpa Ram, Gidzar-i-Kashmir, Lahore, 1856, pp. 256-7. Trakee was a tax collected for the 
payment to Kardars, the official concerned with the assessment and collection of revenue. Abwahs 
were the taxes taken by other officials who assisted in revenue collection. The trakee, taken from the 
cultivators at the rate of four traks per khar^var of paddy, seems to have been introduced by the 
Afghans and continued to be taken during the Sikh period. 
'^* Lawrence, Valley, p. 415-6; Robert Thorpe, Cashmere Misgovernment, London, 1870, p. 4. 
" 1 chilki rupee = 16 chilki annas = 10 Imperial annas. 
to 1,332.3 chilki or an increase of 28 percent on the total assessed revenue. Moreover, 
the officials extracted Rs. 270 or 26 percent of the total assessment as rasum. Thus, 
the peasants were left with just 474.7 rupees or about 23 percent, i.e., less than a 
quarter of the total produce, which could have been barely enough for their 
subsistence. This pattern, it appears, was followed in every village. Taxes other than 
land revenue are also listed and accounted for in Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. Festive 
occasions like Eid, Nauroz and Dussehra meant a time for special 'gifts' known as 
salamana for the revenue-collecting officials.^' The revenue realization required use 
of force to such an extent that the Dogra state employed a special regiment known as 
Nizamat Paltan. This regiment too needed, at times, assistance from the regular army 
to coerce people into paying these taxes. In 1884, the Paltan was composed of 7,429 
men,^ ^ while the total strength of regular army around the same time was 15,000 
which clearly demonstrate the extent of force required by the state in the realization 
of revenue. 
For the assessment of revenue and its realization, the state resorted to revenue 
farming and auctioning of villages.^ '* In 1849, the state provided peasants with the 
option of paying revenue either in cash or in kind, and again in 1873 ordered for the 
same through the asamiwar khewat?^ However, the data pertaining to the said period 
shows that the greater part of revenue was taken in kind, at least till 1880s.^ ^ 
Although, the report of the Land Settlement of 1889-90 recommended the realization 
of revenue in cash, nevertheless, as late as 1923, the Jammu and Kashmir Land 
'° 'Position of Cultivating Classes in Kashmir, 1890', Foreign Department, K. W. Secret-E, NAl, Feb 
1890, File Nos. 106-110, p. 2. 
J' H.M. Lawrence, Section C, 28 January 1848, JKA, 1848, File Nos. 33-34. 
^^  Lawrence, Valley, p. 402. 
-' 'Mr, Henvey's Revised Note on the Famine in Kashmir', Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAl, 1883, 
File No. 86. 
'^' These included farming out of villages to kardars (in 1867), khewat system (1873), and Jzadboli 
(1883). These assessments were largely based on bidding system in which the landlords would pay a 
fixed sum to the state and then exact from the cultivators as much as possible. See Wingate, 
Preliminary Settlemenl, Lahore, 1888, p. 19. 
" Mirza Kamal-ud-Din, Khulasat-u-Tmarikh (Urdu Translation of Mirza Saif-ud-Din's Akhbarat) 
Srinagar, I974,pp. 156-7. 
Diwan Kirpa Ram, Majnnii Report Riyasat-i-Jammit-wa-Kashmir (1872-73), (Urdu), Srinagar, 
Report, p 16; Wingate, p. 19. 
"' See Lawrence, Valley, p. 391. 
Revenue Regulation came up with tlie same recommendation^^ which makes it clear 
that the realization of revenue continued mainly in kind. 
The payment of revenue in kind was designed for the state's monopoly in 
grain and a general ban on trade between villages and towns. The government 
controlled the sale of food articles required by the city people, and restricted the 
monetization of economy. The government even monopolized the sale of rice, the 
staple food of people in Kashmir.^ ^ The cultivation of rice had been for long the best 
option available to the cultivators because it suited the climate and physical 
characteristics of the valley. During the Sikh and the Dogra periods, rice cuhivation 
occupied nearly three-fourths of the cultivable area and accounted for about 50-60 
percent of the total revenue of the state.^° Its yield per acre was much higher as 
compared to maize and wheat, the other major grain-crops. Gulab Singh, realizing the 
importance of this staple crop, introduced the system of collecting shali (paddy; as 
land revenue) in large granaries in the city and then selling it in retail through 
government officials.^' The sale of other crops like wheat, maize, pulses, oil-seeds, 
cotton, etc., was also controlled by the government. The transportation charges, it 
should be mentioned, were not borne by the state but by the cultivators: at the time of 
collecting revenue from the peasants 16 traks^^ would be taken as 1 kharwar but at 
the time of sale of the grain only 15 traks were supposed to make up a kharwar, thus 
savmg 1 trak per kharwar for transportation charges. 
The state fixed the rate of shali (unhusked rice) at 2 chilki rupees per kharwar, 
much below the market rate. Private stores ofjagirdars used to sell grain at 6, 8, 10 
or 12 chilki rupees against Government rate of Rs. 2 chilki per kharwar.^'^ A close 
study of this system of supplying cheap shali to the town beneficiaries reveals that it 
was a tactic on the part of the state to secure the loyalty of the urban elite 
-^ The Jamnm and Kashmir Land Revenue Regulation (Regulation 1 of 1980 Sambat), Resolution No. 
16, 13" September, Jammu, 1923 
-'•'Robert Thorpe, pp. 17-18. 
'° Vigne, Travels in Kashmir, Ladak, Iskardo, Vol. 1, London, 1842, pp. 309-10; Foreign Department 
(Secret-E), NAl, 1883, File No. 86. 
^'Wingate, p. 17. 
'^  1 trak was equal to 6 seers or approximately 5 kg of the Imperial scale. 
" Ibid.; Charles E. Bates, A Gazetteer of Kashmir and the Adjacent Districts ofKishtwar, Badrcnvar, 
Jammu, Naoshera, Punch, and the Vallev of the Kishen Ganga. Calcutta, 1873, Reprint Srinaaar 
2005, pp. 100-1. • ' F ' 5 > 
'Demi-Official letter from F. Henvey to A. C. Lyall', 5"' Dec 1879, Foreign Department (Secret-E) 
NAl, 1883, File Nos. 83-85, p.2. 
34 
(constituting the official class), especially the Pandit community, the Pirzadas and the 
Sayyids, the collaboration of whom was crucial for the survival of Dogra raj. This 
phenomenon also explains why the state and its officials were adamant on collecting 
revenue in kind. In 1891, after much hesitation when the state finally did make 
regulations for the sale of grains, and abolished its monopoly in grain as well as 
enhanced the hitherto prevalent rates, the city people raised hue and cry against it. ^  
Consequently, the Regulations could not produce the desired results. 
The monopoly of the government in the sale of food grains and other articles 
of household plus the appropriation of revenue in kind were probably the most 
important reasons that prevented the formation of money-economy and perpetuation 
of the barter system. Thus, as late as 1890s we find instances where salaries to 
officials were paid in grain, oil-seeds, maize, cotton, and singharas (water-nuts). 
Bazaars, banias and bankers were virtually absent." Wingate, the first Settlement 
Commissioner, thus, rightly called the Government 'a farmer' and 'a gigantic 
bania'.^^ 
The repercussions of the taxation system and infringement of basic rights of 
peasants initially surfaced in the form of abandoning of agriculture, and the flight of 
peasants to neighbouring territories of British India, mainly Punjab.^^ There is also 
evidence that at times, especially during the famine of 1878-79, the discontented 
people resorted to burning down of certain houses in Srinagar believed to be grain 
. 40 
stores. 
It was not only the peasants and cultivators who were over-burdened by taxes 
and exactions, the boatmen, basket-makers, shoe-makers, butchers and grave-diggers 
too were not spared. In 1871-72, taxes from boatmen and grave-diggers amounted to 
Rs. 1510 out of the total revenue of Rs. 113,916"" or 1.33 percent of the total taxes 
-'^  'Supply of Shali (Unhusked Rice) to Srinagar', Foreign Department (External), NAI 1892 File Nos 
98-109. 
•"^  Lawrence, Valley, p. 243. 
The city people, however, used to advance money to the peasants without any interference from the 
government. Wingate, p. ! 7 
'' General Report on the Census of India, 1891, London, 1893, p. 72. It would be pertinent to mention 
here that the peasants could migrate only covertly because of a ban on emigrations This rule was 
revoked only after the great famine of 1877-78. 
*° Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAI, 1883, File No. 86. 
"" Lawrence, Falley, p. 236. 
levied. The available evidence suggests that the boatmen were able to sustain 
themselves mostly on singharas (water-nuts) as their staple food, and even this was 
taxed by the Government; the amount being realized was 30000 to 35000 annually 
or 0.45 - 0.52 percent of the total taxes extracted. Due to their abject conditions, the 
boatmen were often compelled to sell their children, the rate being 100-200 chilki 
rupees and the transactions were even recorded on stamp paper which implies that the 
government supported the sale of children.''^ The tax on butchers amounted to Rs. 
8500 in 1848 (9 percent of the total tax levied on artificers),'*'' and in 1871-2 it had 
expanded to Rs. 21,750 (or 19 per cent of the total tax on artificers)."^ Ceremonies or 
rituals like marriages and circumcision were also not spared from taxation. The cost 
of a marriage license was three to eight rupees and the wretched peasants would often 
find it hard to marry off their sons or daughters.''^ A long list of other taxes is 
mentioned in some sources but the non-availability of statistics renders it challenging 
to determine what their magnitude was.'*'' However, a startling fact which needs to be 
mentioned here is that around 1852 A.D. Gulab Singh replaced the Hari Singhi rupee 
(value 8 annas) with chilki rupee (value 10 annas).^^ It may be deduced, therefore, 
that even if the rates of taxes (in rupees) remained same as before, the tax-payers had 
to pay more annas. 
The shawl-weavers, shawl merchants, artisans, boatmen, gardeners, butchers, 
etc. constituted the bulk of urban population. The other component much smaller in 
number was comprised of karkhandars.^'' government employees, officials, etc. Every 
individual of the working classes was obliged 1o pay heavy taxes irrespective of his 
actual earnings. It would be necessary to discuss briefly the conditions of shawl 
industry, for it was the major component of the urban economy of Kashmir. 
During the rule of the Afghans and the Sikhs, the shawl industry employed on 
an average 30,000 to AQfiOO persons and contributed 30-40 percent of the total 
••- Ibid. See also, Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAI, 18S3, File No. 86. 
"" Ibid. 
•**' Mirza Saif-ud-Din, Akhabarat, Persian MS (13 Vols.), Vol.1, ff. 62-64, quoted from Hangloo, 
Agrarian System, p. 77. 
"*' Lawrence, Valley, p. 236. 
•"^  Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAI, 1883, File No. 86. 
^^ See Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladak, Calcutta, 1890, rpt. New Delhi, 1974, pp. 114-15. Lala 
Ganeshi Lai, Siyahat-i-Kashmir, The Punjab Government Record Office, 1846, pp. 35-38. 
Thorpe, p. 31. The value of chilki rupee was later on (for which no specific date is available) 
enhanced to \6 annas. 
Employers of shawl-weavers. 
revenue to the state.^^ The Dogra state reorganized the Dagh-shawl department 
during early 1850s, the sole purpose of which was to supervise the working of, and 
levying taxation on, the lucrative shawl industry/' The figures show that the state 
imposed a tax of 24-25 percent on manufactured shawls, and an additional 7 percent 
export duty.^ ^ Moreover, an annual tax of 48 chilki rupees was levied on karkhandars 
for each weaver in their employ but the tax was reduced to 36 rupees in 1867. The 
monthly pay of a shawl-baf was at most 3-5 rupees, and he was not allowed to 
relinquish his job.^ '^  To make things worse, no shawl-baf was allowed to purchase 
more than eight kharwars of shall yearly which would make him and his dependents 
survive on fruits and water-nuts for a considerable part of the year. The monopoly 
of rice, as already discussed above, would come in handy here. Thus, the prices of 
food grains could be kept low by monopolizing its sale and paying subsistence wages 
to shawl weavers and other artisans. 
The exorbitant taxes imposed on shawl industry led to a gradual decrease in 
the production of shawls (see Table 1.4). But two other factors also significantly seem 
to have affected the shawl trade—one was the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War 
of 1870, which diminished the demand from France,^^ and another was the famine of 
1878-9 in Kashmir which wiped out about one-third of the city population, mostly 
shawl-weavers. According to an estimate, there were 30,000 to 40,000 weavers in 
Srinagar before the famine, and only 4,000 of them survived the famine." 
Furthermore, the massive emigrations of shawl-weavers to Punjab and N.W.F. P. for 
an alternate livelihood seems to be the important reason of this decline.^^ By late 19"' 
century, several colonies of Kashmiri shawl weavers, numbering about 1833, had 
emerged in Amritsar, Ludhiana, Nurpur, Gurdaspur, Sialkot, and Lahore. According 
See D. K. Ram, Majmui Report, pp. 32-33; William Moorcrofi, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces 
of Hindustan and the Panjab, in Ladakh, Kiindtiz. and Bokhara (2 Vols.), Vol. 2, John Murray, 
London, 1841, p. 123. 
'^ D. K. Ram, Majmui Report, pp. 32-33. Originally the department was established by the Afghans. 
"Bates, pp. 57 and 101. 
" Robert Thorpe, p. 28. 
'•^  Ibid., pp. 28,35,38-9. 
Ibid., pp. 30 & 33. The ceiling on the quantity office to be purchased by shawl-weavers was raised 
to 11 kharM'ars in 1867. 
Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam. Rights and the History of Kashmir, Delhi, 2004, p. 
153. 
Mr. Henvey's Revised Note on llie Famine in Kashmir, Foreign Department (Sec-E), NAI, 1883 File 
No. 86. 
'^  See 'Administrative Reports from Punjab', Foreign Department, K. W. Pol. A Sept 1879 NAI 
1879, File Nos. 63-69, p. 2. 
to the 1891 census, 9,000 Kashmiri shawl-bafs were residing in Punjab. According 
to 1911 census there were 177,549 Kashmiri Muslims in the Punjab [mostly shawl-
weavers]; the figure went up to 206,180 with the inclusion of settlements in the 
NWFP.'^ ° At the dawn of the 20"^  century, this famed industry was virtually dead in 
Kashmir, and any exports, if at all, were made to Europe and America as "curiosities 
and draperies".''' Its decline would have led to serious unemployment problem. In 
fact, there is indication that a large number of shawl-weavers, after the decline of 
industry, moved into other venues of employment especially agriculture, carpet 
industry, and silk industry. 
For the generation of revenues, the state even encouraged trafficking of girls 
and prostitution. For instance, in 1871-72, the tax levied on prostitutes amounted to 
Rs. 1900 [1.67 percent of the total].^^ For every license granted for the purchase of a 
girl, the Government tax was 100 chilki rupees.''^ In 1880, there were 18,715 
'registered prostitutes' in the Valley.^ '* The state went so far in this 'trade' that it 
legalized the institution of prostitution through 'The Public Prostitutes Rules 1921'. 
However, the mounting pressure from the public compelled the State Assembly to 
pass the 'Suppression of the Immoral Traffic in Women Bill' in 1934 which banned 
the practice of prostitution in the State. Its applicability however, remains 
questionable as the existence of trafficking business is mentioned in a Government 
Report published as late as 1940s.'^ ^ 
In addition to the excessive taxation system, the Dogra state perpetuated the 
system of forced-and-unpaid labour (begar) through which the peasants were forced 
to do any work of the state and its officials without providing them any 
remuneration.'''' Among many forms of begar, the most conspicuous practice was the 
Gilgit beggar—named so because the peasants were used as porters for carrying 
^' General Report on the Census of India, 1891, p. 104. 
° Kashmiri Conference ke Chauthe Salana Jalse ki Ruidad, 26 and 27 April 1913, Gujratiwala, Lahore, 
1914, VT 3890d, India Office Library (henceforth lOL), quoted in Ayesha Jalai, Self and Sovereignty: 
Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850, London & New York, 2000, p. 352 fn. 
*•' The Imperial Gazetteer of India, The Indian Empire, Vol. 3 (Economic), New edition, Oxford, 1909, 
p. 217. 
^' Lawrence, Valley, p. 236. 
*"' Robert Thorpe, p. 55. 
*"" Foreign Department (Sec-E), NAJ, 1883, File No. 86. 
Shri Ganga Nath Commission Report on Administration ofJammu and Kashmir, Jammu, 1943, pn 
56-7. 
" F'orced labour was exacted in Kashmir right from ancient times but, as evidence suggests, it was 
paid, although meagrely. 
goods and supplies for the Kashmir troops stationed in Gilgit, the liarsh northernmost 
outpost of Kashmir state. The cultivators were also used as porters by European 
travellers and British officials*'^  and during official visits of government employees.^^ 
Other tasks where we see forced labour being used were the collection of saffron, 
cutting and transporting of wood/*^ carrying telegraph posts and letters, and 
construction of buildings as well as cultivation of wastelands. 
However, it seems that the applicability of begar was not uniform but several 
sections of the society enjoyed exemption from it. There is ample evidence to show 
that the whole Hindu population, including Sikhs, the religious clerics, whether 
Hindus or Muslims, ^ ^ and the people inhabiting the city were exempted from begar. 
Wastelands recently brought under cultivation,^^ and lands granted or sold to 
influential persons as jagirs were also exempted.^^ The exemption thus provided to 
some sections indicates that the burden of the begar fell on the Muslim cultivators of 
the Khdisa lands. Thus, out of a total population of 814,241 (according to the census 
77 
of 1891), 414,241 persons would be actually liable to begar. 
The consequences of begar were manifold. Large number of deaths are said to 
have occurred during the Gilgit begar ^ ^ We hear of many villages being sold for 
paltry sums of Rs. 50 - 300, and the inhabitants 'willingly' offering themselves for 
sale in order to obtain exemption from forced labour.^ The sale and purchase of 
villages eventually led to some inevitable consequences like absentee landlordism, 
^'' See, Mrs. Hervey, The Adventures of a Lady in Tartary, Thibet, China and Kashmir, (3 Vols.) Vol, 1, 
London, 1853, p. 229; E. F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, London, 1893, p. 5. 
""^  'Financial and other Administrative Reforms in the Kashmir State', Foreign Department, Secret-Ii, 
NAl, May 1893, File Nos. 112-125. 
'^ ' M. Ishaq Khan, History ofSrinagar (1846-1947), Srinagar, 3"' ed., 2007, Appendix-A. 
™ Diary of Pundit Khunya Lai, Lalwre Political Diaries, Vol. VI, p. 260, quoted in Ibid, p. 61. 
•" Maharaja Fratap Singh, Diary of an Inspection Tour to tlie Gilgit Road, Civil and Military Gazette 
Press, Lahore, 1893, pp. 12 and 26. 
' ' Ibid. 
" Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAI, 1890, File Nos. 106-110; Lawrence, Valley, p. 412. 
''' At times, the artisan class was also used in begar See, E.F. Knight, p. 68; Robert Thorpe, p. 44. 
These were known as Chak lands, and the assignee was known as Chakdar. 
''^ Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAI, 1890, File Nos. 106-110. 
About half of the population lived in lands which were, by rule, exempted from begar. Lawrence, 
Valley, p. A\2. 
''^ Although the statistics are not known, all the contemporary sources state the huge loss of deaths 
occurring during Gilgit begar. Even Pratap Singh, the 3"* Dogra Maharaja, al^er a visit to Gilgit, 
admitted to the occurrence of large-scale deaths. Maharaja Pratap Singh, Diary, p.6. See also, E. F. 
Knight, p. 67; Arthur Neve, Thirty Years in Kashmir, London, 1913; Tyndale Biscoe, Kashmir in 
Sunlight & Shade, London, 1922, pp. 237-38. 
" Foreign Department (Secret-E), NAI, 1890, File Nos. 106-110; £ F. Knight, p. 68. 
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extension of social exploitation, fragmentation of land holdings, and the absence of 
full utilization of cultivable land.*° It appears that the practice of forced labour also 
significantly contributed to the depopulation of villages. The presence of deserted 
villages along the road to Gilgit is confirmed not only by E.F. Knight but by 
Maharaja Pratap Singh himself^' 
The early writers on Kashmir history often state that under the pressure from 
colonial authorities the Dogra Darbar abolished 'more serious evils' of begar in 
1891,^ ^ and eradicated it fully during 1920s.^ ^ However, the available evidence 
clarifies that neither the state nor the colonial officials were unaware of the 
'exigency' of perpetuating begar, and never actually wanted its abolition. The state 
tried to introduce certain measures, what it called 'reforms', like requisitioning a 
fixed number of men from each village (1889),^ ^ paying 4 annas to begaris for every 
working day (1893),^^ levying of begar cess (1893),^^ and use of ponies instead of 
men for carrying loads (1893).^ ^ But such steps do not seem to have achieved much 
success as is amply corroborated by the begar incidents that took place during the late 
19"^  century and the first four decades of 20"^  century.^^ 
It is a well-known fact that the majority of inhabitants of the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir were Muslims. According to the census of 1891, out of a total 
population of 814,241 inhabiting the valley, Muslims numbered 757,433 or a little 
over 93 percent while the number of Hindus was 52,576 or 6.46 percent. Rest of the 
^^  Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, On the Way to Golden Harvests - Agricultural Reforms in Kashmir, 
Jammu, 1951, p. 50. 
*' Pratap Singh, p. 13; E. F. Knight, p. 255. 
^^  Lawrence, Valley, p. 451. 
^^  P.N.K. Bamzai, A History of Kashmir, Delhi, 1962, p. 606. 
'^^  That the British officials posted in the state felt the 'compulsion' of carrying on with this practice and 
never actually wanted to abolish begar in its entirety is well understood by their recommendations and 
writings. For details, see Wingate, pp. 37-8; Lawrence to State Council, IS* Sep. 1892, File No. 164, 
JKA; 'Report of Mr. Logan on the Financial Conditions of the Kashmir State', Foreign Department, 
Secret-E, NAl, 17"'Nov., 1892, File No. 513-E. 
*^  Wingate, pp. 37-8. 
** Pratap Singh, p. 23. 
^' 'Financial and other Administrative Reforms in the Kashmir State', Foreign Department, Secret-E, 
NAf May 1893, File Nos. 112-125. 
^^  'Article in "Pioneer" (5* Nov 1890) regarding the system of begar'. Foreign Department, Secret-E, 
NAI, Dec 1890, File Nos. 152-158; Pratap Singh, p. 7 
'^^  'Representation of the President Anjuman-i-Nusrat-ul-Islam, Srinagar, regarding the Backward 
Condition of N4uslims of Kashmir', General Department, JKA, 1923, File No. 1609/G-84; 
Memorandum sidwiitled to llie Viceroy, Lord Reading by Prominent Muslims of Kashmir, 1924; 
Orders on the Recommendations contained in the Clancy Commission's Report, Ranbir Government 
Press, Jammu, 1932, p. 39. 
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population comprised of Sikhs (4,092), Christians (132) and Parsis (8).^" Muslims 
masses, whose labour and services formed the financial bedrock of the Dogra state, 
were sidelined to the extent that they possessed virtually no share and say in the 
governing system of the state. Thus, in 1860-61, among the 45 hig jagirdars, 40 were 
Hindus and only 5 were Muslims; the clerks in the employ of Maharaja's government 
numbered 5,572 and not a single of them belonged to the majority community; 
employees other than clerks totaled 7,782 among which Hindus occupied 7,500 
positions while the share of Muslims was just 282 or just 3.62 % of the total. 
The policy of manning the entire administration by the Kashmiri Pandits 
continued for long. During the late 1880s the Dogra bureaucracy was almost 
exclusively drawn from the Pandit community. Regarding the revenue administration, 
Lawrence informs us that right from patwari (village accountant) to Hakim Ala 
(Governor), with hundreds of officials in between, posted in offices at tehsil, district 
and provincial levels, all the slots were filled up by Pandits.*^^  Where the state could 
not employ Pandits, officials would be 'imported' from Brhish India especially from 
Bengal and Punjab.'^ 
The Dogra rulers showed their regional and religious prejudice by excluding 
Kashmiris, especially Muslims, from recruitment in military too. The army was 
composed of Dogras, Sikhs and Gurklias recruited mostly from the Jammu region and 
the Punjab.^'' In an attempt to suppress the fighting spirit among Kashmiris, the 
Maharajas even banned the tradifions of mimic warfare which the people used to 
exhibit for entertainment purposes.^^ Thus, as aptly observed by Mridu Rai,'any 
display of bellicosity even if only for entertainment was to be put down in 
Kashmir.''"^ 
The employment of Pandits in the government services especially in the 
revenue administration could well be attributed to their proficiency in Persian, the 
language used in revenue administration, right from Zain-ul-Abidin's reign (1420-70 
' Lawrence, Valley, p .224. 90 
•" Bates, p. 30. 
'" Lawrence, Valley, pp. 400-01. 
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Prem Nath Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir- Cultural and Political from 
Earliest Time to Present Day, c. 1954, reprint, Srinagar, 2003, pp. 129-0; Bates, p. 61 
Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladak, Calcutta, 1890, ipt. Vivek Publishing House, New Delhi 1974 nn 
140 and 151. ' ' i K-
% ^^V' " ' ."*°" Knowles, A Dictionary of Kashmiri Proverbs and Sayings, Bombay, 1885 pp 3-4 
Mndu Rai, p. 55. ^ f ^ -
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A.D.)." Coming down to Dogra period they were far ahead of Kashmiri Muslims 
partly due to the lack of any attempt by the Dogra rulers to introduce secular and 
modem education, and partly because of the insistence of Muslims, under the 
influence of religious leaders, only on traditional learning which could hardly entitle 
them for claiming government jobs. Much due to the apathy of the state, the first 
school imparting modern education was opened in Kashmir by a Christian 
Missionary, Robert Clarke in 1864, followed by another school in 1880 by J. Hilton 
Knowles. The state on its part did practically nothing to establish any schools or 
provide education till late 1890s. In the field of education even the colonial state, 
which was otherwise so critical of the Dogras, did not exhibh much interest. It may 
be assumed that the colonial project of education for creating low-paid babus had no 
relevance in Kashmir as 'the supply of educated Pandits [was] already far greater than 
the demand'.''^ The gap in the 'supply' of officials, if any, was fulfilled by bringing in 
literate persons from British India, a process which apparently gained momentum in 
the wake of increasing British intervention into the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir 
state towards the close of the 19 century. 
The Dogras always followed a policy of discrimination or rather of hostility 
against the Muslim subjects. They paid no attention to their religious susceptibilities 
but also used 'Hindu' religious symbols as legitimizing tools.'^ In 1847, the Maharaja 
confiscated certedn jagirs previously granted to mosques and shrines, and decreased 
the amount of grants to certain Muslim shrines.' In 1866-67, Maharaja Ranbir Singh 
granted chak lands to Hindus on certain conditions with one condition being that 
'they remain Hindus and accept service nowhere else ... '"" The state even banned 
the slaughtering of cows in Kashmir. Officially the punishment for cow-killing, till 
1860s, was death which was then converted into life sentence'°^ and then into 10 
years imprisonment.'°^ Sometimes the ptniishment meted out to the person who 
Henriette M. Sender, the Kashmiri Brahmans (Pandits) up to 1930: Cultural Change in the Cities of 
Northern India, Ph.D. thesis. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981, pp. 42-3. 
''^ Lawrence, Valley, p. 229. 
"'' For details, see Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects in which she argues, supported by 
exhaustive documentation, that the Dogra state took recourse to religious symbols, religious traditions 
and Hindu kingship theories to transform - or at least, project- Kashmir into a 'Hindu' state. 
'°° Pandit Kunhya Lai, Lahore Political Diaries, 1847-49, Allahabad, 1915, pp. 268-9, quoted in Mridu 
Rai, p. 52. 
'"'Wingate,p.28 
'°l Robert Thorpe, p. 51. 
'"•' Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 138 
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committed the 'crime' of slaughtering cow, or was merely suspected of causing any 
injury to a cow, included cutting off of noses, chopping of ears, burning the 
offender's hair or even torching of houses.'^ "^ Ranbir Singh was more 'determined' in 
stopping the injury to cows. In one instance, he is said to have 'slit a woman's tongue 
for beating a cow which had torn some clothes she had hung out to dry'.'°^ In another 
incident of showing his religious zeal, he instructed Hindus and Sikhs to patronize 
shops of Sikh butchers instead of Muslim shops.""' 
The state also attempted to put a check on the proselytizing mission of 
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Muslims and Christians by depriving the converts of their ancestral property. The 
restrictions on religious freedom became one of the many criticisms that the colonial 
officials made against the Dogra rulers of Kashmir as they regarded it not only an 
impediment in the way of working of Christian Missionaries but also a violation of 
Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 which declared that the rulers 'abstain from 
all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of [her] subjects...' 
The hopelessness and frustration owing to the state structure of dominating 
over the people and depriving them of their just rights kept the sullen for a long time. 
This was to gradually change at the turn of the century. 
Saif-ud-Din Diaries, quoted in Bawa Satinder, p. ] 76. 
1°^  Hugh Rees James Papers, pp. 56-7, lOL, quoted in Mridu Rai, p. 101. 
Saif-ud-Din Diaries, quoted in Bawa Satinder, p. 177. 
'*" Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 138. 
'"' John Malcom Ludlow, Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India, London, 1859, p. 198. 
Table 1.1 Revenue & Taxes from different sources, 1871-72 
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Zar-i-kazaya (fines on 
petty quarrels and wedding 
fees) 
Singhara (water nuts) 
Government ponies hired 
Taxes on shops, artificers 
and others 
Tax on Mint 
Stamps 
Tax on Khateenah 
(circumcision) 
Miscellaneous fines 
Tax on sale of sheep and 
goats 
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Sale of wild fruit 
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Sale oi'chenar leaves 
Tax on Ferries 



































Source: Walter Lawrence, Val/ey, p. 236 
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Table 1.2 Additional taxes (for officials) imposed bv the State 
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Tax on apricot trees 
Nazrana, tax for support of temples, tax for 
dispensary, etc 
Tax on Maharaja's temple 
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ofRS. 10 value) 
Ponies (Rs. 18 paid for pony of 
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Source: 'Position of Cultivating Classes in 
W. Secret-E, NAI, Feb 1890, File Nos. 106-
Kashmir, 1890', Foreign Department, K. 
110. 
^ ^^  This particular village actually did not grow any apricot trees, File Nos. 106-110, NAI, p.2. 
^ ^ ^ Sala: A tax for Sanskrit schools; Jalus was a tax on account of expenses of English visitors 
V^hethcr the chakdar cultivated the land or not, the cultivator was obliged to pay the amount 
assessed. 


























































Sources: Pir Hassan Shah Khoiyami, Tarikh-i-FIassan, Vol. 1, reprint, Srinagar, 1962, 
p. 362; Diwan Krishan Lai, A Short Account of Kashmir, Lahore, 1848, p. 67; Walter 
Lawrence, Valley, London, 1891, pp. 236, 375-76; The Imperial Gazetteer of India, 
Vol. XV. New Edition, Oxford, 1908, p. 133; 'Henvey's Revised Note on Famine', 
Foreign Department (Secret-H), NAI, 1883, File No. 86. 
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Chapter 2 
Early Phase of the Struggle: Political Mobilization 
The oppressions suffered under the Dogra regime made the people restive and 
gave rise to mute resentment against the government. But the discontent remained under 
the surface and there was hardly any manifestation of it. In 1885, Jammu and Kashmir 
came under the de facto rule of the British Indian Government when they succeeded in 
imposing a Resident on the state. Finally in 1889 the then Dogra ruler, Maharaja Pratap 
Singh, was deposed and a State Council was appointed, subject to the control of the 
Resident, to run the administrative affairs of Kashmir. 
During the period of the State Council (1889-1905), two significant developments 
took place in the Valley; the introduction of the Land Settlement (1889-90) and the 
opening of the Jhelum Valley cart road during early 1890s. While the former restored 
some of the rights of cultivators in land,^ the latter connected the Valley with the rest of 
India via Rawalpindi and Abbottabad, thereby fostering links between the people of 
Kashmir and the people living elsewhere in the country, besides a gradual increase in the 
economic activity."* Perhaps it was to some extent a consequence of this that some 
consciousness developed among the people of Kashmir regarding their rights. Initially, 
the Kashmiri leadership focused on improving the educational status of the people. The 
Anjuman-i-Nusrat-ul-Islam, established by Mirwaiz Rasool Shah (head-preacher of Jama 
Masjid, Srinagar) in 1899, originally as a revivalist organization for 'purifying' 
Kashmiris of their social evils, made significant contribution by emphasizing the need of 
modern education for the upliftment of Kashmiri Muslims. It worked on the lines of 
Contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), which did not contain any clause for the 
appointment of a Resident, the British authorities, right from 1847, constantly tried to impose a Resident on 
the Kashmir State to safeguard their strategic and commercial interests. The first two Dogra rulers 
successfully resisted such moves but the British were finally successful in establishing the Residency in 
1885. In April 1889, Maharaja Pratap Singh was deposed on the pretext of maladministration, and for the 
alleged possession of some secret correspondence with Russia and Afghanistan. Foreign Department 
(Secret-E), NAI, Pros. March 1889, File Nos. 80-98. For details, see Dilip Kumar Ghose, Kashmir in 
Transition - 1885-1893, Calcutta, 1975. The powers of the Maharaja were partially restored in 1905 and 
ful ly in 1921. The Times of India, March 7, 1921. 
^ See Chapter 1, pp. 5 and 7. 
•' Lawrence, Valley, p. 386. 
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Anjiiman-i-Himayal-id-hlam of Lahore, of which Sir Muhammad Iqbal was a member. 
The emphasis of the rehgious leadership on Western education, and not only the religious 
education, seems to have been much influenced by Sayyid Ahmad Khan's insistence on 
western education for Muslims. Incidentally, the All India Mohammadan Educational 
Coni^rence established by Sayyid Ahmad Khan just 13 years earlier, in 1886, had some 
Kashmiris as members. Prominent among these were Abdus Samad Kakroo, Moulvi 
Abdul Salam Rafiqi and Khan Bahadur Ghulam Sadiq, who insisted upon the Mirwaiz to 
upgrade his recently-established primary school to the higher level. 
The attempt to impart modern education was not only for developing 
consciousness among the Muslims regarding their rights, but also to make them eligible 
for administrative posts and other government services. But the period of Residency rule 
(1889-1905) seems to have led to a greater import of Punjabis and Englishmen from 
outside the state. According to P.N. Bazaz, well-known Kashmiri leader and 
contemporary writer, 'Armies of outsiders trailed behind the officers from the plains with 
no more interest than to draw as much as they could, and then to depart leaving behind 
their kindred as successors to continue the drain...'^ More than anything, the replacement 
of Persian with Urdu as the language of administration in 1889^ "necessitated" the 
bringing of officials from outside Kashmir since Kashmiri Muslims were far behind in 
the field of education while Pandits too were "ilUterate" as far as Urdu was concerned. 
Thus, even after having obtained education, the locals particularly Muslims, could not get 
their due share in the governing structure, and as such the initial demands of the educated 
leaders concentrated on improving the educational policy of the government and 
revisiting its job recruitment rules in favour of the meritorious candidates of the majority 
community.** 
In view of such state of affeirs, the quest for addressing the problems of the 
Kashmiri people seems to have gained momentum during the early 20"' century. While 
For details, see Nazir Ahmad Dar, Anjuman-i-Nusral-ul-Islain: An Overview, Sriiiagar, 2005 
Ibid, p. 2. 
" Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 135. 
^ Administration Report ofJammti and Kashmir Stale. 1893-94, p. 46. 
" 'Memorial presented by the Representatives of the Kashmiri'Musalman to Sir Louis Dane' Secretary in 
the ho2-cign Department, Foreign Department (Internal-A), NAl, Pros. February 1907 Nos 163-64 
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emphasizing tlie role of local leaders, it needs to be seen how far the political leaders 
from Punjab mediated with the government of the state to build a case for addressing the 
grievances of the people of Kashmir. During the 1^ ' decade of the 20"' century, while the 
state was undergoing alterations in its social, political and administrative fields, with 
varying influences on the life of the people of Kashmir, the Indian National Congress had 
begun assuming a mass base. The method of making pleas and petitions during the initial 
phase, generally known as the 'moderate phase' (1885-1905), now began developing into 
a more vigorous campaign of asserting the nationhood of Indian people. The most 
important role in this regard was played by the Swadeshi movement kicked off as a result 
of the Partition of Bengal in 1905. Already by the end of 1905, political unrest had spread 
to the United Provinces, Punjab, Madras Presidency, Bombay Presidency and the Central 
Provinces; widespread agrarian riots were reported from Rawalpindi and Lahore too. 
In order to analyze the political mobilization in Jammu and Kashmir during this 
period, it is important to discuss the developments in the Punjab and the adjoining 
regions at that time. The spreading of the wave of nationalism to Punjab gave rise to 
agitations and demonstrations against the British Government, which were sometimes 
followed by riots. Besides the pan-Indian sentiment against the colonial government, 
matters of local significance were instrumental in precipitating the matters in Punjab. In 
October 1906 the Punjab Government introduced the Punjab Land Colonization Bill 
which sought to abolish its policy of sale of land in the canal colonies to colonists and the 
hitherto followed policy of granting proprietary rights to the land-holders.'" Ironically, in 
November 1906, the Government announced an enhancement of 25 per cent on the 
occupier rate (the charge on canal water) on the Bari Doab Canal running through the 
districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore.'' To make things worse, cotton-crop (the 
major crop grown in the imgated areas) failed that year and during the preceding one. 
These issues aggrieved the colonists, and the grievances appear to have triggered the 
" Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India, 2004, reprint New Delhi 
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agitation. An overwhelming support from the peasantry of neighbouring areas broadened 
the base of agitation. 
More significantly, some 'extremist' Congress leaders, notably Lala Lajpat Rai 
and Ajit Singh, assumed the leadership of the peasant agitation, heightening the anti-
colonial sentiment, thereby integrating h with the greater, national cause of India. The 
Zemindar, an Urdu weekly (later converted into a bi-weekly), under the editorship of 
Siraj-ud-Din Ahmad, strongly took up the cause of the peasantry, and mobilized the 
public opinion in their favour.'^ The movement was marked by huge gatherings, one such 
gathering in Lyallpur on 3 Februaiy 1907 comprising of as many as 10,000 agitators— 
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.'^ Moreover, the colonists passed resolutions for boycott of 
British goods and a no-revenue campaign. The government responded to such moves 
with repression. To suppress the movement the state resorted to a ban on public meetings, 
gagging of press, arrest of leaders causing 'disaffection' and deportation of Lajpat Rai 
and Ajit Singh to Burma.''' Lord Minto, the viceroy, vetoed the Land Colonization Bill on 
26 May 1907, while the Punjab government dropped its idea of enhancement in water 
rates. By June the agitation had been silenced through dual measures of repression and 
reconciliation.'^ Although the agitation in Punjab was short-lived, yet due to this 
movement the peasants, in the words of Mridula Mukherjee, 'learnt the power of 
sustained and organized agitation and its capacity to make the authorities to concede their 
demands.''^' 
The popular sentiment of agitation, after assuming greater proportions in Punjab 
during early 1907, began to penetrate into Jammu and Kashmir, sharing its border with 
Punjab. The official correspondence and some government reports clearly indicate that 
the popular mood in Kashmir had turned against the government, not only because of the 
growing problems they faced but also by the awareness of the happenings in the 
neighbouring region. In May 1907, Francis Youghusband, the Resident in Kashmir 
informed the Secretary to the Government of India that during the late 1906 and early 
" Ibid, p. 365. 
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1907 'most unfortunate and highly objectionable proceedings ha[d] taken the form of 
public demonstration.'''' In another letter to the secretary he talks of the news of riots in 
Punjab reaching the natives of Kashmir through telegrams, sometimes written in 
'cypher', and through some 'seditious' newspapers. He also warned the government for 
taking steps to curb the seditious sentiments in Kashmir lest 'the electricity in the 
atmosphere would discharge itself in a dangerous explosion.' 
Regarding the political mobilization of the peasantry in Punjab, talk of sedition in 
army, and rioting, the official perception seems to have been of a certain secret plot to 
overthrow the government.'^ Cultivating such perceptions, the Resident in Kashmir 
apprised Maharaja Pratap Singh of the situation. It appears that the colonial officials in 
Kashmir were apprehensive not only of a full-fledged agitation against the government 
but also of a supposed armed revolt. The officials seemed particularly anxious about the 
European visitors, ladies and children in Kashmir.^° Notwithstanding the talk of a 
restlessness and excitement among the people, the Maharaja was hopeful that the 'real 
leaders' were entirely against the agitation.^' The Maharaja obviously had in mind the 
upper-middle class leadership of Kashmir who were at the time inclined more towards 
securing reforms in education and administration than distancing themselves from the 
state. 
The State, much like its colonial masters, attempted to quell the discontent among 
the people by imposing stringent laws and ordinances. Thus, in May 1907, the Maharaja 
issued a proclamation strictly prohibiting the involvement of any of his subjects in the 
'seditious' meetings or movements. People showing mere 'interest in, or an express[ion] 
of sympathy with, persons connected or associated with such movement' were to be 
subjected to 'severest punishment', not to speak of a person who would directly make a 
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speech or participate in meetings causing disaffection?^ Tiie text of the proclamation 
testifies that any meeting could be declared anti-government and any person seditious. 
The authorities in Kashmir followed a method similar to what the colonial authorities 
adopted in Punjab. Sant Singh, a master in the Jammu College, was reportedly expelled 
permanently from the State, for taking part in a 'seditious' meetmg. 
At that time, privately-owned press was completely non-existent in the state 
because of the official ban on the establishment of press and publication of newspapers, 
thereby hampering the growth of pubHc opinion in the state.^ '* During this period 
newspapers or periodicals in the Valley were coming in from other parts of the countiy, 
especially Punjab. The earliest newspapers which informed the general public in the 
country about the happenings in the Kashmir, and the people of the state about the 
conditions elsewhere, were the ones coming from Lahore, Amritsar, Gujranwala and 
Sialkot, the prominent among them being Urdu newspapers Zamindar, Hindustan, 
Inqilab, etc. The educated people in the state used to make groups and subscribe to these 
newspapers. The Resident, in order to prevent the dissemination of new ideas in Kashmir, 
persuaded the Maharaja to censor the press reports coming into the valley. One of the 
newspapers 'India' (published at Gujranwala, a district of Punjab bordering on Kashmir) 
quickly attracted the attention of the Resident. The 'incitement' clearly to be looked as 
sedition and a signal for armed struggle against the State went as follows: 
'Swaraj cannot be obtained witiiout unsiieathing the i'worJ...Natives should 
bring their physical force into play...they should take note of what has been done 
in other countries in the same way...the number of Englishmen throughout the 
country does not exceed 150,000; how many English officers are there in each 
" 'Proclamation of Maharaja against the Participation of Kashmiris in Agitation', Foreign Department 
(Secret-I), NAI, September 1907, File Nos. 9-39. 
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district? If the people were to make up their minds they could easily subvert 
British rule in India [in] one day.' 
Apart from banning the entry of the Punjab newspapers into the state, the 
evidence shows that three college students were expelled from the state for one year on 
the charges of collecting subscriptions for the editor of PanjabeeJ'^ a Punjab-based 
newspaper then under prosecution for sedition.^^ In order to ensure that the 
discontentment in the state is controlled, the newspapers like India, Panjabee and 
Zamindar were banned from entering the premises of the state. The latter two 
newspapers, h must be noted, had vigorously campaigned in favour of peasantry during 
the 1907 agitations in Punjab,"^ The ban on newspapers continued for several years to 
come. Hence, in 1909 another person, named Vishawanath, faced expulsion from the 
state for possessing a number of books and copies of Inquilah, Hindustan, Panjabee, 
India and Swaraj which contained information and news believed to be 'inimical to the 
Govermnent'.^''' The Maharaja proudly declared that following the in the foot-steps of the 
British Government was his 'sacred duty' and gaining favourable attitude of his masters 
his intention while deciding on issues which could spread disaffection against the 
Colonial government or his own.'^ ^ The colonial authorities had already subjected the 
Press in India to censorship through the Newspapers (incitement lo offences) Act 1908.^' 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Francis Younghusband, the Resident in Kashmir, is seen 
showering praise on the Maharaja for his 'wise' decision of prohibiting the flow of 
information into and out of the state.^ ^ True that Muslims were the worst sufferers of the 
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Dogra oppression, but the State was not prepared to tolerate the voice of dissent whether 
that came from any quarter—MusHm or non-MusHm. 
In such a state of affairs, the pohtical organizations outside the borders of the state 
were bound to play an important role in the political awakening in Kashmir. One of the 
earliest organizations based outside the state of Jammu and Kashmir which not only 
brought to light the grievances of Kashmiris but also attempted to pressurize the state 
government to improve the miserable conditions of the people was the All India Kashmiri 
Muslim Conference [or Muslim Kashmiri Conference]. The organization was originally 
founded on 18 February 1896 as Anujuman-i-Kashmiri Musalmanan-i-Lahore. Its 
founding members were Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Mian Karim Baksh, Mian Shams-ud-Din, 
Moulvi Ahmad-ud-Din and Khawaja Rahim Baksh. It was revived in early 20* century in 
and was mainly composed of Kashmiris residing in the Punjab province. Nawab 
Salimullah Khan and Nawab Habibullah Khan of Dhaka were also associated with the 
Organization for some time. The Conference, having witnessed the recent political 
fervour in the country, started a campaign for pressurizing the Maharaja in conceding to 
their demands as well as of their compatriots in Kashmir. The latter, as has been already 
discussed, were barely allowed to put their demands before the government. It is also 
well known that the people living in regions directly under the British rule had a relative 
liberty of forming political associations and the privilege of criticizing the policies of the 
government through the English and Vernacular press. The Princely States in general, on 
the other hand, did not enjoy such rights.^'' 
The Kashmiri Muslim Conference, therefore, passed several resolutions and 
presented memorandums to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to address the problems 
suffered by the people of the state. In 1912, the Conference demanded improvement in 
the educational system of Kashmir and asked the government to employ Muslim teachers 
in state schools, which could provide motivation for Muslims to send their children to 
schools. Being aware of the dearth of educated Muslims in Kashmir, the Conference 
demanded that if there were not enough educated Muslims in Kashmir, these could be 
" M.Y. Saraf, Kashmiris Figlit for Freedom, (2 Vols.) Vol. 1, 1819-1946, 1" published 1977, reprint, 
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brought in from other parts of the country to teach in schools. The Maharaja, however, 
justified his position by replying that the definition of 'state subjects' introduced in 1912 
'prevented' him from conceding to their demand of employing Muslims from other 
places.^^ His response was in clear contradiction to the fact that the employment of 
Punjabi Hindu officials had increased during the rule of the Residency (1885-1905). 
In its fourth annual meeting held in Gujranwala in 1913 the Conference reiterated 
its demands presented in 1912. This time the Maharaja responded that the employment of 
Muslims in schools was not a prerequisite for attracting Muslims towards education. He 
drew the members' attention to the fact that usually Pandits had been teaching Persian to 
Muslims since a long time.^ ^ Although the Maharaja was not wrong in stating the latter 
fact, the dismissing tone of his reaction reflects the attitude of the ruling class towards the 
question of imparting education to Muslim subjects. Back in 1907, some anonymous 
'Representatives of Kashmiri Musalmans' had suggested the Government that the 
imparting of adequate education to Muslims was the only way to provide them a share in 
the administration, and that the Hindu teachers, being the beneficiaries of the state's 
policy, neglected the Muslim students." Besides the demand for education, the Kashmiri 
Conference, in the same session (1913), passed a resolution impressing upon the 
T O 
Maharaja to abolish its policy of not recruiting Muslims into his army. It is apparent 
from the resolutions of the Conference that the nature of the demands was not political 
but related to education and employment. Demands of similar nature had also been put 
forward by the All India Mohammedan Conference in its annual session held in 
December 1908 in Amritsar which was presided over by Nawab Salimullah Khan while 
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Iqbal was its member as well as the General Secretary of the Kashmiri Muslim 
Conference at that time.'^ ^ 
The concluding years of the second decade of 20"^  century saw a great stir in 
political scenario of India. While the Lucknow session of the Indian National Congress 
(1916) led to the merger of the 'moderate' and 'extremist' wings of the Congress, it is 
also significant for the famous Lucknow Pact between Indian National Congress and All 
India Muslim League by which the Congress endorsed the separate electorate system 
granted to Muslims in 1909.'*° The World War I was going on since 1914, and the Indian 
National Congress enthusiastically supported the war effort of Britain. Some 
Representative Indian Leaders in London, notably Lajpat Rai, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, S. 
P. Sinha and others assured the Secretary of the State that "the Princes and people of 
India will readily and willingly co-operate to the best of their ability and afford 
opportunities of securing that end by placing the resources of their country at His 
Majesty's disposal" for "a speedy victory of the Empire."'" Mahatma Gandhi, who had 
recently started his political career in India, had also contributed in this direction. In 
1914, while in London, he had raised a volunteer ambulance corps, and in response to the 
appeal of Lord Chelmsford at the War Conference in Delhi in 1918, he had 'struggled at 
the cost of [his] health to raise a corps in Kheda' to be recruited in army.''^ In providing 
services to the British his belief was that 'it was possible by such services to gain status 
of full equality in the Empire for [his] countrymen."'*^ 
During the war the British Govermnent of India appointed a committee in 1917 
headed by Justice Sydney Rowlatt to investigate 'revolutionary crime' in the country and 
make recommendations for its suppression. On its recommendations, the Imperial 
Legislative Council, despite a unanimous opposition by the Indian members, passed a bill 
on 18 March, 1919, known as 'Anarchical and Revolutionary Crime Act'. The Act 
authorized the government to arrest or search any Indian without warrant or confine 
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suspects without trial for renewable periods of up to a year/'' The Act was condemned by 
the political leadership of the countiy. Several members of the Council, including Jinnah, 
as a mark of protest, resigned from their positions.'*''' But Gandhi, in order to broaden the 
movement, launched a Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act, and gave the call for an all-
India hartal to be observed on 6 April. Although he had anticipated it to be a non-violent 
resistance, his arrest on 9 April provoked a series of violent protests in Delhi, Bombay, 
Ahmedabad, and Amritsar. 
In Punjab the agitation took a violent turn due to the arrest of Gandhi, and the 
deportation of Saif-ud-Din Kitclew and Dr. Satyapal, two popular Punjab leaders, on 10 
April. The Punjab government employed repressive measures and on 13 April, 379 
people were killed when Lt. Governor Michael 0 ' Dwyer ordered the opening of fire on a 
public gathering in the enclosed courtyard of Jallianwala Bagh (in Amritsar). The 
incidents that took place during this time had a long-lasting effect on the political milieu 
of the country. 
About the same time, the Muslims were also disappointed by the methods adopted 
by the British in the War. In the beginning the Muslim leaders, with the exception of Ali 
brothers and Maulana Azad, supported the war.''^  The Muslims in general had provided a 
large number of recruits in the army.'*' But the decision of the Entente powers to 
partition the Ottoman Empire, the last extant Muslim Empire in the world, and the 
abolition of the position of Khalifa, believed to be the temporal and spiritual leader of the 
Muslim community, irked the feelings of Muslims. 
Gandhiji took advantage of the situation and impressed upon the Muslims of India 
to join the non-cooperation movement against the British. At the same time, he asked the 
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Hindus to join hands with the Muslims and make use of that 'opportunity of a Hfe time.' 
In its 35"^  session held in Amritsar in 1919, the Congress, taking note of the Jallianwala 
Bagh massacre and the Khilafat issue, approved of the non-violent, Non-Cooperation 
programme of Mahatma Gandhi.^' Finally, the Congress adopted the non-cooperation 
resolution on 1 August 1920, thereby launching a common struggle against the colonial 
government with a three-fold goal of correcting the 'Khilafat wrong', the 'Punjab wrong', 
and the attainment of Swaraj.^" 
The non-cooperation movement spread to a large part of India, even those regions 
which were hitherto not influenced by the movement initiated by the Congress. The 
links between Kashmir and British India had further improved by then. Although there 
was a ban on meetings and public speeches in Kashmir,^ '* yet a political stir in the state 
could not be prevented by the government. There is evidence to show that a Khilafat 
Committee was formed in Srinagar in 1920 and it was running on the directions of the 
Lahore Khilafat Committee.^^ The meetings related to the Khilafat issue were first held in 
the Jammu province. Since the issue centered on an issue regarded as religious, Imams of 
several mosques in Jammu declaredy//2aJ as was 'being done all over India in connection 
with Khilafat Movement.'^^ In accordance with the decision of the Central Khilafat 
Committee to observe fest and hartal on March 19, the Muslim leaders in Jammti also 
organized meetings to persuade people in complying with the decision of the Khilafat 
Committee. Accordingly, hartal was observed by the people on March 19.^ ^ Excepting 
the hartal observed by the general public, the meetings were generally held in mosques. 
In Kashmir proper the earliest evidence of a meeting held during this period is 
from the Idgah^ ** area where several Muslim leaders addressed a public gathering on 
August 1, 1920, coinciding with the adoption of non-cooperation resolution by INC. The 
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meeting, said to have been attended by about twenty thousand people, was presided by 
Moulvi Mohammad Yousuf Shah. Other prominent leaders included Syed Mubarak Shah 
Andrabi and Baba Qamar-ud-Din. ^^  Another such public gathering is said to have been 
organized at Nawa-Kadal, a suburb of Srinagar on August 5, 1920.*''^  It may be noted that 
the issues raised in the early meetings appear as being devoid of any political nature, and 
centered only on the cry of "Islam in danger". However, there are two notable features of 
the latter meeting which we do not find in the earlier meetings. One is the participation of 
30 to 40 Hindus and second is the raising of Khilafat Fund of Rs. 25-30 on the spot which 
was made a routine in the subsequent meetings and then dispatched to the Punjab 
Khilafat Committee.^' The participation of Hindus in the latter meeting and raising of 
funds illustrates not only the presence of Hindu-Muslim unity but also the enthusiasm 
among the people of Jammu and Kashmir to publicly support the policies of the Congress 
and the Khilafat Committee. 
The public gatherings and speeches that marked the political milieu of Kashmir in 
1920 seem to have receded shortly after the government, on the pretension of maintaining 
law and order, used repressive measures by invoking the 'Proclamation of Maharaja 
against the Participation of Kashmiris in Agitation (1907)', 'the Regulations on the 
Formation of Associations (1911)', 'the Seditious Meetings Regulation (1914)' and a 
nev/ly declared 'Prohibition against the Delivery of Speeches (1922)'. The last one put a 
ban not only on political speeches but also on religious speeches; it especially put 
restrictions on those coming from outside the state to preach or deliver lectures in 
Kashmir.^^ Meanwhile, the Non-Cooperation movement was withdrawn after the Chauri 
Chaura incident that happened on 4 February 1922. Furthermore, as far as the question of 
Caliphate was concerned, the Khilafat movement lost its relevance due to the abolition of 
the office of Khalifa in Turkey in 1924.''^  Consequently, the agitations going on in 
Kashmir in 1920 petered out soon. Nevertheless, 1920s occupies an important place in 
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the political history of Kashmir because of the occurrence of certain incidents which 
could be considered landmarks in the liberation struggle of the people of Kashmir. 
One of the many events that took place during 1920s in Kashmir was the agitation 
in the Silk Factory of Srinagar in 1924. Earlier, during 1870s, while the shawl industry 
was in a state of decline, the government finding the silk a profitable commodity 
monopolized its trade. It also established a silk factory in Srinagar provided with modern 
improved machineiy.'''' As an incentive, a guild of silk-rearers was created and its 
members enjoyed exemption from forced labour.^ ^ The silk industry proved to be one of 
the leading sources of revenue to the state.^'' By 1920, it accounted for 33% of the total 
revenue of the state. 
From 1909-1914, the export of raw silk from Kashmir constituted 17-18 per cent 
of the total magnitude of raw silk export from India.^ ^ A considerable portion of 
population of the city and its surrounding areas was employed in the silk industry as silk 
rearers and workers in the factory. The available statistics show that in 1901 the industry 
provided employment to more than 3,500 persons as workers (in the manufacturing units) 
and 5,500 as rearers of silkworms.^' The number of the workers rose to 5,000 by 1904-5 
while the number of agriculturists employed as rearers increased to 14,427 by 1906-7 
which further increased to 41,552 by 1911-12.'° In 1915, out of a total of one miljjon 
persons employed in the production of silk tliroughout India, Kashmir silk industry was 
the major employer; the number being 80,000. These figures are an indication of the 
significance of silk industry for both the people and the government. 
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However, despite the significance of the silk industry for the state's income, the 
condition of the worlcers seems to have been miserable. The entire labour force of the 
Silk factory was composed of Muslims but the whole administration was manned by non-
Muslims. Almost all the contemporary writers have cited instances of corruption among 
the officials of the factory. Even after bringing such occurrences to the notice of the 
government the situation most likely remained unchanged.^^ More importantly, the wages 
of workers during the 2"'' decade of 20"' century were as low as 8 annas a day, which 
seem to have been too insufficient for subsistence particularly in the wake of a rise in 
prices of commodities, especially food grains, during the period of the War and 
afterwards. The discomfort created by the rise in prices, low wages, and corruption 
among the staff of the factory must have agitated the workers and they struck work in 
July 1924.^ '* The workers, joined by a large number of people, took out processions to 
make their demands heard. 
Due to the gravity of the situation the government stationed troops in the factory, 
and when the workers assembled in the premises of the factory, an open confrontation 
took place between the workers and the troops. The troops opened fire on the protestors 
killing seven and injuring forty.^ *' The official version records that the troops were 
provoked by the protestors when the latter began to attack the officials. The government 
considered the agitation to have been 'engineered' by some external elements and to 
bring the 'disorder' under control Dogra police arrested 25 leaders of the working class.'''' 
Although the workers protested against the arrest of their leaders and demanded their 
immediate release, fifteen of them were awarded six months' imprisonment.^^ Another 
protest, participated by about 1,000 workers, was staged at Hazuri Bagh, which was also 
put down by repressive measures, in which several dozens of protestors were injured. 
After the pronouncement of the sentences on the leaders, the government announced a 
^' Saraf, p. 333. 
" Wardle, pp. 52-3 and p. 150. 
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wage increase of 6 paisa [a little less than 1 anna] per day per head7^ Another agitation, 
influenced by the silk factory unrest, simultaneously took place in Anantnag which, 
according to Ghaush Lai Kaul, a writer (later a journalist) and an eye witness to the 
agitation, was put down by the government in a month 'by show of a machine gun' and 
by dismissing a Tehsildar and exiling the 'anonymous' leader of the protestors. 
A remarkable feature of the agitation was the participation of people not directly 
linlced with production of silk, and the active role played by Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam, 
which had hitherto maintained its position more or less as a reforming and educating 
body.^' This was the only reported agitation launched by the Kashmiri working class in 
early 20"' century, despite the resentment that was already there for a long period; the 
influence was likely cast by the recent political mobilization that had taken place during 
the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movement in 1920. It would be probably wrong to 
assume that the agitation was launched randomly without there being a deep resentment 
among the workers for a long time, and without they being inspired by the recent political 
upheaval in the country. Interestingly, a poem Saqi Nama written by Iqbal, in Nishat 
Garden Srinagar, on his visit to Kashmir in June 1921, gives a description of the 
miserable condition of workers and labourers of the Srinagar Silk Factory, and presence 
of anger among them against the authorities. It is reported that Khwaja Saad-ud-Dm 
Shawl and Sayyid Noor Shah Naqashbandi, two prominent Kashmiri leaders at the time, 
had a meeting with Muhammad Iqbal in 1921 at his residence in Lahore. Iqbal is said to 
have regretted that 'while in India Hindus and Muslims were jointly resisting the foreign 
rule, in Kashmir the Muslims are living in miserable conditions and the Hindus 
dominated eveiy walk of life.' He advised them to offer a united front and \mndi jihad 
against the Dogra autocratic ruler.^ ^ The fact that the workers rose against the injustice 
being meted out to them shortly after the people had participated in the Non-Cooperation-
Khilafat movement shows that the inspiration was the national movement which was 
going on against the British colonialism. 
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It was during the 1920s, argues Chitralekha Zutshi in her book Languages of 
Belonging, which deals with the realization and articulation of the Kashmiri Muslim 
identity, that the emergent Muslim leadership of Kashmir felt the need of 'internal 
unification... if Kashmiri Muslims were to acquire political recognition commensurate 
with their numbers and have their demands taken seriously by the state.' In this process 
of unification an important role was played by the greater contact with British India as 
also by education, the rising influence of press, and general economic discontent in the 
valley.^ '* Despite the ban on certain newspapers, and the general censorship of others, the 
circulation of newspapers coming from other parts of India into the state showed a 
gradual increase during the first two decades of 20* century. The number of newspapers 
coming into the Valley by 1921 was as high as 2,000, including 450 English language 
newspapers. The number of books circulated in the Valley in English, Urdu and Kashmiri 
during the same period to 858, 266 and 30 respectively.^^ Eventually, the emergent 
leadership of Kashmir was likely to be influenced by the political discourses of the Indian 
national movement. Consequently, a certain change in their attitude towards the state is 
clearly visible during 1920s which assumed defiant proportions once the leadership 
realized that their past demands, which predominantly dealt with education, had not been 
conceded. This attitude is manifest in a memorandum which the then Kashmiri leaders, 
belonging to urban upper-middle class, submitted to Lord Reading, the Viceroy, on his 
visit to Srinagar on 14"'October 1924^^—the year in which the silk factory agitation also 
took place. 
The signatories of the memorandum were Khawaja Saad-ud-Din Shawl, Khawaja 
Hassan Shah Naqshbandi, Mirwaiz Kashmir Maulvi Ahmadullah, Mirwaiz Hamdani, 
Agha Syed Hussain Shaha Jalali, Mufti Sharif-ud-Din and Khawaja Hassan Shah 
Maliandi. The memorandum, consisting of seventeen points, reiterated the demands made 
already by Muslims during the past 3 decades about education and employment but what 
is remarkable is that several of its demands are of a nature which neither the state was 
prepared to listen to nor the people had demanded ever before. The document mentioned 
^^  Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, Permanenl Black, 2003, p. 156-7. 
'^ Munshi Mohammad, Census of 1921, Vol xii. Kashmir, Part 1, Report, p. 26, quoted in Ibid p 157 
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figures concerning the employment of Muslims on gazetted and non-gazetted posts in 
several departments. The memorandum noted that out of the total number of gazetted 
posts in the Valley, which stood at 476, non-Muslims numbered 421, and they drew a 
salary of Rs. 16,50,114 while Muslims were occupying just 55 posts (11.55 per cent of 
the total) and drawing a salary of Rs. 1,47, 852 (8.22% of the total).*^ It demanded the 
restoration of proprietary rights in land, abolition of begar (forced labour), restoration of 
confiscated lands to the original holders, and removal of restrictions on the import of 
grain. It also demanded that the mosques and graveyards, which were encroached upon 
by the state, be returned to the control of Muslims.^^ It may be noted here that Pathar 
Masjid, one of the old mosques in Srinagar, had been used as a granary throughout the 
preceding decades of Dogra rule. The demand for its return to Muslim community had 
been made before by Mirwaiz Rasool Shah in 1900 in a petition to Maharaja Pratap 
Singh.^ ^ 
Contrary to the 'conventional' memorandums and pleas made to the rulers in the 
past, the memorandum of 1924 appears to have gone far beyond its 'limits' by 
demanding an impartial tribunal to inquire into the causes of unrest in the silk factory, 
and give a fair trial to the arrested leaders. It also demanded that adequate representation 
be given to Muslims in the State Council. The memorandum went so far as to demand the 
establishment of an elected Legislative Assembly which should also work as a 
Constituent Assembly for drafting a constitution for the state.'" Apparently, demands of 
such political nature seemed more than what the Maharaja could tolerate. 
Although the memorandum made certain political demands and it may be taken as 
a sign of growing politicization among the leadership of Kashmir, N.N. Raina, a 
contemporary writer, raises a question about how and why the memorandum was 
prepared. According to him, the memorandum was a brainchild of the Resident in 
Kashmir, who provided 'assistance' to the Kashmiri leaders primarily to divert the 
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attention of public from the recent killings in the Silk Factory.^' This argument cannot be 
rejected outright because the memorandum does contain a clause which demands that 
'since the rights of Muslims are insecure and trampled under by local authorities, the 
Resident be made answerable for their plight.'^^ In other words, the memorandum 
demanded that the Resident be given more powers than the local authorities; how could 
he be deemed answerable if he had no powers? However, it would also be simplistic to 
attribute the clause as being engineered by the Resident because the people of the states, 
be it Jammu and Kashmir or any other state, had always viewed, owing to the colonial 
policy of showcasing their supposed 'benevolence', the British as 'saviours' as against 
the ruthless, autocratic local rulers. The lauding rhetoric of British 'benevolence', and 
their intervention into the affairs of princely states as part of the 'modernizing' project, is 
clearly visible in almost all the early works that have been written on 19" and 20 ' 
century Kashmir. 
After the Viceroy forwarded the memorandum to the Maharaja, the latter 
appointed a three-member committee consisting of Rai Bahadur Col. Janak Singh (a 
close relative of the Maharaja), Chaudhari Khushi Muhammad Nazir (Revenue Minister) 
and Mr. Glancy (the State Minister for Finance and Police). While the Commission did 
not find any 'truth' in the memorandum, or any suggestion worth considering, the 
Maharaja seems to have been more displeased because the memorandum was presented 
to the Viceroy without taking permission from the ruler,^ "^  and that too when his powers 
had been returned to him by the colonial government just 3 years back (in 1921). As a 
'punishment' for presenting the Muslim community's grievances the government, in 
March 1925, banished Saad-ud-Din Shawl from the State. Hassan Shah Naqshbandi lost 
his jagir which used to fetch him 4,000 rupees while his son Khawaja Noor Shah, who 
was a tehsildar, was dismissed from the post. Hassan Shah Jalali lost his office of Zaildar 
(Territory Officer). The others, who had signed the document, including the two 
Mirwaizs, were let go with warnings, and their official privileges were withdrawn.*^ '^ 
^^^  N.N. Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Maneuvers, New Delhi, 1988, pp. 66-7. 
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According to M.Y. Saraf and P.N. Bazaz, the episode was followed by serious 
restlessness among the people living in Srinagar and its vicinity but the government 
managed to suppress it by handing over the city to army. 
For decades, the Dogra government tried its best not to allow any 'outside' 
political influences getting hold of the Valley. In tune with this attitude the Maharaja, as 
early as 1918-20, attempted, with sheer repression, to stop the flow of Bolshevik 
literature into the Valley.^'' Following this policy of isolating the Valley from the rest of 
India, even 'Deshbandhu' C.R. Das, who attempted to visit the valley due to health issues 
in 1923, was not allowed to enter the boundaries of the state unless he would give an 
undertaking in writing that he would not involve himself in political stuff in the state. On 
refusal of giving such an undertaking the police officer who stopped him from going past 
the check post told him that he was just complying with the order(s) of the Maharaja. 
go 
C.R. Das refused to give the undertaking and, therefore, had to cancel his visit. 
Notwithstanding these measures, the borders of the Princely States were 
permeable to the dynamics of social and political processes taking place in 'British 
India'. Conversely, often the happenings in princely states—as in the case of Kashmir— 
would invoke reactions from the people and press in the British India. Thus, the news of 
events that happened in Kashmir in 1924 did not remain confined within the boundaries 
of the State. M.Y. Saraf informs us that meetings condemning the actions of the Kashmir 
government took place in Lahore, Jalalpur Jattan, Rangpur, Gujranwala, Wazirabad, 
Lyallpur, Karrianwala, Sangla, Simla, Amitsar and Dhaka.^ ^ The Majlis-e-Khilafat of 
Amritsar, presided over by Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, severely criticized the repression in the 
silk factory as well as the neglect of the British government in addressing the issues of 
people of Kashmir.'°° It was in Lahore that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, then studying 
in the Islamia College Lahore, came to know about the events of 1924. There he got a 
^ Saraf, p. 329; Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 132. 
1'^ ' Alastair iamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Oxford, 1993, p. 55; U.K. Zutshi, p. 101. 
H.D. Gupta, Deshbandhu Chittaranjan Das, New Delhi, 1977 pp 81-2 
' ' Saraf, p. 339. 
'"^  Zamindar, September 27, 1924, quoted in Saraf, p. 453. 
39 
chance of meeting Saad-ud-Din Shawl and Noor Shah Naqashbandi shortly after the 
former was exiled from Jammu and Kashmir.' ' 
While the local organizations in Punjab took direct or indirect part in criticizing 
the policies of the Kashmir govermnent and politicization of the Kashmiri masses, a 
striking fact is that prior to 1930s neither the Indian National Congress nor the Muslim 
League formally participated in the movements launched in Jammu and Kashmir or, for 
that matter, in any other Princely state. One of the probable reasons of this 'non-
interference' was that in spite of being considered an 'integral part of geographical 
India''°^ the States were conceived as legally 'independent entities under the British Law' 
and 'that part of India which [was] described as British had no more power to shape the 
policy of the states than it [had] (say) that of Afghanistan or Ceylon.'"'^ This poshion was 
probably an outcome of the British projection of geographical India, especially after 
1857, as a combination two political Indias—the "Brhish India" and the "Indian India"— 
and which they affirmed as late as 1928-29 through the Indian States Enquiry Committee 
Report.'"'* The non-interference policy of the Congress was possibly also affected by the 
varied social, political and other aspects of the states in which a uniformly extended 
political movement might have not produced desired results. Consequently, for the 
greater part of the freedom struggle the Congress, even with its all-India character, 
maintained distance from interfering into affairs of the states. 
The Indian National Congress in its Allahabad session held in 1908 declared that 
'the objects of the Indian National Congress are the attainment by the people of India of a 
system of Government similar to that enjoyed by the Self-governing Members of the 
British Empire and a participation of them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire 
on equal terms with those members.''°^ Again, in the Nagpur session (1920) the Congress 
reiterated that its goal was 'attainment of Swarajya by the people of India by all 
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legitimate and peaceful means'.'°^ Although the Resolution adopted in the said session 
called upon 'all the sovereign Princes of India to establish full responsible government in 
their states' '"^  it is doubtful whether at this juncture the Congress included the States in 
its framework o^ Swaraj. 
The official Congress policy of non-interference into the internal affairs of the 
states was time and again affirmed by Mahatma Gandhi in his political speeches and 
correspondences. In his speech at All-India States Conference, Belgaum, held on 30' 
December, 1924, he speaks about the cordial relations he had with the Princes, especially 
those of Kathiawad States. In his scheme of Indian Swaraj there was no idea of 
destroying the States but a guaranteed status for them. However, this did not mean the 
states' people would be put at the mercy of their Princes. Instead it would be made sure 
that 'they will also guarantee progressive and enlightened government to their 
subjects.''°^ In the 3'''^  Kathiawad Political Conference held at Bhanvnagar on S"' of 
January 1925, Gandhi spoke in detail about the policy of the Congress vis-a-vis the States 
in these words:" 
'1 have often declared that the Congress should generally adopt a policy of non-
interference with regard to Indian States... Just as the Congress clearly cannot 
have any effective voice in the relations between Indian States and the British 
Government, ever so will its interference be ineffective to the relations between 
the Indian State and their subjects...Still the people of British India as well as in 
the Indian State are one, for India is one... [But] so long as British India does not 
obtain Swaraj, so long will India, British as well as Native, remain in a distracted 
condition.' 
Regarding the position of the states in Ixiture India (after it had attained SM'araj), 
his belief was that:'" 
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'British India under Swaraj will not wish for the destruction of the Indian States, 
but will be helpful to them. And the Indian States will adopt a corresponding 
attitude towards British India... When the auspicious day of the freedom of 
British India arrives, the relation of ruler and ruled in the Indian States will not 
cease but will be purified. Swaraj as conceived by me does not mean an end of 
kingship.' 
At the same time, however, he criticized the Princes for their lavish expenditures 
and their incapability in mitigating their subjects' miseries. According to him. Princes 
were not independent proprietors but only 'trustees of their subjects for revenue received 
from them',"^ and they were wholly responsible for the welfare of their subjects. 
In sharp contrast to Gandhi, some Congress leaders, which included Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Pattabhi Sitaramayya and Vallabhai Patel, were insisting on adopting a radical 
approach towards the problem of States."'* In 1923, Nehru had a first-hand experience of 
conditions prevailing in Indian states, when he was invited by the Sikhs of Nabha to 
participate in the Akali protest"^ held against the stopping of a religious ceremony by the 
newly-appointed British Administrator. The British Administrator had replaced the 
deposed Maharaja of Nabha in the wake of a long drawn-out, violent quarrel between the 
States of Patiala and Nabha. The Sikhs from other parts of India had been sending jathas 
into Nabha, who were reportedly stopped, beaten by police and arrested. In one of these 
jathas, Nehru, along with two associates, A.T. Gidwani and K. Santanum of Madras, also 
moved towards Nabha and upon entering the boundaries were arrested. After a prolonged 
'trial' of few days, they were initially awarded six months imprisonment, but later on 
charges of sedition were imposed on them and sentenced to a total of two years or two 
and a half years of rigorous imprisonment."^ A few days later, however, their sentences 
"^  Ibid., pp. 12-4. 
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were suspended and they were asked to leave Nabha on the condition that they would 
never visit the State again. 
The Nabha episode provided Nehru with 'some insight into the realities of Indian 
States'."^ After facing the trial, in which neither laws were followed nor the accused 
were given any chance to defend themselves, he felt that 'if this was the state of affairs 
when more or less prominent politicians like us were concerned, what, I wonder, would 
be the fate of other less known.'"' With this experience Nehru concluded that the states 
were no less than a 'combination of feudalism and the modern bureaucratic machine with 
the disadvantages of both and the advantages ot none.' 
Although Gandhi declared at the outset of the Kathiawad Political Conference 
thait his views about Indian States need not be construed as the official Congress policy 
regarding the States' problem,'^' it appears that for other members of Congress, despite 
the opposition by leaders as prominent as Nehru and Patel, the possibility of an 
immediate change in policy towards states was remote, given the stand of Gandhi, who 
had in a short period of time contributed to the national movement more than any other 
leader could contribute. Gandhi's doctrine of non-interference would, in effect, become 
the policy of Gandhi's doctrine of non-interference, in effect, reflected the official policy 
of the Congress. Even though this basic tenet of non-interference remained in place 
during 1920s and 1930s, this is not to suppose that the States' people were completely 
disallowed to participate in the national movement. In fact, for organizational 
convenience, the country was divided into 21 Congress provinces and the states were 
incorporated in adjoining provinces on linguistic basis. A Resolution passed by the 
Congress Working Committee on January 1, 1920 provided that people of the states 
could become members of District Congress Committees and could participate in the 
' " ibid, p. 102. 
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Congress sessions as delegates without, liowever, disturbing the principle of non-
interference.'^ 
It was probably because of this non-interference policy that the political leaders 
within the States began to launch local organizations in their respective states to fight for 
their civil rights and liberties. These early organizations included the Baroda People's 
Conference (probably the first organization of its kind; 1918), the Kathiawad Political 
Conference (1921), the Deccan States Subjects Conference, the Rajputana Seva Sangh, 
the Bhavnagar Praja Parishad, and similar organizations known as praja mandals and lok 
parishads from several other states.'^^ It were primarily the members of these 
organization who thought of holding an All-India Conference of the state's people, an 
idea that became successful only in 1927 although the process of bringing together the 
state's people under one banner had been underway since March 1922 while the Non-
Cooperation movement was still going on. '^ '* On 17'" December 1927, in Bombay, 600 
delegates, besides 2,000 visitors, representing 67 out of the total 562 states (as identified 
by the Butler Committee Report, 1928), participated in a joint session and it was here that 
the All-India States' People's Conference was formally founded. The first session, held 
at the same time, was presided over by one Dewan Bahadur Ram Chandar Rao ' and 
prominent leaders such as N.C. Kelkar, A. V. Patv/ardhan, Balwantray Mehta, and P.L. 
Chudgar participated in it. 
The immediate work done by the All India States' People's Conference was the 
holding of meetings and discussing the problems of the States. The delegates belonged to 
some of the major Princely Slates from Rajputana, Central India, Cutch, Kathiwar, South 
Maliratta States and Hyderabad (Deccan).'^ ** As such, most of the states were yet 
unrepresented in the Conference primarily due to the absence of people's political 
organizations in these states. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was also one of the 
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unrepresented states at the Conference primarily because no political organization existed 
in the state at that time due to a ban on the formation of political associations. There were 
some associations working in the state but their work was limited to socio-religious 
sphere. One such association was the Youngmen's Muslim Association based in Jammu. 
It was founded some time during the early 20"' century but revived in 1922. Its objectives 
were the safeguarding of educational, social and religious rights of Muslims in the 
state,'^^ and a clear-cut policy of not indulging in political matters. Initially it worked, as 
mentioned by Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, one of its prominent leaders, as a charitable 
body for the construction and maintenance of Muslim funeral places {Jenazagah), and 
subsequently, it started a campaign against the shuddhi movement of Arya Samaj (which 
was aimed at re-converting to the Hindu faith the people who had embraced Islam or 
Christianity). In this endeavour, the Association worked on the lines already laid out by 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Hind and Maulana Ghulam Bhik Narang's Anjuman-i-Tableeg-ul-
Islam}^^ The first annual session of the Association, after its revival, was held in 1924, 
and during the following years it gained a good recognition in Jammu province. 
Although the prohibition on political activities prevented h from working on political 
lines, it was to play an important role in Jammu and Kashmir in the coming years. At the 
same time, there were certain socio-religious organizations of Pandits in the state. 
Sanatan Dharam Youngmen's Association was one such organization and it played an 
important role as an organization to counter the communal activities of Arya Samajists in 
the state. 
The pressures put on the state during the early decades of 20"^  century, however, 
necessitated a revision of the state's policies towards its subjects. In order to reduce the 
resentment among the masses Maharaja Hari Singh, after his accession to the thi^ one in 
1925-6, announced certain reforms to be introduced in the state. In 1926-7, the Maharaja 
put into effect the Agriculturists' Relief Regulation 'with the intention of freeing 
agriculturists from the clutches of money-lenders and protecting them from usurious rates 
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of interest.' He also introduced free and compulsory education in all municipal areas of 
the state in 1930, the demands of which had been made by the Memorandum of 1924 and 
repeatedly by the All India Kashmiri Muslim Conference.'^^ What is probably more 
significant is the redefining of the term 'State Subject' in 1927, the battle for which had 
been long carried on by Pandits and the Dogra Sabha.'^'' The struggle 'Kashmir for 
Kashmiris' was apparently launched by Pandits in the wake of an unprecedented influx of 
Indians and Europeans from other parts of the country for employing them in services in 
Jammu and Kashmir. The Pandits and the Dogra Sabha members were, thus, finally 
satisfied in 1927 due to the definition of 'Hereditary State Subject' according to which, 
'all persons born and residing in the state before the commencement of the reign of 
Maharaja Gulab Singh and also all persons who settled therein before the commencement 
of 1885 and have since been permanently residing in the country' would now be 
considered state subjects. It was accompanied by a decree from the Maharaja that no 
person whose credentials did not fit in the definition would be permitted either 
employment in state services or the right to purchase agricultural land in the state.''''' 
These reforms notwithstanding, the Muslim subjects still seemed to be less than 
satisfied apparently because their grievances were myriad compared with extent of 
reforms introduced. As a severe blow to the state's talk of development Sir Albion 
Bannerji, a Bengali Christian civil servant of the Government of India acting as Foreign 
and Political Minister in the Jammu and Kashmir Government for over 2 years, resigned 
on 15"' March 1929. In a statement to the Associated Press at Lahore he observed that:'^'' 
"Jammu and Kashmir state is labouring under many disadvantages with a large 
Mohammadan population absolutely illiterate, labouring under poverty and very 
low economic conditions of living in the villages and practically governed like 
'" Report of the Commission appointed under the Orders of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur, dated 
the 12* November 1931 to Enquire into Grievances and Complaints, 1932, p. 35. 
'"" M Ishaq Khan, History ofSrinagar 1846-1947: A Study in Socio-Cullural Change, Srinagar, 1978, p. 
161. 
'^ •^  Dogra Sabha, an elite, loyalist body, composed of upper-class Muslims from Jammu and Pandits from 
Kashmir, Ibunded in 1903 by Lala Hansraj under the aegis of Maharaja Pratap Singh himself, was 
established with the goal of "uniting' Hindus and Muslims of the state and making them loyal to the 
Maharaja. 
'"'^  Report of the Committee to Define the Term "State Subject", 1927. 
'^ "^  Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 135; Saraf, 349-50; P.N. Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, c. 1941, reprint, Srinagar, 
2002, p. 88. 
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dumb driven cattle. There is no touch between the Government and the people, 
no suitable opportunit}' for representing grievances and the administrative 
machinery itself requires overhauling from top to bottom to bring it up to the 
modern conditions of efficiency. It has at present little or no sympathy with the 
people's wants and grievances.. .There is hardly any public opinion in the State. 
As regards the press it is practically non- existent with the result that the 
government is not benefited to the extent that it should be by the impact of 
healthy criticism." 
This statement, obviously, must have created serious implications for the state 
since it came not from the civil quarter but from a civil servant of the colonial 
government. The statement not only provided a pretext to the British authorities but 
created a stir in the India Press. The statement was reproduced in many newspapers to 
highlight the maladministration in Kashmir. Several Urdu newspapers from Punjab made 
it a point to take a tough stand against the Dogra regime. Issues of Inqilah and Siyasat 
(Urdu dailies of Lahore) dedicated poems and couplets to Sir Albion Bannerji for his 
'enlightened' role in highlighting the issues of Kashmir masses. The Siyasat newspaper 
even published a 'Sir Albion number' to widely publicize his press statement.''^ ^ 
However, these newspapers did not criticize the Maharaja openly probably being 
apprehensive that such a step would lead to their prosecution. Certain newspapers, 
however, showed an open pro-Maharaja approach. The Paras, an Urdu daily operating 
from Lahore, while admitting that the statement of Albion Bannerji was not wrong, put 
the blame of maladministration on the officials rather than on Maharaja. It went so far as 
to claim that 'Muslims are to be blamed because they don't utilise the privileges bestowed 
by the Maharaja on them. Hindus are in no way more privileged than Muslims in the 
State; in fact, Muslims enjoy more privileges than Hindus."'""^ 
There is, however, one curious thing related to the timing of the press statement of 
Albion Banerrji. It came at a time when Russia had reached up to Pamirs, China was 
filled with anti-West zeal, and there was a talk of possible Russia-Afghanistan alliance. 
' " Siyasat, Lahore, 12 April 1929, General Department, JKA, 1929, File No. 1328/P-47. 
'-^ ^ See Inqilab, Lahore, 11 April 1929 and Siyasat, 13 April, 1929. 
'^"^ Siyasat, 12 April and 13 April 1929, JKA, File No. 1328/P-47. 
"" Paras, 27 April 1931, JKA, File No. 1328/P-47. 
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Moreover, recently, on December 31^' December 1928, Gandhi had given uhimatum to 
the Government to concede within 2 years the demand of Dominion status as envisaged 
in the Nehru Report of 1928. In such a state of affairs, if the Russian advance or Chinese 
aggression against the British in India was inevitable, the national movement in India also 
posed a threat. The colonial state was probably focused on the internal problems it faced, 
and any attempt on the part of Afghanistan, China or Russia to sabotage the colonial 
interests in the region could have proved fatal to its existence. Kashmir, being a meeting 
point of the three empires, again, offered a bigger problem to the British. An editorial in 
the Zamindar (Lahore) reproduced in one of the April issues of Guru Ghantal points out 
that the disclosure of Albion Bannerji's account of conditions in Kashmir was a 
deliberate attempt on the part of the colonial authorities to annex Kashmir.''" While such 
a contention is not corroborated by other sources, yet it is not unlikely that the British 
were at least tiying to strengthen their hold on Kashmir. There is evidence that during the 
first 5 years of Maharaja Hari Singh accession to the throne the relations between the 
ruler and the Resident had become somewhat strained.'''^ The declaration of the Maharaja 
that 'only state subjects would be appointed in state services' would have certainly 
annoyed the colonial authorities as literate persons from outside the state could no more 
be employed in the stale except in case of special permission from the Maharaja. In fact, 
Sir Albion Bannerji had come to the state to be its Prime Minister but could only be 
employed at a lower post''*'' since the Maharaja preferred a Prime Minister from among 
his state subjects. 
Meetings were arranged to publicize and deliberate on the Albion Bamierji's 
assertion. Meanwhile, the Kashmiri Muslim Conference organized its 13 armual session 
on 28* April 1929 in Ludhiana. It invited several Pandits to attend the session. Among 
others it sought to get support from Pandits Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehi-u, Sir 
Narindranath, Shiv Narayan Shameem, Raja Sir Hari Kishen Kaul, Kashyap Bandhu, Jia 
Lai Kaul, etc. As a gesture of bringing in even non-Muslims in its fold the members of 
'" Cunt Ghantal, JKA, File No. 1328/IM7. 
'''^  For details, see Foreign and Political Department, NAI, 1927, File No. 729-P. 
"" Foreign and Political Department, NAI, 1929, File No. 247-P. 
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the Conference were ready to change its name to All India Kashmiri Conference or All 
India Kashmiri National Congress.''*'' 
The Kashmir leadership took note of how Albion Bannerji critiqued the state's 
policies towards its subjects but there is no mention of any public activity or uproar being 
created by them in support of Bannerji's account possibly owing to the restrictions put on 
freedom of speech. It is possible that they remained silent owing to the apprehension that 
repercussions of 1924 memorandum incident might be repeated. 
However, it is also observable that secretly a new type of leadership was 
emerging in Kashmir whose attitude towards the state and the problems faced by the 
people would be of a different nature than it had been during the past. A group of young 
men educated from colleges and universities in Lahore, Aligarh, and other places having 
a first-hand experience of the rising tide of nationalism and its achievements against the 
colonial rule returned to the Valley in 1930. This batch comprising of Sheikh Abdullah, 
Ghulam Muhammad Bakshi, Muhammad Rajab, Qazi Saif-ud-Din, Ghulam Mukhtar, 
Hakim Ghulam Murtaza and others''*^ would play a significant role in the future politics 
of the state. Sheikh Abdullah, who was to later become a popular leader, listened to 
speeches of Jinnah, Gandhi, Ali Brothers and Motilal Nehru during his stay in Aligarh.''"' 
As Sheikh Abdullah has recorded in his autobiography, it was in Lahore that he got 
deeply influenced by eminent nationalist personalities like Sarojini Naidu, Maulana Zafar 
Ali Khan (editor of Zamindar) and Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal.''*^ During his stay in 
Aligarh Muslim University he saw Mahatma Gandhi for the first time who had been 
invited by the students of the University. He watched Gandhi with 'great admiration' and 
was greatly influenced by his 'magnetic personality'.''*^ 
As an initial step towards the realization of their goal, they set up a Reading 
Room in Srinagar, citing educational purpose as the reason, bul in reality it worked as a 
'""* General Department, JKA, 1929, File No. 1328/P-47, p. 12. 
"^ Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 46; Saraf, p. 354. 
"* Ibid., p. 352. 
''" Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, pp. 39-41. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 42. 
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lobby for discussing myriad problems faced by the people.'''^ It attracted a number of 
educated Muslims and its membership soon grew. The Reading Room (or Reading Room 
Party as it came to be known later) subscribed to several newspapers to get acquainted 
with the happenings in the outside world. It also subscribed to and made contacts with the 
monthly English magazine Indian States based in London, dedicated to discussing the 
problems suffered by the States' people.'^" However, outwardly the focus of the Reading 
Room Party remained on the problem of unemployment among the educated Muslim 
youth, and its attempts to make the situation better does not seem to have met with much 
success. 
However, the rising discontent among the masses unfolded only in 1931. A few 
incidents took place which infuriated people to an unprecedented extent. One incident 
was that in a village in Jammu, Muslims were refused access to a ground to be used for 
Eid prayers.'^' Another incident took place on 29 April 1931 in Jammu. While an imam 
(Muslim priest) was delivering the Eid khutba (sermon), a police sub-inspector, named 
Khem Chand, posted there to keep vigil on the activities of people, ordered to stop the 
khutba as soon as the imam spoke of Pharaohs as cruel and tyrant. According to the sub-
inspector, this was a transgression under the law and a sign of 'inciting sedition'. 
Another incident, of a graver nature, and which precipitated the crisis in Jammu region 
was the alleged desecration of Quran by a Hindu police sub-inspector who allegedly 
threw on ground a copy of the Quran which was in possession of his Muslim subordinate. 
Later reports revealed that the incident, although exaggerated, was not wholly untrue. 
Meanwhile, some pages of Quran were found in a public latrine in Srinagar. These 
incidents collectively injured the religious susceptibilities of Muslims and brought to 
head a crisis which was making its way up from past few years.'^^ 
In reply to a telegram of Muslim Kashmiri Conference to the Kashmir Darbar, the 
latter assured them of 'fullest sympathy with the religious susceptibilities of His 
'"'' Saraf, p. 354; Bazaz, ///5/0/7 o/Struggle, p. 142. 
'^ " Saraf, p. 355 
"'Ibid, p. 362. 
' " Ibid, p. 362; Abbas, p. 64; G.H. Khan, p. 125. 
' " Saraf, p. 365. 
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Highness' Muslim subjects'.'^'' In spite of that, an enquiry committee appointed for this 
purpose, headed by G.E.C. Wakefield, the Prime Minister, finished its proceedings on 
12"' of June but published the report after 17 days of delay.'^^ The Wakefield report, 
however, categorically stated that "no deliberate insult was offered to the Quran-i-Sharif 
and what happened was a pure accident".'^'' His report, quite expectedly, did more hami 
than good. Also, as eyewash, the Hindu constable, who was charged of insulting the 
Quran, was "retired" from the service even though he had completed almost 30 years in 
service and was nearing retirement. The Muslim constable was dismissed from the 
service on account of his "mis-statemenf of facts. These steps, as some newspapers 
warned the Darbar, would 'aggravate the feelings of uneasiness and discontent...' 
These incidents were ibllowed immediately by holding of meetings by the 
Muslim leadership of the state. In Jammu, the movement was spearheaded by the 
Youngmen's Muslim Association (Jammu) and the people, for the first time, openly 
defied the authority. It was during these days that Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah went to 
Jammu to meet the leaders there and after returning to Srinagar founded the Srinagar 
branch of the Youngmen's Association.'^^ The Reading Room Party, founded back in 
1930, and the Youngmen's Association (Srinagar) jointly demonstrated against the 
attitude of the government towards the Muslim religious issues. By then, Mirwaiz Yusuf 
Shah had already made several public addresses. On 8" June, he for the first time 
introduced Sheikh Abdullah to the audience.'^^ Several newspapers based in Punjab 
provided space for the news of incidents happening in Jammu and Srinagar, and 
eventually the Inqilah, the Siyasat and the Muslim Oultook were banned from entering 
into the State.'^ *' 
On 13" June, a meeting took place between Sheikh Abdullah, the Mirwaiz and the 
Governor of Kashmir, in which the latter asked them to present their grievances in 
''" Muslim Outlook, Lahore, July 1, 1931. 
' " Ibid. 
'^ ^ The Indian Nation, Patna, July 4, 1931, quoted in G.H. Khan, p. 127. 
^^^ Muslim Outlook, My \,\92>\. 
'^ ^ Abbas, pp. 67-8. 
'^' The Aina weekly, September 7, 1971 quoted in G.H. Khan, p. 127. 
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writing to the Maharaja.""' Meetings were held by the members of different organization 
of Kashmir on 18''^ , 20"' and 21^' of June. ""^  On 21*' June the most important meeting took 
place at Khanqah-i-Mualla, one of the most revered shrines of Kashmir, where the 
representatives of the deputation which drafted a memorandum addressed a huge 
gathering of about thirty thousand people."*^ Towards the close of the meeting, Abdul 
Qadeer, a non-Kashmiri Muslim and an employee of an English officer who was on his 
vish to Kashmir, delivered a fiery speech asking people to 'rise to the occasion and fight 
for the vindication of their honour.''^'* On 25"' June he was arrested giving rise to a 
serious resentment among the people.'^^ His trial took place in the central jail Srinagar on 
13"' July 1931. It is recorded in several accounts that several thousand Muslims gathered 
in the courtyard of the jail and intended to watch the trial. The authorities, however, 
denied the permission and, instead, as Saraf informs us, arrested five persons from the 
crowd. The restive people, after their demand that the arrested people should be released 
and they should be allowed to watch the trial was not entertained by the police, forced 
their entry into the compound. At this juncture the Governor ordered his troops to open 
fire which killed seventeen persons on the spot and injured nearly 40 others of whom five 
died later; making the total number of persons killed twenty two.""^ While Abdul Qadeer 
was deported from the state, the incident of 13" July had serious repercussions that were 
to echo in the state during the coming years. 




164 , Saraf, p. 373. 
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Chapter 3 
From Community Politics to National Struggle (1930-32) 
The events that took place in 1931, particularly the July 13' incident, have been 
revisited by every historian or scholar writing on the history of modern Kashmir. As the 
year occupies a very significant place in Kashmir's history of struggle for freedom, it has 
been eulogized to the extent that 'the events of 13 July have since achieved a near-
mythological status in Kashmir's political folklore...'' Prem Nath Bazaz, a veteran leader 
of the freedom struggle in Kashmir and a famed writer, for instance, claims that, Trom 
this day the struggle for independence and freedom in the most modern sense started 
openly."^ P.N.K. Bamzai, another well-known writer, has also propagated the same view. 
According to him, "It [was] from that date that the people took upon themselves the task 
of securing for themselves the right of democratic self-rule." Others writing on the 
Kashmir's history of the freedom struggle have probably taken these statement too 
literally. This has often led to the belief that the year 1931 was the starting point of 
political consciousness among Kashmiri masses. However, this trend more often tends to 
overshadow the nuances of the political movement which were taking shape in Kashmir 
during the preceding decades. It leads to the negation of the fact that during the preceding 
decades the Kashmiri leadership, without claiming to be political campaigners, but 
apparently being influenced, and at times guided, by the political events happening in 
other parts of India, had already built up their niches in the seemingly-invisible political 
atmosphere of Kashmir. What was needed was a stimulus which could induce them to 
raise their voice and mobilize the masses against the autocratic government; the 
brutalities of 1931 certainly provided them that much-awaited opportunity. The 
advancements, although not so promising, made in the fields of education and 
communication, the emerging new leadership coming from several universities and 
colleges of India, especially from Lahore and Aligarh, and having gathered first-hand 
experiences of the direct colonial rule and the changing political milieu of the time, were 
' Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Harvard, 2003, p. 19 
" Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 147. 
^ Bamzai, Cultural and Political History of Kashmir, Vol. 3, New Delhi, 1994, p. 732. 
'' See Cliapter 2 for details. 
possibly the greatest factors which provided an impetus to the resistance movement in 
Kashmir. 
A remarkable feature of this phase of the struggle was that while the earlier 
processions or agitations seem to have remained confined to the cities of Jammu and 
Srinagar and their vicinity only, the incidents of 1931 clearly cast their influence even on 
the countryside. This phenomenon is demonstrated by a series of state-wide agitations, 
processions, and public gatherings that marked the greater part of the period from 1930 
through 1932. At several places like Handwara, Baramulla, Sopore, Uri, Anantnag, 
Mirpur-Kotli, Poonch, etc., situated at considerable distances from the capital, people 
openly defied the authority wiiich had till now held them down with a stem hand. The 
state responded by shooting the protesters and, according to the contemporary accounts, 
killed over hundred persons (exact number is not known) in a short span of time. The 
agitation went beyond the boundaries of class character, including in it peasants, workers, 
businessmen, landed class, and even government officials. However, the movement was 
still largely unorganized due to the absence of any coordination group which could have 
consolidated it. But the extent of politicization among the masses can be gauged from the 
fact that even after the arrest of popular leaders viz., Chaudhaiy Ghulam Abbas, Sardar 
Gauhar Rehman, Mistri Yaqub Ali, Sheikh M. Abdullah, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar and 
Maulvi Abdur Rahim during the next 3 days after the 13"' July incident, the people did 
not give up.*^  Rather they protested against the imprisormient of the leaders and observed 
a complete hartal until the release of the leaders on July 31, 1931.^ Sheikh Abdullah 
records an episode v '^hich took place on July 13 immediately after several leaders anived 
to attend to the wounded protestors in the jail firing. He writes that, T was attending a 
victim who told me in a fast fading voice...Abdullah! I have done my duty. Now you 
proceed ahead.' Though the statement is from an individual, it does throw some light on 
the spirit of struggle that had taken birth among the people. It also appears that possibly 
the people had already seen a leader in Sheikh Abdullah, and which he was to fully 
illustrate during the years to come. 
' All-India States' People's Conference, Kashmir, (Pamphlet) Bombay, 1939, p. 7; Abbas, p. 
' Muslim Outlook, July 18, 1931; Saraf, pp. 381 -2. 
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Another significance of tlie 1931 agitation lay in the participation of women in 
processions. We have evidence of at least two processions which were solely taken out 
by women. One such procession was taken out by them on 24 '^ July and it terminated in 
the Mazar-i-Shohada (Martyrs' graveyard; where the persons who died on 13"' July were 
buried). Another procession, participated by about 5,000 women, was taken out on 27"' 
July. A women speaker is recorded to have appreciated the efforts of Punjab Muslims but 
asked them not to confine themselves to 'merely issuing statements'. What is more 
interesting is her declaration that, 'We appeal to the army not to oppress women as it has 
no chivalry. But if they have any such instructions, they will find us ready to meet the 
challenge.'^ 
The events of 1931 should not be seen in isolation; they have to be viewed in an 
all-India context. The year 1930 witnessed momentous events in the National Movement 
as the Civil Disobedience Movement was formally launched by the Indian National 
Congress in 1930 with Swaraj or complete independence as its ultimate goal. In the wake 
of the boycott of the Simon Commission (1927-8) the Indian national leadership was all 
set to frame a constitution for the nation. An all-party meet at Delhi on 12 February 1928, 
with a second session at Bombay on 19 May, agreed for the appointment of a committee 
headed by Motilal Nehru to frame the future constitution of India. This resulted in the 
preparation of the Nehru Report which demanded a Dominion status for India. The 
Report was endorsed at the all-parties conference at Lucknow in late August.'" 
However, the Report fell short of expectations of many leaders, including Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Jinnah, and Subhas Chandra Bose. Leaders like Jawaharlal and Subhas Rose 
backed by many others did not want anything less than 'Puma Swaraf and due to the 
pressure put by them the Congress, in its annual session held in December 1928 at 
Calcutta, declared its intention of launching civil disobedience and demand for complete 
independence if the government did not accept its demand of Dominion status within a 
year." Added to this were Gandhi's "eleven points" which, among others, demanded a 
reduction of the land revenue to at least 50%, abolition of the salt tax, devaluation of the 
Jnqilah, Lahore, August 2, 1931, quoted in Saraf, p. 384 
'" Irfan Habib, 'Civil Disobedience 1930-31', Social Scientist, Vol. 25, No. 9/10, Sep. - Oct., 1997, pp. 43-
66. 
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rupee to Is. 4d., reduction of military expenditure to 50%, withdrawal of protective tariff 
on foreign cloth and release of political prisoners.'^ Since the British Government did not 
pay heed towards these demands, the Congress in its Lahore session held on 29 
December 1929, gave a direct call for a struggle to attain full independence—"purna 
swaraj or azadi" in the official terminology of the Congress.'^ Gandhi initiated the civil 
disobedience by his famous Dandi March (on 12 March 1930) from Sabarmati Ashram in 
Ahmedabad to Dandi, a coastal area of Gujarat. Upon reaching there on 6 April he and 
his companions defiantly broke the salt law by extracting sah.' With that a period of 
huge unrest commenced which was to influence almost the whole India. Major cities like 
Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Peshawar, etc. became scenes of public protest and resistance 
to which the government responded by measures of repression. In Peshawar about 200-
250 protesters were killed in firing by troops. Thousands of textile workers and 
railwaymen went on strike in Bombay. People engaged in picketing of foreign cloth and 
several laws were openly defied including the launch of a no-tax campaign starting from 
Bardoli on 10 May. Popular leaders were arrested and incarcerated. By mid-November 
about 29,054 persons were in prison. Moreover, the revolutionaries also launched attacks 
on the British, Cliittagong armoury raid, led by Surya Singh on 18 April, being one of 
such important acts. '^  
Although the two main political organizations (Congress and Muslim League) 
were still adamant on their policy of non-interference into the affairs of the states, it is 
clearly visible that the political developments in 'British India' were making their echo 
into the states which were still reeling under feudal regimes with no basic rights for the 
people living there. During the late 1920s attempts were being made by both the 
Imperialists and the Nationalists to redefine the nature of the states and their relationship 
with the British-ruled territories and the people living there. For both, the position of 
States within the bigger political picture of India posed problems as they were scattered 
here and there in the Indian landscape. With a population of 20 percent out of total 
'- Collected Works of Gandhi, Vol. 48, p. 271 
'^  Irfan Habib, p. 53. 
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population, and occupying 40 percent of the total area of tiie country,"' the situation was 
not that they could be ignored for some more time. While the British were theoretically 
more bent towards the Princes, whom they projected as 'representatives' of the Crown in 
India, and whom the Viceroy Lord Irwin addressed as "Joint workers" and "Brother 
builders",'' the nationalist group was naturally inclined towards the people and their fate 
in the changing political scenario of the country. In this regard, the British appointed the 
States Enquiry Committee (popularly known as the Butler Committee) in 1928 while the 
All-Parties meet convened by the Congress at Delhi in 1928 discussed the States' 
problem. The Butler Committee reiterated the paramountcy of the British Crown on the 
Indian princes but yet again left out the definition or the 'extent of paramountcy'. 
However, in order to maintain the princes' position as 'bulwarks' against Indian 
nationalism, the paramount power guaranteed protection of the 'rights, privileges and 
dignity of the princes'. The Report announced that, 
'The projiiise of the King Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights 
and dignities of the Princes carries with it a duty to protect the Prince against 
attempts to eliminate him and to substitute another form of government. If these 
attempts were due to misgovemment on the part of the Prince, protection would 
be given on the conditions set out in preceding paragraph. It they were due not to 
misgovemment but to a widespread popular demand for change the Paramount 
Power would be bound to maintain the rights, privileges and dignity of the Prince 
but it would also be bound to suggest measures as would satisfy the demand 
without eliminating the Prince.' 
Clearly the British government was not prepared to provide the people the rights 
they were demanding. An attempt on their part to protest against the autocratic rule could 
be inferred as 'attempt to eliminate him [the prince] and to substitute another foiTn of 
government'. Despite the ambiguity in the definition and extent of paramountcy, the 
'* E.A. Gait, Census of India, 1911, Volume 1, Part 1 - Report, Calcutta, 1913, p. 12. 
" T.ord Irvvin's Speech in a State Banquet in Srinagar on April 12, 1927', Times of India, 14 April, 1927. 
' ^  Report of the Indian Slates Committee, 1928-29, Clause 27 and 106, p. 18 and pp. 51 -2. 
" Ibid., Clause 50, p. 28. Emphasis mine. 
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Princes, in their turn, also insisted upon the continuance of the British Connection in any 
form of Government that might be set up in India in future. 
On the other hand, the Indian National Congress, discussed about the States' 
problems in the Nehru Report. It recognized the fact that the 'subjects of the Indian states 
[had been] showing a lively interest in the internal affairs of their respective states and 
urging for a definite recognition of popular rights and liberties'.^' The Report stated that 
'it would be very poor statesmanship and shortsighted policy to ignore those obvious 
historical, religious, sociological and economic affinities which exist between the people 
of British India and the people of these States.''^ ^ It also believed that 'it [wa]s 
inconceivable that the people of the States, who [we]re fired by the same ambitions and 
aspirations as the people of British India, w[ould] quietly submit to existing conditions 
for ever, or that the people of British India, bound by the closest ties of family, race and 
religion to their brethren on the other side of an imaginary line, w[ould] never make 
common cause with them.'^^ Jawaharlal Nehru went a step further by declaring at the 
Lahore Congress that, 'I am a socialist and a republican, and am no believer in kings and 
princes, or in the order which produces the modern kings of industry...'.^'* Nevertheless, 
in spite of such statements the Congress policy towards the States during this period 
remained ambiguous due to its pledge of non-interference into the internal affairs of the 
States and all it could provide to the States' people was moral support. 
The representatives of the States' people, on their part, were also trying to gain 
support from the nationalist leaders for persuading the princes and the British 
government. In its very first session in 1927, the All India States' People's Conference 
(henceforth AISPC) sought the cooperation of the nationalist leaders in their goal of 
attainment of responsible government. In his presidential address, Ram Chandra Rao 
underlined that,^ ^ 
"^ Times of India, February 14, 1929. 
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'The Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, the National Liberation 
Federation, the Hindu Mahasabha and other political organizations in British 
India are now actively engaged in examining the question of a new constitution 
for India. The All-India Congress Committee has charged the Working 
Committee of the Congress to frame a scheme in consultation with the various 
political parties in the country. 1 sincerely hope that the this committee and other 
political organizations will not content themselves with framing proposals 
relating only to British India leaving the position of the Indian States in the new 
constitution undefined.' 
Furthermore, in order to generate public opinion in favour of the states' people a 
deputation was sent to London by the AISPC in 1928 in connection with the Butler 
Committee. To plead the case of the stales the deputation presented a memorandum to 
the Committee. The members of the deputation were Ramachandra Rao, G.R. 
Abhyankar, A.D. Shet, and P.L. Chudgar. The statements made by the deputation were 
commented upon by a section of the British Press, notably by Manchester Guardian and 
the NeM> Leader. The publicity by the Press gave rise to a debate in the British Pariiament. 
The debate was raised by Lord Olivier in the House of Lords. He remarked, while 
commenting on the already-existing notion of Princes' autocratic governments, and 
ignoring the 'paramountcy of the British Government over the Princes', that, ^^  
'Most, if not all of these Principalities are arbitrary and absolute Governments 
[sic]. Everything depends upon the autocratic will of the Sovereign. With regard 
to the laws, with regard to the administration of revenues, with regard to the 
appointment of justices and with regard to many matters which in our 
constitution have been taken out of the power of the Sovereign, those matters are 
there absolutely within the power of the Sovereign, and are liable and sometimes 
subject to abuse... When you are reconstituting the whole framework of Indian 
Government and are considering the question how far the Government of Indian 
states can be fitted into that framework, I think it will be found impossible to 
disregard the question whclher the autocratic power of the Princes should not in 
some degree be restricted and delegated.' 
26 R.L. Handa, pp. 345-54. 
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In spite of this the Report of the Butler Committee came as a disappointment for 
leaders of the States' people as it did not contain any significant provision for the 
introduction of reforms in the states. As far as the fate of States' people was concerned it 
contained a clause which provided that, 'The guarantee to protect a Prince against 
insurrection carries with it an obligation to enquire into the causes of the insurrection and 
to demand that the Prince shall remedy legitimate grievances and an obligation to 
prescribe the measure necessary to this result.'^^ As is evident, this clause could not 
benefit the people of the states in any considerable manner [since h would actually be 
nullified by the clause which guaranteed protection of princes against any unrest.] 
Notwithstanding the policies of the nationalist and the imperialist groups, the 
States' people were perhaps more keen to emulate the struggle of the people in the 
British-ruled regions of India. In Mysore, for instance, in the aftermath of the labour 
strikes during 1920s which were suppressed by the Government, the excited political 
atmosphere prompted many people to participate in the Civil Disobedience Movement 
though they were ruthlessly dealt with by the government. The people, in general, 
observed satyagraha and women were particularly involved in picketing of foreign cloth 
stores and liquor shops.^^ In Orissa, recognizing the urgent need for representing the 
princely states of Orissa and to address the grievances of the people, the Orissa State 
People's Conference, with the active co-operation of the AISPC, was formed at Cuttack 
on 19 June 1931. The first meeting was presided over by Bhubananda Das. '^ The 
Conference was supported by popular national leader P. Sitaramayya. Several leaders 
from the State participated in the Salt Satyagraha.^' In Talcher, a state of the Orissa 
" Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-29, Clause 49, p. 28. 
-^ For details see, S. Chandrashekar, 'Reforms and Reactions and the Regime in Mysore 1881-1910' The 
Quarterly Journal of Mythic Society, No. 2, 1 February 1985, Bangalore, pp. 131-44. 
M. Jamuna, 'Women and Freedom Movement in Princely Mysore', People's Movements in Princely 
States, ed. Y. Vaikuntham, Delhi, 2004, pp. 132-3. 
^^  D.P. Mishra, People's Revolt in Orissa: A Study of Talcher, New Delhi, 1998, p. 22. 
A.C. Pradhan, 'People's Movement in the Princely Slates of Orissa in the Wider Context of the 
Nationalist Movement: A Case Study of the Nilgiri State', People's Movements in Princely States, ed. Y. 
Vaikuntham, p. 200. 
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region, people's movement against forced labour and excessive rent and abwabs was 
going on from 1922 and it came to a head in 1932. 
Similarly, in several states of Rajaputana the leaders prepared memorandums to 
press for their demands and attempted to participate in the civil disobedience movement 
in addition to formation of associations in spite of the government ban on their 
formation.'''^  In the state of Alvvar (a part of the Rajaputana), in 1933, there was a 
formidable rising against Maharaja Jaisingh Sawai's revenue enhancements, begar, 
grazing dues, and reservation of forests for hunting.'^ '' Similarly, in Kashmir the 
unprecedented agitation was triggered by the immediate oppression of hs people and, of 
course, due to the long-standing issues faced by them. In a typical colonial language the 
census of 1941 noted that in 1931 the 'political unrest in India' had caused a stir among 
the "dissatisfied elements" in Jammu and Kashmir and they had made "communal 
claims" that led to the 'excitement of communal feelings' in the state.''^ 
What was common in all these movements in different states was the timing of 
their occuiTcnce which coincided with the civil disobedience; they were not spontaneous 
either, but a reilection of the long-standing grievances of people against the respective 
rulers. Although, the factors leading to these individual movements might have been of 
local origin, yet their occurrence at the same time does not seem to be a simple 
coincidence. Not unexpectedly, therefore, the people's movement in the princely states 
and their leaders not only directly supported the national movement but also took direct 
support from it in the process. 
The immediate post-1930 period is very significant for the freedom movement in 
Jammu and Kashmir at least on two important fronts—one was the awareness that the 
press brought about in different parts of the country about the problem in Kashmir, and 
for that matter the problems in other princely states governed more or less under similar 
condition. As a result of this, Kashmir received the attention of nationalist leadership of 
"' People's Revolt in Orissa, p. J 9. 
•^^  V.D. Mathur, States' Peoples Conference Origin and Role in Rajasthan, Jaipur, 1984, 67-72. 
"''' Sumit Sarkar, p. 324. 
R.G. Wreford, Census of India, J 941, Vol. XXII, Jammu and Kashmir, Parts I and II, Essays and Tables, 
Jammu, 1943, p. 4. 
'"^  Y. Vaikuntham, (ed.) People's Movements in Princely States, p. 15. 
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India and, henceforth, a greater coverage from the press. Another was the formation of an 
organised political platform in Jammu and Kashmir under the banner of All Jammu and 
Kashmir Muslim Conference (sometimes referred to as the Kashmir Political Conference 
in the Anglo-Indian and Native Press throughout the country). Both of these were 
instrumental in the metamorphosis of this locally-launched movement into a movement 
against the powerful, colonial power in India. These two aspects are deah with in detail 
below. 
Immediately after the firing on the protestors outside the premises of the Srinagar 
central jail, a section of the Punjab press, particularly the newspapers owned by Muslims, 
launched a scathing attack on the Kashmir Darbar through its news reports and editorials. 
The wide criticism came particularly after the Kashmir Darbar in its official statement 
claimed that the firing on the protestors was fully justified and unavoidable.^'' The Press 
widely publicized the not-so-apologetic attitude of the Darbar with the result that the 
Kashmir affairs won a great sympathy from people and leaders from outside the state. In 
order to sympathize with the people of Kashmir several organizations outside the State 
issued statements criticizing the government's oppressive policies in dealing with the 
agitation. In a protest meeting in Sialkot, the Secretary of Youngmen's Assocation threw 
light on the condition of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir. Anjuman Muhasin-i-
Islarn, with its headquarters in Ilissar, Punjab, severely criticized the findings of the 
Wakefield Enquiry Committee [appointed to enquire into the khutba and Quran issue] as 
'absolutely unsatisfactory, evasive and conflicting'.^^ The All India Muslim Kashmiri 
Conference also passed a vote of no-confidence against the enquiry commission and 
requested the Viceroy and Secretary of the State to appoint an impartial committee.'"' Mr. 
Arshad All Khan, president of the Jamiat Tabligh, Mussorie, in a meeting held on 18* 
July, went so far as to request the British Government in India to depose the Maharaja of 
•" 'Muslim Outlook' (Lahore), July 19, 1931, Foreign and Political (Secret), National A, NAI, 1931, File 
No. 440-P. 
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Kaslmiir. We also hear of protest meetings being held in Qadian, Amritsar and as far as 
Dacca.'*^ 
There were also some attempts to persuade the Kashmir Darbar to allow 
delegations from outside the state. These delegations would interact with the people and 
would submit their reports to the State and the Central governments. The Muslim 
Navjavan Committee, a not-so-famous organization in Punjab, in July, called upon the 
Muslims of Punjab to appoint an enquiry committee.'*^ A group of Muslims in Dacca also 
sought to send its members into any enquiry committee that would be setup by Muslims. 
Mian Abdul Aziz, the president of Lahore Municipality wired to Maharaja on 18 July 
and requested the Maharaja to accept an enquiry committee from Lahore.'*'' A similar 
request was made by the Jamiat-ul-UUema, Delhi.'*''' The Ahrars also demanded an 
elaborate inquiry into the conditions of the Muslims of Kashmir.'*^ But the Maharaja, 
being apprehensive of the complications that may arise for him from such enquiries, put 
down these requests and reiterated his earlier stand that 'no outside committees of 
enquiry could be allowed nor any interference in the local affairs of the State people by 
outside public...''*^ Instead, he strongly argued against them and insisted on the 
impartiality of his appointed committee, the Dalai Committee. But the Muslim leaders 
from the state boycotted the committee and its Muslim non-official members resigned.''^ 
Finally the enquiry committee had to content with Barjor Dalai (the Chief Justice of the 
Srinagar High Court) and two other Judges of the Court. The committee started its work 
on July 27 and submitted the report in September.^^ The committee concluded that the 
large group of people who had come to witness the trial of Abdul Qadeer constituted an 
unlawful assembly and that they used force against the police. It stated that the firing on 
"'Ibid., July 20, 1931. 
'-Ibid., July 16, 19 and 26, 1931. 
''Mbid.,July 18, 1931. 
'"''Ibid., July 27, 1931. 
*^ Times of India, My 2^, 1931. 
^'^ The Tribune, My \4, \93],p.8. 
"*' Times of India, September 28, 1931. 
"'^  Muslim Outlook, July 27, 1931, 
"' Saraf, p. 379 
'° The Srinagar Riot Enquiry Committee Report, (Samvat 1988), 1931, p. 1. 
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the mob was completely justified.^' The report of the commission did not seem to have 
disappointed the leadership as their boycott of the committee bears testimony that they 
did not trust it right from the start. 
However, what brought the matter into more attention was the observation of 
Kashmir Day at several places throughout the country. In Peshawar the Kashmir Day was 
observed on 10^ '' July. The Ahmadiyya community, which was to play a significant role 
in the future politics of the state, also observed it on the same day. In Kanpur, the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema decided to observe it on 24* July while the Lahore local committee also 
declared to observe it on 24"\ At this time the laying down of a definite programme 
seemed premature. Therefore, Fazl Hussain^^ and Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood 
Ahmad (Head of the Ahmadiyya group) appealed the organizations to demonstrate unity 
so that the observation of such a day could produce desired results. They gave a call for a 
unified conference whose lask would be to discuss intricate matters regarding Kashmir, 
bring awareness about these problems through press and lay stress on strengthening the 
position of Muslims in Kashmir.^ ^ On the basis of this understanding, barely a week after 
the July 13 massacre, several leaders, who had already been a part of the nationwide anti-
colonial movement, laid the foundation of the Kashmir Committee (subsequently known 
as the All India Kashmir Commhtee) in Simla which aimed at speaking on the behalf of 
Kashmiri Muslims. The founding members of the Committee included Fazl Hussain, 
Khawaja Hassan Nizami, Mirza Bashir-ud-Din, Syed Mohsin Shah, Mohammad Ismail 
Gazhnavi, Hasrat Mohani, Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal and Maulana Mohammad Yaqub. 
The members chose Mirza Bashir-ud-Din as the president of the Committee and his 
personal assistant, Moulvi Abdul Rahim Dard as the Secretar)'.^ "* Immediately after its 
formation it began to pressurize the Maharaja and the Government of India to appoint an 
enquiry committee in order to bring forth the facts about the central jail incident. It 
" Srinagar Riot Enquiry, pp. 6 and 8. 
^' He was a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly (1920), nominated as minister for education in 
Punjab in 1920, and on the Viceroy's Executive Council during the 1930-1935 period. 
" Muslim Outlook, July 16, 1931. 
G. H. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, p. 139. Ace. to P. N. Chopra, Maulana Shaukat Ali and 
Abul Kaiam Azad were also present in the meeting at Simla where the Committee was foimed. However, 
no other source has mentioned their names. See, P.N. Chopra, India's Struggle for Freedom: Role of 
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decided to celebrate the Kashmir Day on August 14.^ ^ The Day was observed in Lahore, 
Sialkot, Ferozpur, Delhi, Surat, Gorakhpur, Bombay, Calcutta and Simla.^ ^ It was shortly 
afterwards that Sheikh Abdullah quit the job of school teacher with the Education 
Department and began to work as a full-time political worker. 
The response of the state to these developments was dismissive. The Maharaja 
attributed it to a few agitators who had created an "artificial agitation" to clamour for 
jobs.^^ He still seemed adamant on considering—or pretended to consider—the agitation 
as cause and not the symptom of restiveness owing to deprivation. Some British 
legislators considered it, at best, the work of outside agitators—"Bolshevist agents," as 
one M.P. put it. However, majority of the Secretary's officials in Simla, instead of 
portraying it as the "work of outsiders", admitted that internal factors— t^he 
CO 
maladministration and peoples' plight—were behind the angry reactions of the people. 
We do not have any evidence of the Congress and the Muslim League rendering 
any official support to the leaders of Kashmir at that time. However, at an individual 
level some leaders did render support in the form of press releases. In this regard the 
statements of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru may be considered 
very significant as these might have put some pressure on the Kashmir government. 
While Kashmir was going through the tumultuous period, Maulana Azad and Tej 
Bahadur Sapru were on their visit to Kashmir in August to advise Maharaja on the issue 
of Indian federal scheme and the second Round Table Conference. Maulana Azad's 
Statement, which he issued at the time, was later published in August 13 issue of ^Z-
Jamiat. He urged the Kashmir government to release the political prisoners and call the 
representatives of Muslims to listen to their grievances. He emphasized that the 
'horrifying events in Kashmir' were not conducive to the success of the RTC. According 
to him, 'If these persons (leaders) are being kept without any fault on their part in a 
wrongful confinement, then the Government of Kashmir are making a grave error... the 
political atmosphere in India has become disturbed by the events in Kashmir... [While] 
'^ G. H. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, pp. 140-6. 
"' Ibid., pp. 140-6; Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 142. 
" Muslim Outlook, July 18, 1931. 
^^  Ian Copland, 'Islam and Political Mobilization in Kashmir, 1931-34', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2 
(Summer 1981), p. 233. 
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the people interested in such political suits [as in Kashmir] attend in thousands the court-
rooms in India and in the Punjab...the necessity has never been felt that they be shot 
dead.''^ Raising the issue of the trial of Abdul Qadeer, he castigated the attitude of the 
Government who projected the issue not as political but as a dispute between Hindus and 
Muslims. According to him, 'even the name of it [trial of Qadeer] does not figure 
anywhere and in all publications it is being shown that the root of all this trouble is the 
conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims.''''' Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru also criticized the 
goverrmient and urged upon the need of the government 'to be large-hearted and liberal 
in considering the grievances of the public.'^' These statements from such famed public 
figures, Bazaz informs us, produced a 'sobering effect on both sides' which culminated 
into the signing of a 'Temporary Truce' on August 26, 1931, between ten representatives 
of Muslims and the government; the former gave an undertaking that they would 
completely stop the agitation while the latter pledged to release all political prisoners 
unconditionally.^^ The prisoners were released immediately after the agreement.^^ But at 
the time of submitting a memorandum to the Maharaja (shortly after their release), his 
attitude, as Ghulam Abbas states, led them to believe that 'the movement could not be 
taken to its logic end by making pleas and prayers.'*''' 
The people were, however, greatly disappointed by the terms of the truce as they 
did not deal with the underlying grievances but only with matters arising out of the 
agitation and its causes.^^ But it appears, as is evident from the events that occurred later, 
that the truce was signed by the Muslim representatives out of expediency. The truce may 
also be considered a victory for the political leaders of the state because by signing it the 
government was, in a way, acknowledging the leaders as a part>' to the conflict between 
the government and the people.^'' On 21''' September, Sheikh Abdullah was again arrested 
on the ground that 'before and after the truce he broke the undertaking by making 
^"^ Al-Jamiat, Delhi, August 13, 1931. 
"' ibid. 
**' Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 143. 
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political speeches in mosques under cloak of religious exhortations.' What was more 
worrying for the government was that he supposedly received letters from Punjab calling 
hirai for reviving agitation.''^ The re-arresting of the Sheikh again agitated the people and 
they came on streets to demonstrate their anger. In a huge demonstration on 22" August 
at Jama Masjid, Srinagar, which had by now became an established platform for the 
Muslim leaders to make their speeches and arrange public gatherings, the protestors were 
again fired at by the state troops and four persons were killed. The number of persons 
killed at other places in Srinagar at the same time was ten.''^ These incidents clearly show 
the extent of public fury that the state was facing at the time. 
Around this time there were two groups of Muslims in Punjab which seriously 
tried to spearhead the movement in Kashmir - one was the Ahmadiyya group, that had 
already begun to participate in the struggle through the All India Kashmir Committee, 
and another was the Majlis-i-Ahrar. The Ahmadiyya movement, founded by Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, district Gurdaspur (Punjab), during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century claimed to aim at reforming and revitalizing the decadent Muslim 
society in the post-Mutiny period. Gradually the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
began to be identified as a separate, heterodox sect. Starting from reforms in education to 
establishing of schools, by the early 20"' century the sect had begun to participate in 
political activities. '^^  As early as 1924, the Ahmadiyyas had started their activities in 
Kashmir. Mirza Kamal-ud-Din, the Head of the Ahmadiyyas delivered a series of public 
speeches in Srinagar. He was particularly supported by Moulvi Abdullah Vakil, who later 
was a founding member of the Reading Room Party. Kashmir was of special interest for 
the Ahmadiyyas who believed that Jesus, the messiah, was "buried" somewhere in 
Kashmir, and since Ghulam Ahmad was the much-awaited Mahdi (messiah), it was their 
duty to 'to be the cause of liberafion of the persecuted people of Kashmir.'^ '^  By 1931, the 
missionary activities of Ahmadiyyas in Kashmir had already won them 2,955 followers.'" 
'''' G. H. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, pp. 153-4; Also See, Times of India, September 23, 1931. 
""^  G. H. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, p. 154. 
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The Kashmir crisis of 1930s presented an once-in-a-Iifetirne opportunity to the 
Ahmadiyyas and Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood became the self-appointed spokesman of 
Kaslimiri Muslims. 
Attempts of reconciliation notwithstanding, an important development took place 
around this time which was certainly new in the political history of Kashmir. The Majlis 
Ahrar-i-Islam, in mid-August, decided to send jathas (bands of volunteers) into the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir to launch Satyagraha and create disturbances in order to get the 
demands of Muslims heard.^ ^ The Majlis Ahrar-i-Islam (or Ahrar Party as it was 
popularly known) was a middle-class urban organization founded on 29 December 1929 
at Lahore''^—at the same time and place where the annual session of Indian National 
Congress was being held and the declaration of Puma Swaraj or Complete Independence 
was made. The basic factor leading to the creation of the Ahrar group was the dissent 
between the Punjab Khilafat Committee and the Central Khilafat Committee or, to put it 
more accurately, between Maulana Shovvkat Ali and Maulana Azad. With the active 
support of Maulana Azad,''' several ex-Khilafatists and ex-Congressite Muslim leaders, 
particularly Maulana Syed Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Chaudhary Afzal Haq, Habib-ur-
Rehiman, Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan and Maulana Mazhar Ali 
Azhar established the said organization. The Nehru Report (1928) had brought to fore the 
dissention between several Hindu and Muslim leaders, for it neither favoured the Muslim 
demand for thirty-three percent representation in the central legislature nor the principle 
of separate electorates. Although the Punjabi Khilafatists were opposed to such 
provisions of the Report, yet, under the influence of leaders like Motilal Nehru, Tej 
Bahadur Sapru, Maulana Azad, Zafar Ali Khan and others, they signed the document at 
the All-Parties meet at Lucknow.'^ However, they were disillusioned when the Congress 
abandoned the Nehru Report in December 1929 and demanded complete independence 
for India. Accusing the Congress of not taking them into confidence on such an important 
Munshi Ghulam Ahmad Khan, Census of India, 1901, Volume xxiii-A, Kashmir, Part-II-Tables, Lahore, 
1902. 
''^  Times of India fBombay), September 1, 1931. 
" Inqilab (Lahore), January 14, 1930. 
''' Afzal Haq, Tahkh-i-Ahrar, Lahore, 1968, pp. 13 and 71. 
'^  Ibid,, p. 72, 
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matter,''^ they decided to forni an organization which sliall heavily draw its ideology irom 
Congress but act on its own terms. By 1931, having acquired considerable political 
experience, organizational and mobilizing skills in the on-going civil disobedience 
movement (and previously in the Khilafat-Non-Cooperation movement), they decided to 
send volunteers into Jammu and Kashmir. 
The sending ofjathas from British India to the States was not a new phenomenon. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, as early as 1923 Sikhs had been sending jalhas into the 
Nabha state to launch satyagraha against the state government.'''' But for Kashmir, it was 
certainly a new phenomenon. It seems that the idea of sending volunteers into Kashmir 
was initially proposed by Shiekh Muhammad Iqbal in a meeting with some Muslim 
leaders. For the virtue of sending volunteers, Iqbal argued, 'the Maharaja's resources 
would not be sufficient to withstand such a movement for a long time; he will have to 
seek the assistance of the British Government and when this assistance is sought and 
naturally, made available, that would be the appropriate moment for us to demand that if 
they wanted to intervene in the dispute on the side of the Maharaja, then they must 
78 
equally ensure that important grievances of the State Muslims [be] also redressed.' 
However, the credit of putting such an idea into effect at ground level must go to y\.hrars. 
The first Ahmx jatha left from Sialkot on Sunday, 30"^  August 1931, but it was 
stopped at Suchetgarh (near the Jammu-Punjab border) by the order of the Kashmir 
authorities.^' Determined in their effort to send in move jathas the president of the Majlis, 
Mazhar Ali Azhar, accompanied by two others, marched towards the State. Although the 
volunteer band was not allowed to enter the State boundaries, Mazhar Ali and his two 
companions were permitted to visit Srinagar on the condition that they won't hold any 
meetings or inquiry and deliver no speeches.^ *^ This might have proved a golden 
opportunity for them but for their accepting the invitation of the Kashmir Darbar to be its 
royal guests. The Kashmiri leadership, considering the Ahrars to be in collusion with the 
Kashmir government, did not respond well on their arrival in Kashmir, with the result 
"* Janbaaz Mirza, Karavan-i-Ahrar, Laliore, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 80. 
" See Chapter 2, pp. 31 -2 for detaiLs. 
'^Saraf,p. 383. 
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that the Ahrar leaders had to return to Sialkot disappointed.^' Another reason for the 
kikewarm response from the Kashmir leadersliip was that the Ahrars insisted upon the 
demand of a responsible government as the only solution to people's miseries which the 
Kashmir leadership feared, much under the influence of the Ahmadiyya group— 
according to the Ahrars—would not be entertained by the State government or by the 
Paramount Power.'^ ^ 
The Ahrars, although disappointed, could not afford to lose any opportunity of 
pressurizing the Kashmir government. By October the Ahrars were busy recruiting 
volunteers in thousands and sending them into Jammu and Kashmir. Hundreds of them 
were put behind the bars. Already by November as many as 2,376 Ahrar volunteers, 
dressed in red shirts, had illegally crossed the Punjab-Kashmir border. At one time (date 
is not specified) the total number of Alirar prisoners in the State Jails was as high as 
7000.^'' The situation was certainly alarming and embarrassing for the authorities in the 
State as well as in Delhi. The official correspondence about this period clearly illustrates 
this. An alarmed State Government informed the Government of India about its 'inability 
to prevent effectively the ingress oiJathas or to control the situation arising out of their 
Off 
entry' and asked for some way out. The situation was worsened because of a violent 
agitation in Mirpur district of Jammu province. In spite of promulgating Section 144 of 
the Criminal Penal Code in Sialkot, the authorities succeeded neither in preventing the 
recruiting of volunteers nor their departure from the Punjab.**^  The Resident in Kashmir 
wrote to the Maharaja on October 9, 1931 that, 'It seems of vhal importance to the 
Government of India that Your Highness's government should satisfy public opinion 
immediately and it is prepared to have an enquiry made by an absolutely impartial officer 
into the alleged grievances with a view to the redress of those established to be 
reasonable.'" On November 4, 1931 the Government of India issued an ordinance—the 
'^lVlirza,p. 190. 
'^ The Ahrar Point of View, published by Khawaja Ghulam Mohammad, Secretary Majlis Ahrar-i-Hind, 
Lahore, 1931, pp. 18&28. 
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Kashmir Ordinance No. X of 1931—specially aimed at the prohibition of sendingya/Zzai-
into the state. The Ordinance, together with the attitude of the Kashmir leadership 
towards the Ahrars, came as a setback to the Ahrars' militant activities in Kashmir. A 
fun;her blow came due to the dispatch of British troops, on the request of the Maharaja, to 
Jammu in November, 1931, who ruthlessly aided the state in its attempt to put down not 
only the activities of the Ahrars but also those of the local agitators.*' 
In Jammu province the Ahrars were more popular among the cultivators, and 
consequently their activities were more concentrated in Jammu Division than in 
Kashmir.'^ Furthermore, by the early 1932 the Ahrars were clamouring to be recognized 
as a party to the Kashmir agitation and claiming that 'further discussions [regarding 
Kashmir agitation] should take place with them directly...''' However, the Ahrars were 
losing ground in Punjab as well as in Kashmir with the same swiftness as their rise. By 
the end of 1932, the activities of Ahrars had almost ceased in Kaslmiir. 
The Ahrars, apart from sending jalhas into Kashmir involved themselves in a 
bitter controversy with the Ahmadiyyas active in the state and the Kashmiri leadership 
alike. They were particularly critical of the Ahmadiyya lobby because they considered 
the latter to be "heretics" who were trying to hijack the people's movement in Kashmir, 
through the All India Kashmir Committee, for their own ends; they were of the view that 
the missionary zeal of Ahmadiyyas was responsible for their interest in Kashmir. They 
were also critical of the approach of Ahmadiyyas whose main focus had been on 
persuading the Maharaja through memorandums and the like. Contrary to it, the Ahrars 
insisted on launching saiyagraha to pressurize the government to concede to their 
demand of no less than a responsible government. Another marked difference in the 
viewpoint of Ahmadiyyas and Ahrars was that while the former were trying to persuade 
and pressurize the Maharaja through the Paramount Power, the latter were not ready to 
'" Delhi Records/Home Department, NAI, File No. 13/23-31, 1931. 
Bazaz, Hisloiy of Struggle, p. 152 
'^ ^ Miridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir, Delhi, 2004, p. 
263. 
"' The Statesman, (Calcutta), March 5, 1932. 
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invite any British interference into the affairs of the Kashmir state, which they beHeved 
should be settled between the Maharaja and the people.^^ 
The Truce of 26"' August notwithstanding, the state's cold attitude towards the 
demands by the Muslims did not help to defuse the political atmosphere in the state. The 
people not only resorted to protests and strikes but also attempted to launch armed 
struggle against the state. On 24"' September 1931, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, head cleric of 
Jama Masjid who had gained popularity among the masses during the ongoing agitation, 
attempted to launch an armed struggle against the state. People armed with crude 
weapons like axes, spades, hoes and sticks paraded the streets and assembled at Khanyar, 
close to the Martyrs' graveyard. Notices were pasted which read 'Mohammadans have no 
quarrel with the Hindus but have declared /7/2flaf against His Highness' Government.'^^ It 
is highly significant that not a single Hindu man, woman or child was molested by the 
mob.^'' At this time, the State passed an Ordinance, known as Notification 19-L,^ ^ which 
was reminiscent of the Rowlatt Acts. The Ordinance, enacted on 24"' September, imposed 
Martial Law in Srinagar and surrounding areas. Under the Ordinance, police and militaiy 
officers were given complete freedom to arrest any person on the basis of mere suspicion. 
The militaiy or police were authorized to take possession of any land, buildings, movable 
and immovable property, means of transport, telegraphs and such other things that 
seemed necessary to them. The punishment for a person - of course, without a trial - not 
cooperating with the authorities ranged from an imprisonment of six months to three 
years, or flogging not exceeding thirty stripes or fine extending to Rs. 1000.^ ^ By making 
dozens of arrests, not surprisingly, the state crushed the attempt of armed struggle in no 
time. However, the available records show that armed groups were formed in several 
other areas as well. Anantnag, situated at a distance of 51 km from Srinagar was the 
scene of one such violent attempt on the same day. A mob of angry people attacked a 
•^^ Al-Jamiat, August 24, 1931. 
'•' 'Telegram from Resident in Kashmir to ttie Home Department', No 60-C, dated September 24, 1931, 
Home/Polilical (Secret), NAl, File No. 423 (2), 1931; Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p .148; Times of India. 
September 25, 1931. 
''' See, Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 148. 
'^  ibid., p. 149; Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 151. 
*^  'Notification No. 19-L, dated 8"' Assuj 1988 (Sanivat),' September 24, 1931, Appendix B, All India 
Stales' People's Conference, Kashmir, pp. 40-7. 
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military picket and killed one personnel and wounded a dozen. In retaliation the troops 
opened fire and killed 19 persons on the spot. In another incident, in Shopian, angry 
armed protestors attacked a police station on 25"^  September; one police constable got 
• 07 
killed there. Incidents of similar nature were reported from Baramullah, Sopore and 
Handwara areas of north Kashmir.'^ Besides the enactment of the Ordinance, what might 
have proved a boon for the state here was its age-old policy of depriving Kashmiris of 
possessing firearms. There were strong chances of revolutionary extremism among the 
people but the absence of firearms among the furious people probably acted as the 
greatest hurdle towards such a development. 
The revolutionary extremism having failed, the next tactic that the people could 
use was to launch a civil disobedience. The people of Kashmir, it seems, were still 
una)vare of such a tool. However, the leadership was certainly not unaware of its 
advantage. As already discussed elsewhere, several states' people observed Satyagraha 
against the respective princes analogous to Gandhi's method against the British. In 
Kashmir, too, we have enough evidence to show that apart from adopting the general 
policy of protests and processions, they also resorted to civil disobedience for a brief 
period of time. The Ahi-ars had already launched the civil disobedience movement in 
parts of Jammu division but could not succeed much in influencing other parts of the 
state. But some leaders from the state were convinced that a similar strategy on the part 
could bear fruit. 
Therefore, Sardar Gauhar Rehman, the 'Dictator' of Jammu province launched 
the civil disobedience on December 25, 1931, initially, limited to Mirpur district only. He 
declared a boycott of the Glancy Commission and started a campaign of non-payment of 
revenue. The movement, the 'Dictator' declared, would be based on the creed of non-
violence and people were asked to quote arrests. He pledged not to withdraw the 
movement unless the government agreed to concede to certain demands such as grant of 
establishment of responsible government as 'announced by the Premier of England in his 
speech at the end of the Round Table Conference', remission of 50 percent in land 
'''' Times of India, September 25, 1931 and September 28, 1931. 
'^ ''Ibid., September 29, 1931. 
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revenue, dismissal of tlie Prime Minister of Kashmir, release of prisoners and liberty in 
religious matters.^^ One of the highly interesting demand made in this declaration was 
that the 'States should have a status of separate provinces and ... they should enjoy same 
privilege[s].'' This demand of 'separate provinces' is surely an attention-seeking 
demand since this kind of demand had never been made by any other leader of any 
princely state. 
No-tax/no-revenue campaigns formed a significant act of defiance on the part of 
peasants during the civil disobedience movement in several parts of India. Such 
campaigns had already been carried out in Kheda, Bardoli (by Vallabhai Patel), the 
United Provinces, and some other places, on both political and economic grounds. 
Gandhi was reluctant in approving such campaigns, but was of the view that the peasants 
should launch such campaigns on their own. The no-rent/no-revenue campaign led by 
Congress apparently secured important remissions in revenue and rent in many 
regions.'°' The provision of non-payment of revenue was certainly a new concept in 
Kashmir. The no-revenue campaign in Mirpur was carried out by Raja Mohammad 
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Akbar Ghazi, Elahi Bakhash and Wahab-ud-Din.'"" This campaign, however, could not 
succeed in Kashmir proper. "^ ^ There is also indication of setting up of a parallel 
government in Lolab, a border region of Kashmir valley where the agitators appointed a 
Governor and a judge of their own.^ '^* How far these attempts succeeded is not clear but 
their occurrence is indicative of the politicization that was taking place among the people. 
The program of no-revenue was bound to attract the cultivator, and it was primarily this 
section which was to become the focus of the movement later on. 
While the state was going thi^ ough this transitional phase in every aspect of life 
that one could conceive of, communal discord was also making its way into the socio-
political fabric of Kaslimir. Already on 13"' July 1931, immediately after the central jail 
'''' "Sardar Gauhar Rchman: Why 1 am Launching Ihe Civil Disobedience MovementTPublic Press; Sialko!, 
December 25, 1931, Foreign and Political, NAl, 1932, File No. 127-P. 
'°" Ibid. 
'"' For details, see Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of tlie Indian National Congress, Vol. 2 (1935-1947), 
Bombay, 1947, p. 790; Mridula Mukhcrjee, pp. 84-5, 343, and 350; Sumit Sarkar, p. 231. 
'"' Abbas, p. 37. 
' A Brief Note on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Year 1931. 
"^* Times of India, February 13, 1932. 
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firing incident, while the dead bodies were being taken through the Maharajgunj bazaar 
(a market place located at a distance of few miles from the jail), Muslim mob allegedly 
beat up several Hindu shop-owners and ransacked their belongings; in Vicharnag and 
other areas of the city similar incidents reportedly took place.'^^ It is not clear what the 
provocation was. The Hindus blamed the Muslims and vice-versa. The Muslim leaders 
refuted this accusation and claimed that the Pandits had actually hidden the "looted" 
material and much of it was later recovered from their shops. '°^ Few days later there were 
reports of beating up of Muslims and molestation of women by Hindus in a locality, the 
credibility of which is, again, not well established.'"'' It appears that although 
exaggerated, the incidents were certainly not unfounded. 
There were attempts on the part of the state to conceal the real nature of the 
people's movement and save its face from opposition and criticism from certain quaiters. 
The Barjor Dalai Committee appointed for enquiring into the causes of the central jail 
incident got its report published in October 1931. It portrayed the movement not as a 
struggle against the Maharaja or his autocratic dynasty but as a Muslim movement 
against the Hindus of the Valley who had acquired far greater jobs as compared to their 
numerical strength. It stated that the Muslims subjects had full faith in the Maharaja's 
government and the law of the land but what had created the problems was that 'a section 
of the Hindus had overpowering representation in the Government and that section 
oppressed the Mohammadans.''"' Thus, the report of the committee narrowed down the 
causes of the struggle to a mere fight of Muslims for jobs and against the Pandit 
community. For a brief period of time, such portrayals were not limited to official reports 
and documents only but are present in representations and memorandums submitted by 
the either community. For the first time, we see terms like 'nafionalism' and 
'communalism' being used in the context of Kashmir polifics in documents and speeches 
of Muslims as well as Pandits. Despite being politically active against the autocratic 
'"^  Ibid., July 15, 1931; Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 132-4. 
""^  See 'Representation made by the Deputation of Muslim Representatives to His Highness, August 15, 
1931.' 
"" Muslim Outlook, July 18, 1931. 
'"'' Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 134. 
"*' Barjor Dalai, Report of the Srinagar Riot Enquiry Committee, Samvat 1988 (1931), Srinagar, 1932, p. 
45. 
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instruments of the state, each community tried to assert its 'loyalty' to the Maharaja's 
person and his throne, and at the same time put the blame of communal disharmony on 
the other community. The Muslim representatives claimed in a representation to the 
Maharaja on August 15, 1931, that, 'True to their traditions, these Pandits reduced the 
Muslims to utter helplessness... by hiding their property to pretend that they were looted 
by Muslims.'"° In reaction to the demands of Muslims, the Pandhs, in a representation, 
argued that they '[could not] look on things through communal glasses.' Instead, 
according to the representation, the 'Musalmans ha[d] presented their claims avowedly 
on communal grounds and for communal ends.' ' 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Pandits became particularly critical of the 
"concessions and favours" that the Darbar was now granting to Muslims as a part of its 
appeasement policy. Apparently being apprehensive of a change, in near future, in what 
they considered an "equilibrium", the Pandit community started to oppose the Muslim 
demands. The Pandits felt aggrieved over the Truce arrived at between the govermnent 
and the Muslim leadership on August 26. According to Prem Nath Bazaz, who was one 
among the four signatories who sent a letter to the Prime Minister complaining against 
the truce, 'they did not like that the Government should have parleyed with the Muslim 
leaders who were mainly responsible for the riot and loot in which they had terribly 
suffered.' On the refusal of the Prime Minister to recognize them as the representatives of 
Pandits,"^ they started an agitation. Pandit Kashyap Bandhu, who was one of the 
representatives, was arrested. However, the government soon agreed to grant them 
'certain very minimal demands and the agitation came to an end.'"'' The Representation 
of 24"^  October, presented its apprehension that 'Muslims have been taken into services 
because they are Muslims,' while 'Pandits are being excluded from service because they 
are Kashmiri Pandits.'"^ A statement by the Pandit Sudhar Sabha, a lesser-known 
"° 'Representation made by the Deputation of Muslim Representatives to His Highness', August 15, 1931. 
'" 'Memorial presented by the Sanatan Dharam Youngmen's Association on behalf of Kashmiri Pandits to 
His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu and Kashmir', October 24, 1931, p. 3. 
"" 'Flepresentation of Sanatan Dharam Youngmen's Association, Srinagar, to the Prime Minister and his 
Reply Thereto', September 6, 1931, p. 2. 
"^  The Prime Minister, Hari Krishen Kaul, was himself a Kashmiri Pandit. 
'^ Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 143-45. 
'" 'Memorial presented by the Sanatan Dharam Youngmen's Association', p. 4. 
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organization of Kashmiri Pandits, stated that, 'In every department of public life, the 
Muslim is the spoiled child and the Hindu the step-child of the government.'"^ These 
statements, however, appear to have been too far from reality because even a cursory 
look at the position of Muslims in services, or for that matter in any other government 
avenues, as compared with Pandits, reveals that the claim was wholly untrue. The 
statements seem to have 'created more bitterness in the communal atmosphere and more 
suspicions in the minds of the Muslims who imagined that the Hindu movement was a 
maneuver to hoodwink them.'" ^  
However, certain Pandits also recognized the nature of the agitation of Muslims. 
To them it did not appear to be against any particular community but against the 
administration. Pandit Guash Lai Kaul, a writer and journalist, who was reportedly beaten 
up by a Muslim mob on July 15"^ , admits that the Hindus were looted and beaten not 
because they were Hindus but because they were identified as the collaborators of the 
Dogra regime."^ Bazaz, in spite of initially supporting the Hindus—whom he calls 
'reactionary'—in framing memorandums to be submitted to the Maharaja, later 
acknowledged that, 'Doubtless in 1931, the struggle was aggressively communal 
outwardly but those who had not kept their eyes shut could see that it was in essence the 
struggle of a victimized and enslaved people against the despotic mle. It was sooner or 
later bound to proceed on the right track.'"^ 
Around this time, it may be argued, the agitation was a purely Muslim struggle 
against the state, though it does not necessarily follow that it was a communal one. Since 
Kashmir had 93% Muslim population, their regional and religious identities have been 
(mis)construed as synonymous. Before arriving at any conclusion, it is necessary to 
consider the general picture of the state-of-affairs that prevailed in the state in 1930-31. 
In a situation where the ruling class and the military (except for a small contingent of 
Dogra Muslims from Jammu) were exclusively drawn from the minority community, 
'"" 'Statement of Kashmiri Pandit Sudhar Sabha, Srinagar, to Prime Minister, His Highness's Government', 
August 8, 1931, Political Department, Jammu and Kashmir State Archives, Jammu, File No. 96/S9/1931, 
1931. 
" ' Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 145. 
"** Gaush Lai Kaul, 'The Freedom Struggle of Kashmir', Studies of Kashmir Council of Research, Vol. Ill, 
Special Number, Srinagar, November, 1978, p. 90. 
' " Bazaz, Histoy of Struggle, p. 147. 
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administrative positions were almost monopolized by the religious minorities (Hindus 
and Sikhs), Muslims did not possess an equitable share in any of the departments of the 
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Government slots of landholders and petty officials were also occupied predominantly 
by Hindus, the majority did not enjoy any civil and political rights, and restrictions were 
put on their religious practice, the distinction between a struggle launched on religious 
lines and the one based on nationalist or democratic lines becomes difficult. Religious 
symbols used for mobilization and the popular indicators of political resistance often 
overlapped which makes it challenging to understand which one was dominating the 
other. In this way the situation in Kashmir during the said period presents a complicated 
picture. Quite interestingly, such a striking picture is illustrated by every contemporary 
source, whether written by a Muslim or a non-Muslim. Even the Middleton Enquiry 
Committee that was appointed to look into the causes of September unrest and communal 
riots emphasized that, 'The agitation was directed against the State authorities, and 
although it was entirely Muslim, it was not communal in the sense of being directed 
against any other community.''^' 
Right from the start there were some people and organizations outside the state 
that were against the people's movement in Kashmir. They believed that the struggle of 
Muslims had a two-fold goal—one was waging war against the Hindu ruling prince and 
overthrowing him and another was the enslaving of Hindus or eradicating them from the 
state. Such propaganda was carried out by parties from outside the state, especially when 
some Hindu leaders from outside the state realised that the Muslim struggle in the state 
was backed and even guided by the Muslims leaders of Punjab, Delhi and elsewhere. 
Several newspapers owned by Hindus published editorials and news-reports in favour of 
the state officials and the 'Hindu' ruling prince.'^^ That the organizations outside the 
state—both Muslim and flindu—were greatly responsible for giving communal colour to 
the struggle of Muslims against the state is corroborated even by government reports. G. 
E. C. Wakefield, the minister-in-charge of the Police, Political and Foreign Departments 
at the time of disturbances, noted that the leading exponents of the Punjab Muslim 
'^ ° See Table 1.5. 
Report of an hujuiry into Disturbances in Kashmir in September J 931 conducted by Mr. L Middleton, 
I.C.S., in November and December 1931, p. 21; Times of India, February 19, 1932. 
'-- Muslim Outlook, July 24, 1931. 
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"communalist" press—the Inqilab, the Siyasal and the Muslim Outlook—questioned the 
Kashmir government at every step, its every action 'anathemised as a deep-laid design on 
the part of the state authorities to frustrate the legitimate progress of Mohammadans and 
to undermine their rights and privileges.' The Dalai Committee Report observed that, 
'the meeting of the All India Kashmiri Muslim Conference held on 26"' December 1930 
was particularly virulent, and all its dogmas were adopted by the Youngmens Muslim 
Association of Jammu.' It held the two Associations responsible for hatred of the 
Muslims against the government. 
In support of the Maharaja and the Kashmiri Hindu community, the Hindu 
Mahasabha was the foremost among the organizations that carried on this propaganda. At 
its Akola session held on August 15, 1931, it passed resolutions in view of the "fieiy 
propaganda" carried on against the Maharaja of Kashmir and concluded that the root-
cause of the unrest in Kaslimir was 'a secret conspiracy of influential men working 
behind the agitation.''^^ 
As early as August, Dr. Moonji, a well-known Mahasabhaite, was seeing the 
Kashmir struggle as a conspiracy to destroy the "Hindu kingdom". He 'had hoped that 
the propaganda going on against the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir would act as an eye-
opener for Hindus all over the country but was disappointed.' Such anti-Muslim 
propaganda apart, there is one curious thing about letter. In the said letter Moonji asks the 
Maharaja that, 'may I now again request your Highness to extend to me your promised 
help and send me the amount by cable to my address which is care of Thomas Cook and 
Sons, London or care of India Office, as I have told your Highness I shall require not less 
than rupees five thousand for propaganda work in England.''^^ This clearly suggests that 
the Mahasabha was paid by the Maharaja for giving a communal colour to a movement 
against his rule. 
'^ ' "Note by Mr. G.E.C. Wakefield on the Causes of Unrest amongst the Mohammedans of the Jammu and 
Kashmir State', PoHtical Department, JKA, File No. B485/13/1931, p. 15, quoted in Chitralekha Zutshi, p. 
216, 
Report of the Srincigar Riot Enquiry Committee, p. 19. 
^-^ Al-Jamiai, Augus{20, m\. 
'^ '' 'Letter from S.B. Moonji to The Maharaja of Kashmir', dated August 19, 1931, Moonji Papers, Nehru 
Memorial Library, Delhi. 
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In November 1931, a deputation of fifteen Hindus and Sikh members of the 
Legislative Assembly led by Sir Hari Singh Gour met the Viceroy in connection with the 
Kashmir situation. They reportedly emphasized 'the strategic importance to India of the 
danger of surrender to the pan-Islamic school of thought.' Bhai Permanand, president of 
the Hindu Mahasabha and one of the members of this deputation, traced back the roots of 
the Kashmir unrest to the 1930 session of All-India Muslim League when 'Sir 
Muhammad Iqbal publicly propounded his theory of "dividing" India into Muslim India 
and Hindu India, and taking the north-west part of India for a Muslim Confederation.' To 
him, the resistance movement in Kashmir appeared as Pan-Islamic design to overthrow 
the 'Hindu' Dogra Raj there.'^^ In December 1931, a group of reactionary Hindus held a 
same Ian at Lahore under the banner of Riyasati Hindu Hitshishi Samelan. The objective 
of the samelan was to 'chalk out a practical programme to combat the Moslem movement 
in and outside the State.' In case of a retaliatory movement by Muslims, the samelan 
decided to send jathas for some Moslem state. 
Again, in February 1932 a letter from 8 Hindu and Sikh members of the 
Assembly'^^ claimed that the agitation was 'engineered, fed and nourished by the fanatic 
moulvis and Ahrar leaders from the Punjab.' The letter even recommended the use of 
force to quell the agitation in the state. It emphasized that, 'It is not enough that the 
policy be right; it is necessary for the restoration of public confidence that it should be 
believed to be right.''^^ Bhai Parmanand (M.L.A. and Mahasabha member), along with 
one Rai Bahadur Lala Sevak Ram (MLC, Punjab) visited communally-affected areas and 
made enquiry about the situation.^^' Interestingly, the government allowed this enquiry 
despite disallowing a similar enquiry by the Ahrar leader, Mazhar All, back in September 
1931, citing its declaration in September 1931 that 'no outside committees of enquiry 
could be allowed nor any interferences in the local affairs of the State people by outside 
public...' ' Quite expectedly, these incidents of partiaHty were bound to vitiate the 
'' ' Times of India, November 16, 1931 
''Mbid., December 25, 1931. 
' The letter was signed by Bhai Permanand, Sant Singh, Harbans Singh, Raghubir Singh, A. Das, 
Gosv/ami Puri, S.G.Jog, and Lalchand Navalrai. 
'"" Times of India, February 13, 1932. 
'•^ 'Ibid., March 14,1932, 
'•'" ibid., September 28, 1931. 
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relative communal harmony in the state and lead to a polarization of the two communities 
in Kashmir. 
Speaking of Kashmir proper, it is a known fact that for ages Muslims and Hindus 
had remained in a relative harmony, without being affected by the communal conflicts 
that had ravaged most parts of India during the late 19'^  and early 20'^  century. But during 
1931-32 communal riots did occur in Kashmir and Jammu provinces. In the Kashmir 
valley, a couple of communal riots occurred in July and a few during the subsequent 
months but none of them was of a serious nature as to result in a loss of life of civilians. 
On the other hand, the communal clashes that took place in Mirpur, Jammu, Rajouri, and 
Kotli areas of Jammu province were of graver nature and dozens (Hindus and Muslims) 
died there.''''' The communal harmony that prevailed in Kashmir for a long time is usually 
attributed to Kashmiriyat, a term symbolizing belonging and fraternity among the Hindus 
and Muslims of Kashmir and recognized as a cornerstone of the peaceful coexistence of 
the Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir over centuries. Several definitions put forward by 
writers and scholars who have examined the Kashmiri society are rather vague in their 
treatment of the subject. Terms like multiculturalism and tolerance, ethnic nationalism, 
love of the homeland {kashir), mutual adaptation of religious traditions, behavior pattern, 
etc., are widely used for defining Kashmiriyat but the ambiguit)' still remains. Some 
writers and scholars have even challenged this concept of Kashmiriyat as a cover-up and 
a hotchpotch of ideologies of secularism and nationalism.''''* A detailed analysis of the 
term, its meaning and implications is beyond the scope of this study. But it would be 
sufficient to observe that while we cannot exclusively attribute the communal harmony in 
the Kashmir valley to Kashmiriyat, the fact that communal riots took place in the Janunu 
region to a far greater extent, with greater severity, and for longer duration than in the 
Kaslimir valley implies that something was at work under the surface which prevented 
such happenings in the Valley. Kashmiriyat may well be invoked to understand this 
phenomenon, but even then, the magnitude of repression that the Dogra dynasty 
unleashed in Kashmir valley—their "gold-bought territory"—appears to have been far 
'" See, Ibid., November 5, 1931 and January 28, 1932. 
'"•* For a detailed analysis of tlie term by various writers, see, R.ataii Lai Ilangloo, 'Kashmiriyat: The Voice 
of the Past Misconstrued', Nyia Ali Khan, (ed.) The Parchment of Kashmir - History, Society and Polity, 
New York, 2012, pp. 37-40. 
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greater than they did to contain the more severe situations in the Jammu province—their 
"eternal" home. Thus, it may be concluded that the virtue of Kashmiriyal and a harsh 
state machinery in the Kashmir valley restricted the severity of communal conflicts there. 
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Chapter 4 
From Community Politics to National Struggle (1932-38) 
The recurring acts of defying the authorities by the people soon made the state 
realize that repression alone was not the solution of the problems that the state was 
facing. It is pertinent to mention here that from July up to November the government 
enacted as many as ten ordinances to put down the agitation.' This is enough to gauge the 
magnitude of the agitation and the extent to which the State attempted to keep things 
under control. Finally, the Colonial authorities suggested the Maharaja to appoint a 
commission which would enquire into tlic long-standing grievances of the people and 
help "normalize" the situation. The Maharaja was also aware of the repercussions for his 
administration and even his possible dethronement in case the law and order problems 
escalated more than what he could control. Already in 1930-31, during a session of the 
First Round Table Conference, in response to a question by Diwan Bahadur 
Ramachandra Rao (a prominent member of the AISPC), regarding the grant of 
fundamental rights of citizenship to the States' people, Maharaja Hari Singh had boasted 
that 'such rights [were] already in operation in [his] State as also in many other States.' 
This he had asserted in spite of the absence, in his state, of these rights like people-
elected legislature, religious freedom, press and newspapers, public opinion, freedom of 
association, etc. In backdrop of the mounting unrest among the people, he was now 
prepared to grant certain basic rights to his subjects in order to reduce the magnitude of 
grievances among them. Therefore, he agreed to the proposal of the colonial officials 
which culminated into the appointment of the Grievances Enquiry Commission under the 
chairmanship of Sir Bertrand J. Glancy—the most important commission that was ever 
set up in Dogra-ruled Jammu and Kashmir. 
The Glancy Commission was formally appointed in November 1931. With B.J. 
Glancy, a senior member of Foreign and Political Department of Government of India, as 
its chairman, the enquiry commission consisted of four non-official members: Ghulam 
' Times of India, November 5, 1931. 
- hidian Round Table Conference, 12''' November, 1930- 19"' January, 1931, Proceedings, Calcaiia, 1931, 
p. 246. 
83 
Ahmad Ashai and Pandil Prem Nalh Bazaz representing the Muslims and Hindus of 
Kashmir province, respectively, and Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas and Pandit Lok Nath 
Sharma representing the Muslims and Hindus of Jamniu province, respectively. The 
Hindu community of Jammu, however, soon recalled their member as a protest mark 
against the inclusion of Hindu Law of Inheritance in the enquiry.'^  In March 1932, the 
enquiry commission submitted its detailed report. It brought to fore the grievances of the 
people of Kashmir, in general, and of Muslims, in particular. The Commission sought to 
bring sweeping changes in the administrative, educational, social and political structure 
of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The first and foremost demand of the enquiry commission pertained to the 
restoration of religious places of Muslims which were hitherto under the control of the 
Stale and, for the restoration of which the community had been fighting for long. It 
suggested the granting of religious freedom to every community living in the state and 
asked the Maharaja to warn his officials not to be involved in the insult of or interference 
with the religious tenets of Muslims. Another significant recommendation in this regard 
was the recognition of the right of the converts to acquire ancestral property. It 
recommended the setting up of more schools especially for Muslims, provision of special 
Muhammcdan scholarships, improvement in girl educalion and increasing the number of 
Muslim teachers in schools.'"' Regarding the employment of Muslims in services, the 
Commission specifically advised the government not to pitch minimum qualifications 
unnecessarily high;*" this meant that the persons with much higher qualifications than the 
required minimum need not necessarily be preferred over Muslim youth with standard 
qualifications, a practice that had been in vogue in the stale for many years. 
For the purpose of providing relief to agriculturalists, the Commission 
recommended that proprietary rights be restored to cultivators with the condition that a 
Land Alienation Act be passed which should allow a cultivator to sell or mortgage his 
land only to a member of the agricultural class. It also suggested the remittance of 
Report of the [Gkmcyj Coiniimsion, p. 1. 
•' Ibid., pp. 3-8. 
Mbid.,pp. 9-17. 
"Ibid., p. 19, 
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Malikana and suspension of or reduction in the grazing tax/ Besides these, the 
Commission took a serious note of several other grievances of the people and 
recommended, among other things, the abolition of unauthorized exactions and forced 
labour, development of industrial sector, construction of hospitals, improvement in roads 
and communication, reorganization of the Dharmarath Trust, prevention of trafficking of 
women, and the like. In response to the report of the Commission, the Maharaja passed 
orders to immediately put into effect the recommendations as soon as possible.^ 
The report complcicly disproved the earlier stand of the Maharaja that his subjects 
were enjoying fundamental rights and that discontent did not exist in his state. Through 
the outcome of the different enquiry commissions over past few months the British v/erc 
also invalidating the claim of good administration and existence of perfect communal 
harmony as asserted by the Maharaja on different occasions."' The Clancy Commission 
invoked generally positive reactions from the Muslims in the state and outside. However, 
a section of Kashmiri Hindus functioned against the Commission during the period of the 
enquiry as well as after its publication. Fearing that the recommendations, if 
implemented, would set into motion forces which would lead to upliftment of Muslims 
supposedly at the cost of the livelihood of Pandits, they started rallying public support 
against the Commission on two fronts—economic and religious. The Pandit Yuvak Sabha 
(or Pandit's Political Conference) announced a boycott of the Commission and asked the 
Hindu members to quit; Lok Nath Sharma succumbed to the pressure but P.N. Bazaz 
refused to quit for which they "disowned" him." They raised objection over the 
recommendation that Muslims be appointed on priority basis and special scholarships be 
provided to them. Apprehensive that such recommendations would put their position in 
jeopardy, they demanded that merit be considered in employment to services, and that the 
' Rent extracted by the State, hi Kashmir proper, except in the Sriiiagar city, the State was the owner of the 
land, hi a few parts of Jammu, same was the case while the rest of the land was owned by private 
proprietors. Normally, the malikana used to be merged in the revenue and demanded from the cultivators. 
But under the Settlement of 1931, the State imposed malikana over and above the land revenue. This 
created disaffection among the cultivating class in Jammu province, especially in Mirpur district. Ibid., op. 
26-7. 
Mbid., pp. 26-31. 
See, Orders on the Recommendations contained in the Glancy Commission's Report, .lammu, 1932. 
'" For instance, in a speech during the First Round Table Conference, he had boasted of the existence of 
perfect communal harmony in his stale, a claim that soon proved to be untrue. 
" Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 154-55; Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 213. 
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scholarships be provided to Hindus also.'^ Shortly afterwards, the campaign of 
disappointed Pandhs took the fonn of an open agitation against the Kashmir State. For 
ages the Pandits had been associating themselves with government employment so much 
so that 'while for other communities it was merely a step towards greater political 
leverage, for the Pandit it determined his veiy being.''^ A handbill entitled 'Agitation 
Zindabad' (Long Live the Agitation) was circulated among the Pandits in Srinagar 
immediately after the Maharaja passed orders to implement the Glancy Commission's 
recommendations in 1932. In a bizarre allusion to Napolean, it exhorted the Pandits to 
'produce [his] spirit [and] show to the world that though [they] were small in number 
[they] were so intelligent that heavens too whirl before [them].''"* 
While previously they had agitated against the employment of Punjabi officials in 
Kaslmiir administration, the Glancy Commission recommendations had made them prone 
to a new rival. This bone of contention gave rise to what came to be known as the 'Roti 
Agitation' or 'Bread Agitation'. With speculation from certain quarters that their 
agitation was backed by the Congress, they affirmed that theirs was a 'cry for bread' and 
was not even remotely 'associated or inspired by the Congress.''^ Paradoxically, at the 
same time, they vowed to 'fight with the weapons of [the] Apostle of truth, non-violence 
and love [Mahatma Gandhi]' and warned the government that the efforts of 'the Glancy 
Commission...to strangulate the Kashmiri Pandit' would not succeed.'^ Although the 
Congress did not involve itself in the agitation, some Hindu Mahasabha leaders, notably 
B.S. Moonji, were taking interest in the Pandit agitation. They projected themselves not 
only as 'well-wishers' of the Pandits but also as 'guardians' of the Hindu faith. 
Perceiving the state of Kashmir as a Hindu state for the mere fact that it was ruled by a 
Hindu prince whose origin supposedly went back to the great 'Suryavansha of Sri 
'- Ranbir (Weekly), Jammu, May 20, 1932. 
'•' Bazaz, Inside Kasiimir, p. 283. 
'"' Translation of a handbill titled 'Agitation Zindabad', 11/1/1/2223, CRR, 1932, lOL, quoted in Chitralekha 
Zutshi, p. 276. (In the absence of access to the original source 1 have quoted the words exactly as cited in 
the said secondary work). 
'^  'An Appeal to the British from Maheshwar Nath Kaula, Fifteenth Dictator', Letter from C. Latimer 
[Resident] to R.E.L. Wingate, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, dated May 20, 1932, Foreign 
and Political (Political), NAI, 1932, File No. 325-P, Nos. 1-6. 
"^  'Appeal from Maheshwar Nath Kaula', Foreign and Political (Political), NAI, May 21, 1932, File No. 
325-P. 
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Ramachanderji, symbol of the ancient Kshtriya valour, pride of Hindu race and the 
defender of the Vedic Dhanna', Dr. Moonji, while protesting on the question of property 
right to converts and use of supposed Hindu pilgrimage places by Muslims, brought to 
the notice of B.J. Glancy that such laws 'concern[ed] the entire Hindu society of India 
and not only the local Hindus of Kaslimir' and, therefore, must not be altered.'^ Thus, the 
right-wing organizations of India could see the Commission's report through the prism of 
religion; several Pandits from the valley shared this view point. Pandh Kashyap Bandhu, 
a member of the Sanatan Dharma Association who later joined the ranks of Muslim 
leaders, was at this point, believing it to be a move to 'root out Hinduism from the 
country' and 'please the Muslims,''** 
The Sikhs also supported the Pandits in their quest of challenging the Muslim 
demands despite enjoying a considerable share in the administrative setup of the state 
much higher than their proportional numerical strength in the population. Sardar Budh 
Singh, the well-known leader of the Sikh community of the state, in his presidential 
address to the Sikh Political Conference, declared that the Government of India was in 
collusion with the Muslims and they either wanted to Europeanize the administration of 
Kashmir or Muhammadize it. Since 'the peril of Pan-Islamism stare[d] the Hindus in the 
face quite as much as the Siklis', it was the latter's obligation to help Hindus in giving a 
common fight against the Muslims.''^ 
The agitation, however, ended in whimper, with several Pandits ending up in 
prison.^" One of the significant causes of the failure of this agitation was that some of the 
popular Pandit leaders did not support it. Either out of expediency or because of seeing 
the recommendations of the commission through a compassionate eye, they refused to be 
dvsmn in into the agitation. Pandit Jia Lai Kilam, who is said to have been one of the 
instigators of the agitation,^' later retracted from his stand and claimed that the agitation 
represented no more than some random unfortunate events 'engineered by some 
'^  'Letter from Moonji to B. J. Glancy', dated March 9, 1934, Moonji Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum 
and Library, New Delhi. 
'* 'English Translation of a letter from Kashyap Bandhu to Jagat Narian Lai of the Hindu Sabha (Patna)', 
dated 25 June 1932, R/1/1/2662 (1), CRR, lOL, 1932, quoted in Chitralekha Zutshi, pp. 276-77. 
" The /ndian Nation (Patna), November 25, 1931. 
-" 'C. Latimer to Sir Charles, dated 6"' June, 1932', File No. 325-P. 
"' Fida Muhammad Flassnain, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir, New Delhi, 1988, p. 71. 
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misguided officials.'^^ P.N. Bazaz was fi-om tlie beginning, except for a short spell of 
time, sympathetic towards the MusHms' demands. While adding a 'note of dissent' by 
Chaudhary Ghuiam Abbas to the Enquiry Commission report, which B.J. Glancy agreed 
to add after much reluctance, Bazaz consistently remained in favour of the note. Abbas 
informs us that 'if there had been a Hindu member other than Bazaz, Muslims would 
have got not even half of what the Glancy Commission recommended for them.'^ "* This 
negates the portrayal of the Pandit community as a unified group opposing the demands 
of Muslims and giving a communal colour lo the events. 
After the publication of the Glancy Commission report, the government appointed 
the Kashmir Constitutional Reforms Conference in March 1932 with B.J. Glancy as the 
chairman and two official members and twelve non-official members representing 
different communities inhabiting the state.^ ^ Curiously, the members were chosen from 
within religious communities, regions and the landed aristocracy, leaving aside the 
peasants, labourers and workers.^'' Subsequently, a Franchise Committee was formed 
under the chairmanship of Sir Barjor Dalai which chalked out a program of introducing 
adult franchise and establishment of a Legislative Assembly in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
Now that the government allowed the formation of political platform in the state, 
the Muslim leadership felt the need of establishing a representative organization. Thus, in 
October 1932 the state saw its first ever purely-political organization - the All Jammu 
and Kashmir Muslim Conference - which held hs first session on 15*'' - 17"^  October m 
Srinagar under the presidentship of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. The idea of a joint 
organization of Muslims and non-Muslims, as proposed by Abdullah, could not 
materialize due to the rift created by now between the two communities. The demand 
"" 'Letter from Jia Lai Kilam to Tej Bahadur Sapru', dated February 25, 1933, Srinagar. 
"Abbas, pp. 110-1. 
-^  Ibid., pp. 112-3. 
" Times of India, March 9, 1932; Selected Documents, pp. 193-94. 
'^ Mirza Shafiq Hussain, Kashmiri Musalmanon ki Siyasi Jadujehd, 1931-39: Muntakhab Dasiwaizal 
(Urdu), 1985, pp. 193-4. 
"' Times of India, June 6, 1932. 
"* Munlakliab Dusiawuizul, p. 217. 
''' Sheikh Abdullah, Flanies oflhe Cliinar, p. 36. 
88 
for the implementation of the Glancy Commission recommendations in their totality, 
which the government had been continually delaying, became the primary objective of 
the Conference. In order to educate people about the recommendations, how these were 
going to affect their lives and what steps needed to be taken in case of a further delay in 
their implementation, the Muslim Conference leaders started a mass contact campaign 
under the guidance of Sheikh Abdullah. 
Sheikh Abdullah was aware of the indispensability of winning over the trust of 
the masses. Long before his career as a political leader started, he was probably thinking 
of success of a movement in terms of public support. In 1924, when Khawaja Saad-ud-
Din and Khawaja Noor Shah Naqashbandi were banished from the state, Abdullah was a 
student in the Islamia College Lahore. The former two were staying at Mian 
Nizamuddin's home. Abdullah used to visit them. One day they complained about the 
silence of people of Kashmir over their banishment over which Abdullah told them that 
since they had not taken the people into confidence, they should not expect anything in 
return from them.'''' Apparently being influenced by Gandhian tactic of launching 
movements, he seems to have realized that any movement with a mass base would impact 
the status quo more than what petitions or pleas forwarded by individuals could do. 
From its inception the organization, in spite of having a communal nomenclature, 
declared itself to be non-communal body established to fight for the just rights of 
Muslims of the state. In his presidential address, Sheikh Abdullah declared the members' 
'loyalty to the Maharaja''' and affirmed that 'we have declared it at the outset of the 
struggle that the Kashmiri movement is not a communal movement, but for the redress of 
the grievances of all the people. I assure my Hindu and Sikh brothers that we are ready to 
remove their sufferings as we ha^ e^ done in the case of Muslims.'^^ The leaders reiterated, 
time and again, that all they wanted was a responsible government which would benefit 
all the people irrespective of their religious or class affiliations. Ironically, a section of 
the Hindu community, supported by the Hindu Mahasabha, could not reconcile 
themselves with such statements. The demand for the establishment of a representative 
^^bid. 
' Times of India, October 16, 1932. 
"" Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 36. 
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government in the state, argued the Hindu leaders, was 'made out on the lines of 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah's "'Fourteen Points" asking for a democratic constitution but 
demanding that the seats should be reserved in the ministry and the legislature for 
Muslims in proportion to their numbers.' This statement was issued while ignoring the 
fact that the Kashmiri leadership had neither made any reference to Jinnah or the Muslim 
League during the pre-1931 period or the period immediately after it, nor was there any 
direct support of the League forthcoming to Kashmiri leaders during the given period. In 
fact, the later dcvelopmenls took the Muslim movement closer to the Congress than to the 
League. The demand of joint electorate as early as 1933-34 is a clear indication that the 
policy of the Muslim leadership in Kashmir, if not avowedly that of Congress, was 
certainly not inspired by the Muslim League's politics in India. 
Notwithstanding the disapproval of the use of communal politics by the Muslim 
Conference, the leadership did not abandon, as a tool of mobilization, the use of religious 
symbols and rhetoric. Pathar Masjid, the first mosque that was restored to the community 
(hitherto used by the goverrunent as a granaiy) on the condition that no 'speeches other 
than purely religious be made in the mosque or in the compound attached to it',^' turned 
•J C 
into a political platform for the Muslim leadership. The party chose a green flag with a 
crescent^^ as the colour green and the crescent are usually associated with Islam. 
Furthermore, the speeches before the public gatherings and the sessions of Muslim 
Conference would always begin with Sheikh Abdullah reciting verses from the Quran. 
Right from its inception the struggle for responsible government in Kashmir 
suffered from serious contradictions and challenges, both from within and without. On 
the one hand, the challenge was posed by the Dogra-British alliance and, on the other 
hand, by the inlra-community and inter-communily rivahy, all of which tended to undo 
the very purpose of the ixeedom struggle. In this regard the more pronounced rivalry was 
the one between Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah (head cleric of Jama Masjid). 
'Statement by Hindu Mahasabha to Press', issued November 18 1931, the Indian Nation, November 23, 
1931. 
''' 'Notification by Prime Minister, Jammu and Kashmir', dated 29 October, 1932, Political Department, 
JKA, 1933, File No. 373/kl-P.S. 
' The first session oftlie Muslim Conference in 1932 was held in the Pathar Masjid. 
•''' Hassnain, p. 77. 
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The basic cause of the rift between these two leaders seems to have been the growing 
popularity of Sheikh Abdullah among the masses which somehow reduced the charisma 
of the Mirwaiz, who was once venerated by the Kashmiri Muslims 'only next to the 
Prophet'.''^ As political consciousness grew among the people, it affected the dominant 
religious perceptions of the time; those fighting solely for political purpose began to 
outshine the Mirwaiz, and in the course of time Sheikh Abdullah emerged as the most 
popular leader.^ ^ Eventually, Mirwaiz began to lose his royal patronage, the source of his 
livelihood. In fact, the leaders battled for getting control of mosques and shrines as 
platforms for public speeches and gatherings. To the dismay of Yusuf Shah, S. Abdullah, 
according to available evidence, at many occasions, himself began to preach at various 
mosques,^^ and even began to acquire offerings from the people—a privilege that the 
Mirwaiz had been enjoying for long.'"^ 
In this rivalry the religio-cultural conditions of Kashmir played no less significant 
role. Even though the Mirwaiz Jama Masjid had a good following among the people, yet 
people had greater affiliations with those who possessed a pro-shrine and pro-saint 
standpoint; Mirwaiz Ahmadullah Hamdani was from the latter stock. Mirwaiz Yusuf 
Shah could apparently not tolerate the siding of Abdullah with his arch-rival, Mirwaiz 
Hamdani. Therefore, he blamed Sheikh Abdullah of being a Qadiani,""—a tag that could 
have disrupted the career of Sheikh Abdullah forever, for Qadianis (Ahmadis) were 
considered heretics in the conservative religious circles. The Ahrars, who had already 
been disappointed by the attitude of Abdullah towards them, also gave currency to the 
rumour spread by Yusuf Shah.''^  The Mirwaiz and the Ahrars believed that in the guise of 
political activism the Ahmadiyyas were actually carrying on their proselytizing activities 
in Kashmir."*^ 
"Abbas, p. 68. 
'^  Ibid., p. 167. 
•^^  R/1/1/2223, CRR (Political Department), Fortnightly Reports on the internal Situation in Kashmir, 1932, 
report dated 1 September 1932, lOL, quoted in Mridu Rai, p. 269. 
'*" R/l/1/2223, CRR (Political Department), Fortnightly Reports on the Internal Situation in Kashmir, 1932, 
report dated 18 July 1932, lOL, quoted in Mridu Rai, p. 269. 
'" Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 32. 
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Serious dissentions both within the Kashmir Committee and the MusHm 
Conference occurred due to this propaganda. As a resuU, the Muslim leadership, headed 
by Sheikh Abdullah severed connections with the Ahmadiyyas. In a meeting at Lahore 
Sheii-ch Abdullah declared that 'it was impossible for [them] to involve the Ahmadiyyas 
and their fellow-travelers in [the] movement because their dual commitment could fan the 
flames of internecine strife.''*'^  In an attempt to retain his public image as a devout 
Muslim, he publicly stated thai 'Muslim Conference [wa]s a purely political body and 
ha[d] nothing to do with any sect; that he [wa]s a Hanafi Muslim by belief and ha[dj no 
sympathy for the religious propaganda of Qadianis.'''^ Consequently, several Ahmadiyya 
leaders from the old guard, notably Ghulam Nabi Gilkar and Moulvi Abdullah Vakil, quit 
the Muslim Conference/^ On the other hand, the suspicion of the proselytizing zeal of 
Ahmadis arose among the members of the Kashmir Committee and Sir Muhammad Iqbal 
suggested its reorganization. Us reorganization took place in September 1932.'''' 
The intra-comniunity rivalry among the Muslims manifested itself not only 
through accusations and counter-accusations but also took the fonn of open clashes. The 
gulf between Abdullah and Mirwaiz led to a polarization of the followers of these two 
leaders into two extremely adversary groups—the Shera group (named after Sheikh 
Abdullah who was popular among the Muslims as Sher-i-Kashmir or the Lion of 
Kashmir) and the Bakra group (named so because of the long beards of mullahs, who 
rallied behind Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah). The state, while outwardly trying to ease the intra-
community tensions of Muslims (for these were a threat to the law and order), was, in 
fact, trying the "carrot and stick approach'. On the one hand, the group led by S. Abdullah 
became the victim of government oppression and, on the other hand, attempts were made 
to woo the Mirwaiz. Thus, when a person from the 'shera' group was killed in a clash 
between the 'bakras' and 'sheras', a clash that was reportedly provoked by Yusuf Shah's 
speech in a Srinagar mosque, the government ordered that, Tiis Highness the Maharaja 
Bahadur is pleased to order that a police post be located in Maisuma for a period of six 
months and expenses incurred on this, Rs. 1828, be realized from people other than 
'" Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 33. 
•'^  Times of India, Ociobcr 6, 1933. 
''"' Sheikh Abdullali, Flames ofihe China/; p. 33. 
" Times of India, July 4, 1933 and September 6, 1933. 
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Hindus, Sikhs and Yusuf Shahi Muslims."^^ By exempting "Yusuf Shahi Muslims" from 
paying the punitive tax, the Maharaja was clearly revealing the 'rapport' with Mirwaiz; 
the term "Yusuf Shahi Muslims", in itself, shows that the Maharaja was playing the 
sectarian card by "creating" a sect of Muslims paying allegiance to Yusuf Shah. As the 
later developments revealed, the Maharaja succeeded in his attempt to a considerable 
level. Soon Abdullah and Yusuf Shah parted ways, and in 1933, Yusuf Shah founded his 
own party— t^he Muslim Azad Party Conference—as an alternative to the All Jammu and 
Kashmir Muslim Conference. 
Even though Maharaja Hari Singh had, without any delay, passed orders on the 
Clancy Commission's recommendations, most of these were not implemented with the 
same swiftness. Rather, as the official organ {Sadaqat) of the Muslim Conference noted, 
'the Government sat satisfactorily by applying the "Glancy Chloroform" bottle to the 
nose of the public and thought that the calmourers had become senseless."''^ Those 
recommendations that were implemented could neither satisfy Muslims nor Hindus. 
Therefore, in 1934, the Muslim Conference decided to launch a civil disobedience. The 
government re-enacted the Notification 19-L. The Working Committee was dissolved 
and Ghulam Abbas declared the 'Dictator'. A civil disobedience movement ensued in 
which several leaders including Ghulam Abbas were arrested and imprisoned.^ 
Although, by now the civil disobedience launched by the Congress in 1930 had receded, 
people of several princely states had taken cue from it. Running parallel to the civil 
disobedience program of the Congress, and even after it was withdrawn, were the 
movements started by states' people in Alwar, Sikar (Jaipur), Loharu, and some states of 
Rajasthan and Orissa; Kashmir - as it was deeply inspired by the anti-colonial struggle of 
nationalist organizations - usually emulated their policies to bring pressure on the state 
government. 
"** Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 40. 
"' Sadaqal, January 26, 1934, Political Department, JKA, 1933, File No. 223/PP2/1933. The first 
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In the autumn of 1934 the government finally announced the elections to the 
Legislative Assembly—or Praja Sabha (Assembly of Subjects) as it came to be called. 
Although a memorandum submitted by Ghulam Abbas, prepared in consultation with 
Abdullah and Bazaz, demanded a joint electorate system for the proposed Assembly, the 
government did not accept the demand.^' The Assembly was to have a total strength of 75 
members; of these 33 were to be elected and 33 nominated. The elected members were to 
consist of 21 Muslims, 10 Hindus and 2 Sildis; the nominated members would be 12 
officials, 14 non-officials and 16 State Councilors. Adult suffrage was not adopted 
presumably due to low standard of education. Candidates for membership of Assembly 
were required to have attained the age of 25 and to be literate either in the Persian or 
Devanagri script. The Praja Sabha was authorized to exercise power of interpellation, of 
passing resolutions, of discussing budget and of introducing and passing resolutions. By 
the Regulation No. 1 of 1991 Samvat (1934), all ultimate powers were vested in the 
Maharaja. The members of the Assembly could hold the office during the Maharaja's 
pleasure. The members would have no power on the Privy Purse; they would have 
control neither on army nor the Dharmarath trust; nor could they do anything about the 
Ordinances issued by the Maharaja from time to time. Besides, it enfranchised only ten 
percent of the total population.^'' 
These provisions do not seem to have pleased any of the communities' leaders. 
Nevertheless, the elections offered them a chance to represent the voice of the masses 
which they could not afford to lose. The main contesting political parties were the AH 
Jammu and Kashmir Muslims Conference, the Muslim Azad Party Conference of 
Mirwaiz, the Yuvak Sabha of Kaslimir Pandits, the Hindu Mahasabha of Jammu, and 
some independent candidates." '^' Even though most of the leaders of the Muslim 
Conference were in prison, and despite the opposition by certain members. Sheikh 
Abdullah remained adamant on contesting elections.^^ To everybody's surprise the 
Muslim Conference won a landslide victory, bagging all the 21 seats earmarked for 
'^ Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 159. 
" R.G. Wreford, Census of India, 1941, Vol. XXll, Jammu and Kashmir, Parts I & II, Essays and Tables, 
Jammu, 1941, p. 5. 
" Regulation 1 of 1991 Samvat, G.H. Khan, Appendix H, pp. 483-91. 
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elected Muslim members.^'' Thus, Abdullah's choice of participating in elections as a 
means of enhancing the prestige and credibility of the Muslim Conference as well as 
having a little, if not full, control on the government machinery, proved to be a decision 
of political prudence. The government certainly felt shocked on seeing the massive public 
support garnered by MC during its less than two years of existence. The victory in 
elections not only increased the prestige of Muslim Conference but also brought to light 
Abdullah's political foresight. 
l^ he first session of the Assembly was held in October 1934. At the inaugural 
ceremony, the Maharaja proclaimed: 
'For our part we declare Divine Providence having laid upon us the sacred duty 
to care equally for all those commitled to our guardianship, we recognize no 
difference between one person and another or between one class and another. 
They are all our beloved children, whatever tlieir persuasion or creed, and we 
desire to protect, foster, guide and advance them by any means in our power. Out 
of the great love and affection, we bear our beloved subjects, we have called 
upon you to do your part in working for the well being of this state.' 
The Maharaja, thus, proclaimed his paternalism in these words. However, such 
rhetoric could not prove fruitful as the subsequent events proved. The Praja Sabha, where 
the 'beloved subjects' were "called upon to do their part' proved to be no more than a 
hoax, 'though...given the grand eloquent name of Praja Sabha!'^^ The Maharaja was still 
the pivot of the administrative machinery and the executive was responsible to him and 
not to the Assembly, The only thing in Praja Sabha that could be considered beneficial 
for the people of the state was that it would act as a platform for dialogue between the 
different communities of the state. 
After the formation of the Muslim Conference the Kaslimiri Muslim leadership 
constantly made efforts to induce the non-MusIini leaders in joining the movement for 
responsible government. With the purpose of approaching the minorities, the Muslim 
^^ Hassnain, p. 82. 
'^' 'Proclamation of Maharaja Hari Singh to the Praja Sabha, 1934', quoted in Hassnain, pp. 82-3. 
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Conference formed a committee consisting of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, Saad-ud-Din 
Shawl, Agha Syed Husain Jalali, Moulvi Abdullah Vakil, and Mian Ahmad Yar Khan. 
Deliberations with the Hindu and Sikh leaders succeeded to some extent and as a result 
many non-Muslim leaders joined the Muslim Conference. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz had 
been a supporter of the Muslim demands right from July 1932. Sardar Budh Singh's 
inclusion in the organization was the important outcome of these efforts.^ ^ By 1933, it 
had become apparent to the Muslim leadership that the support of non-Muslims in the 
national cause was of utmost importance. Even though some non-Muslim leaders had 
voiced their sympathetic attitude towards the Muslim Conference, it was still 
unsatisfactory as the bulk of the non-Muslim population and the leaders did not look at 
the Conference with favour. Thus, Sheikh Abdullah, in order to remove the 
apprehensions of the non-Muslims, declared in the presidential address of the Muslim 
Conference held in Mirpur in December 1933:^ ° 
'The loss of rights is a loss to all, whether he is a Muslim or a non-Muslim. The 
Muslim Conference has fought for the right of the people and there is no 
discrimination between a Hindu and a Muslim. The proprietary rights, remission 
of taxes, freedom of press and platform, rights to organize association and 
assembly have benefitted all. 1 appeal to the non-Muslims that they should stand 
shoulder to shoulder with us so as to take part in the emancipation of the people, 
freedom of the nation from degradation, poverty and slavery... there is no reason 
why Hindus should not join their Muslim brothers on this national front.' 
The speech of Abdullah bears testimony to the fact that the Muslim leadership did 
not recognize Hindus and Muslims as two separate nations. The speech does illustrate 
political foresight, and recognition of the need for a common fight against the Dogra Raj, 
a strategy that would be aimed at the welfare of the 'nation' rather than the 'community'. 
The contributions of Abdullah and Bazaz in this direction are far greater than any other 
leader. Their initial closeness and later rivaliy may be traced back to their meeting in the 
Cheshmashahi garden in Srinagar in July 1932. Here, these two leaders, one of whom, as 
59 
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the president ol' the Sanatan Dharma Youngmcii's Association, had protested on the 
release of Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders in August 1931^' and, the other who had 
been generally critical of the attitude of the Pandits, decided to conduct the freedom 
movement of Kashmir together on 'secular, progressive and democratic lines.'^^ 
As a joint venture, Bazaz and Abdullah, in early 1935, started a weekly 
newspaper viz., IIuDidard,^^ which would act as a 'standard-bearer of democracy and 
unity of all Kashmiris without any consideration of caste or creed they professed'.^'' The 
newspaper published editorials in which scathing attacks were made on the government's 
policies, the conservative Hindus and Muslims were taken to task, and suggestions were 
made for the improvement of Hindu-Muslim relations for the over-all development of the 
nation. Probably as a result of this, the fourth annual session of the Muslim Conference 
held under the presidentship of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas in October 1935 witnessed the 
participation of several Hindu and Sikh leaders.''^ At the same time, the Kashmiri 
leadership, after severing connections with the Ahmadiyyas, began to stay aloof from 
Punjab politics which, according to them, was the leading cause of the communal strife in 
Kashmir. Such opinions found abundant space in the editorials of the Hamdard written 
by the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh leaders. Hamdard became a staunch advocate of 
maintaining the indigenous character of the struggle and purge it of the influence of all 
the "communal" organizations of Punjab which had allegedly misled the struggle of the 
people of Kashmir right from its inception. ^ The newspaper, however, was not averse to 
the nationalist leaders of India; in fact, it was Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, a well-laiown 
Congress Socialist, who inaugurated the first issue of Hamdard in a public meeting in 
Srinagar.^'' The newspaper published articles and editorials of nationalist leaders of India. 
Articles by Jawaharlal Nehru could usually be seen in the newspaper. 
*"' Representation of Sanatan Dharam Yoiingmen's Association, Srinagar, to the Prime Minister and his 
Reply Thereto', September 6, 1931, p. 1. 
*•" Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 157. 
^^  Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Cliiiuir, pp. 46-7; Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 167. 
'"' Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 167. 
*" Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chimr, pp. 47-8. 
'''' 'How did Communal Mentality became widespread in Kaslimir?', Hamdard, Srinagar, February 1, 1936. 
''' Bazaz, History of Struggle, p. 167. 
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By 1935, the political atmosphere of India had witnessed a considerable change. 
The Government of India Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1935, envisaged a 
federal scheme, the deliberations for which had taken place during the three Round Table 
Conferences held during 1930 and 1932. Although the Congress had boycotted the First 
Round Table Conference in 1930, the British officials persuaded Mahatma Gandhi for 
participating in the Second Conference held in 1931. During the proceedings the 
constitutional problem of India was discussed and a federal structure proposed for the 
centre in which the princely states and the provinces would participate. The princes 
(Kashmir, Hyderabad, Baroda and others), Muslim leaders (Jinnah, Sir M. Shafi and 
others) and the Liberal group (Tej Bahadur Sapru and others) to the proposals. The 
princes anticipated a reduction in the claims of paramountcy; the Muslims were satisfied 
by the provision of a weak centre while the clause of a responsible centre enticed the 
Liberal group.*"^  But the proceedings broke down on account of the failure of the 
Minorities Committee to arrive at any agreement. Although the Muslim representatives 
comprising of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Sir Muhammad Shafi and Agha Khan and the 
Liberal group agreed to the provision of joint electorates with reserved seats for Muslims, 
the insistence of the Jinnah group for reservation of seats in Bengal and Punjab was in no 
way acceptable to the Mahasabha group led by B.S. Moonji and M.R. Jayakar.^^ Not only 
that, now the depressed classes, Anglo-Indians and Christians too demanded separate 
electorates. Thus, on the one hand, the British had an advantage with whatever the 
results, and on the other hand, neither could the communal problem be solved nor was 
Gandhi satisfied. 
The second phase of the civil disobedience movement, thus, started in 1932 after 
the Second Round Table Conference (1931) from which Mahatma Gandhi returned 
'empty-handed' despite of his initial optimism.''^ For next one and a half years, the 
movement succeeded in sustaining itself in spile of severe repression by the British 
government. But in comparison with the enthusiasm among the people during the first 
"^  Sumit Sarkar, pp. 308-09. 
''' Sumit Sarkar, p. 309. It is noteworthy to mention that even in 1927, at the All-Parties meet in Delhi the 
Mahasabha had opposed the demand of Muslims which had resulted in the disappointment of Muslim 
leaders. They adopted a similar approach in this case as well. 
D. Chakrabarty and C. Bhatlacharyya (ed.), Congress in Evolution - A Collection of Congress 
Resolutions from 1885-1931 and Other Documents, 1935, p. xiv. 
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phase, the second phase could not evoke much enthusiasm due to circumstances. With 
much more intense and systematic repression by the government, as compared with the 
first phase of the civil disobedience, the movement was called off in 1934. Gandhi now 
concentrated on a constructive programme. 
In the meantime, Gandhi was arrested in January 1932. While in prison he went 
for a fast unto death against the Communal Award [Ramsay Macdonald Award] which 
guaranteed separate electorate to the depressed classes. Gandhi was of the view that the 
provision of the separate electorate 'would politically separate them and would 
permanently block the path of their integration into Hindu society.' The negotiations 
between Gandhi and Ambedkar led to what came to be known as the Toona Pact'. 
Tlu-ough this agreement Gandhi accepted the proposal of reserved seats for the depressed 
classes. Finally the Third Round Table Conference took place in November-December 
1932 which recorded the lowest participation of delegates. The three Conferences spread 
over three years led to the proposal of replacement of diarchy in provinces by responsible 
governments and a federation in the centre consisting of the provinces and the states - a 
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basis for the passage of the Government of India Act, 1935. 
The provinces were to be governed under a new system based on provincial 
autonomy under which elected ministers controlled all provincial departments, subject to 
huge discretionary powers on the Governors appointed by the British. The representatives 
of the States to the federal legislature were to be appointed directly by the Princes who 
were to be used to check and counter the nationalists. Defence and foreign affairs would 
remain outside the control of the federal legislature, while the Viceroy would retain 
special control over the subjects.'^ The Act provided for a federal structure that would 
corae into effect only if more than 50 percent of the princely states acceded to it by 
signing the Instrument of Accession, which would override their previous treaties with 
the paramount power.^'' 
" For details, see Sumit Sarkar, p. 320-29. 
' ' H.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Register, 1932, Vol. 2, New Delhi, pp. 242-6; Sekiiar Bandyopadiiyay, p. 
324,. 
^^Bipan Chandra, p. 317. 
^^  Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, p. 325. 
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The proposed federal scheme seemed poHtically unsound due to the ultimate 
powers given to tlie Viceroy and the Governors and, therefore, could satisfy no one 
among the Indian political organizations or leaders. The Lucknow Congress (1935) 
rejected the constitution imposed on India by the Act of 1935. It denounced the Act as an 
imposition 'to the accompaniment of widespread repression and the suppression of civil 
liberties' and 'designed to facilitate and perpetuate the domination and the exploitation of 
the people of India.'''^ Congress candidates, however, for the ensuing elections to 
provincial Legislature were instructed to fight the elections on the basis of rejection of the 
constitution and the determination of the future of India by a Constituent Assembly and a 
full national independence.^^ 
The Princes, initially very enthusiastic about the federation, were disappointed by 
now. The federation scheme would practically not solve the problem of paramountcy 
thrust on the princes; additionally, they would have to surrender certain fiscal rights. 
Therefore, most of them were reluctant in joining the federation. Finally, in a Conference 
in Bombay the assembled princes resolved that the tenns on the basis of which accession 
was offered to them were fundamentally unsatisfactory and unacceptable to them. The 
federation never came into existence but elections to the legislature took place in 1937 
and Congress installed ministries in seven provinces. 
The AISPC, in its Karachi session (1936) adopted a resolution condemning the 
proposed federal structure in which the states' people had been deprived of the right to 
elect their representatives.''^ Although the Muslim Conference was far removed from this 
resolution, nevertheless, its viewpoint was similar to the AISPC. The Muslim Conference 
held the view that the Maharaja should not join the federation without prior consultation 
with the representatives of the people, and in case the states felt compelled to join the 
' ' 'Resolution passed at the Lucknow Session of Congress', Jawaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, 1937-1940, 
p. 99, fn. 
'' Ibid, 
" V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, London, 1950, pp. 29-32. 
''^R.L. Handa,p. 187. 
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federation, only elected representatives of the people had a right to sit in the federal 
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legislature. 
With regard to princely states, the vacillating policy of the Congress as well as the 
Muslim League had considerably upset the states' people's leaders, though they had not 
turned hopeless. During 1930s the AISPC published more than a dozen pamphlets and 
booklets about the conditions prevailing in its member-states. The most important of 
these were Indian States as their People See Them - Bikaner (1933), White Sheep of 
Bikaner (1934), What do the Stales' People want of the National Congress? (1934), 
Bhulabhai Desai & People of States (1935), Indictment of Patiala (1939), Kashmir 
(1939), and Lawless Limbdi (1940). These widely-circulated pamphlets aimed at 
informing the public opinion in India about how the states were being run under the 
autocratic regimes, how the people were gradually awakening from the political abyss, 
how the states' rulers were outwardly projecting the notion of prevalence of peace and 
contentment among their subjects but in reality curbing their civil liberties, and how an 
impression was being created that the national consciousness was non-existent among the 
people of the states. Although, this role played by the AISPC is commendable, it could 
rarely succeed in mobilizing the people of the states, a responsibility which was left for 
the leaders of the respective states to be fulfilled. 
Throughout the early 1930s the AISPC persistently attempted, as the exclusive 
but combined organization representing tlie states, to make its presence felt, and thereby 
alter the Congress policy regarding the states. It strived hard in convincing the Congress 
to accept it as a supplementary organization from the states and eschew its policy of 
excluding the people's movement in the states from the realm of the national movement 
of India. In one such attempt, in 1934, the Conference published a manifesto entitled 
' What do the States' People want of the National Congress?' The manifesto opens with a 
Q A 
compassionate note which reads: 
' ' Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 47. 
States' People's Confei-cncc,' JVhal do the States' People Want of the National Congress?", 1934, p. 1, 
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'It is a vain hope. British India will, by turning its baciv, on the States' people and 
allying itself with the States' rulers, only deliver itself into the hands of brown 
autocrats instead of white bureaucrats. From the frying pan into the fire.' 
The manifesto criticized Gandhi's stand in the Second Round Table Conference**' 
on the question of federation which, the manifesto claimed, 'gave a free hand to the 
Princes in such important matters as the States' representation in the federal legislature' 
and sabotaged the 'fundamental rights of the States' subjects.' It argued, not incorrectly, 
that in case of a surrender of power by the British in near future the transfer of power 
directly to the princes would put even the interests of 'British' India in danger. Such an 
arrangement would only lead to establishment of oligarchy and not a democratic self-
government.^^ While Gandhi still regarded the princes as "trustees" of their subjects, it is 
quite interesting that the manifesto was dra^ving the attention of the Congress towards a 
fact that was to become a contentious topic during mid-1940s, viz., the balkanization of 
India into many autocratic units constituting tlie princely states. 
The said manifesto questioned the prospectus of a Constituent Assembly as 
conceived by the Congress and demanded a clarification as to what the position of the 
States would be in the Constitution that the Assembly would frame. To safeguard the 
liberties of the people living in the states, it attempted to exact a pledge from the 
Congress that 'the States' people [would] be admitted to the Constituent Assembly on the 
same footing as British Indians.'^'' 
In yet another vain effort N.C. Kelkar, the president of the AISPC in 1934, in a 
letter to Gandhi asked for an explanation from the latter when the Congress' strategy of 
"keeping itself unspotted" had already been given up by the Congress by accepting 
members from states and enlisting them in its district and provincial committees. '^* I'o 
this, the Mahatma replied, rather vaguely, that his policy of non-interference was "wise 
' The demand of the slates' people's leaders that the states be represented by the popular leaders in the 
future federal legislature was not accommodated by the British policy-makers who instead insisted that the 
states be represented by their respective rulers. In the Second Round Table Conference, Gandhi did not 
press for the election of people's leaders in the federal legislature. 'N.C, Kelkar's Telegram to Swaraj Parly 
Conference', 1934. 
^~ Ibid., p. 2. 
'Mbid.,p.3. 
^* 'Letter from N.C. Kelkar to Mahalma Gandhi', Poona, dated June 22, 1934. 
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and sound" since 'that part of India which [wa]s described as British ha[d] no more 
power to shape the policy of the States than it ha[d] (say) that of Afghanistan or 
Ceylon.'^^ 
Ironically, thus, the continued efforts of the AISPC failed and the Congress 
leadership's out and out policy of excluding the States' people's movement from its 
political sphere remained unaffected till late 1930s. 
An event which greatly disappointed the leaders of the People's Conference 
occurred in 1935. Bhulabhai Desai, a top-ranking right-wing leader of the Congress 
Assembly Party, in a speech at a meeting of the Bar Association of Mysore State, 
publicly declared that, 'The states' subjects are not burdened by a foreign domination. 
Their only complaint is that power and authority are in a single hand, but their problem is 
much easier of solution than the problem of winning Swaraj for British India.' Advising 
the princes against a further surrendering of their privileges to the British, he even 
suggested the princes 'to omit references to States' subjects m the Accession Treaties.' 
In his view the princes alone were entitled to determine the nature of relationship 
between the states and the federation while the people had no right to claim that privilege. 
In response to his speech the Working Committee of the AISPC, under the presidentship 
of Amritlal V. Thakkar, passed a resolution on 23'^ '' June 1935, which condemned the 
speech as 'doctrines which are reactionary and retrograde in spirit, and detrimental to the 
best interests of the people of the Indian States.'^ ** Desai's speech drew huge 
condemnation from the press. Newspapers and periodicals such as Servant of India, the 
Bombay Chronicle, the SentinaJ, the Amrit Bazar Patrika and the Tribune unanimously 
took him to task for undermining the sufferings of the states' people.^^ 
From its inception till 1936 the AISPC held four annual sessions and one special 
session. By 1936 the Conference had garnered enough nationalist support. Nehru and 
^^  'Letter from Mahatma Gandhi to N.C. Kelkar', dated July 2, 1934, The Collected Works ofMahatma 
Garidhi,y o\.6A,p. 121. 
' 'R.L. Handa,p. 106. 
" Indian States' People's Conference, BhulabhaiJ. Desai and the Peoples of the States, Bombay, 1935, p. 
5. 
^^  'State People's Conference: Working Committee Resolution', Ibid., p. 25. 
*' See, Ibid., pp. 25-44. 
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Pattabhi Sitaramayya considerably backed the organization ideologically and morally. 
Consequently, Jawaharlal Nehru, Pattabhi Sitaramayya and Rajendra Prasad attended its 
fifth session, held in 1936, in Karachi. The ambiguous policy of Congress towards the 
states still lingered on. Nehru, who at an individual level always opposed the autocratic 
form of government, nevertheless remained silent. In his address to the session, he could 
only assure the people of a future when '[the Congress] fight bore fruit and the British 
power trembled, the princes would not be able to resist the demand of the states people.' 
Based on his experience of the mass contact program, he, however, urged the need for 
mass contacts in place of mere petitions and memorandums to bring about real political 
mobilization among the people of the states.^'' Contrary to Nehru's and Rajendra Prasad's 
address, Pattabhi's address seemed more radical in that he admitted that the Congress was 
not justified in leaving states people to their fate.^' This was probably for the first time 
that a front-rank Congress leader had in clear words expressed disappointment against the 
Congress' stand vis-a-vis the State's people when the latter were looking forward to the 
Congress for support and guidance. 
The session, however, occupies significance in certain matters. Perturbed over the 
repression in the States directed against the agrarian discontent among the people of 
Kashmir, Alwar, Sikar (Jaipur) and Loharu, the members laid down the foundation of a 
Civil Liberdes Union. Furthermore, the session drew up a program of agrarian demands: 
a one-third cut in land revenue, scaling-down of debts, and an enquiry into peasant 
grievances in the context of the 'tragedies of Kashmir, Alwar, Sikar (Jaipur) and 
Loharu.' Although Kashmir was yet to become its member, the Conference 
condemning the repression in Kashmir shows that the events in Kaslimir had acquired 
importance at a greater level. 
Apparently, by now the Kashmiri leadership was drawn closer to Congress 
politics. The campaign launched in Ilamdard against the "interference" of leaders from 
Punjab into the internal affairs of the people of Kashmir very much impacted the popular 
'°R.L. Handa,p. 184. 
"Ibid., p. 185. 
"-Ibid., pp. 186-87. 
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perception among the leaders and the people. Therefore, Sheikh Abdullah, in a press 
conference at the residence of Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew in Amritsar emphatically declared: 
'Communal tension in Kashmir is the result of propaganda by the communal 
leaders of Punjab. We want people of the Punjab not to interfere in our internal 
affairs. Our next program will be to follow the principles of the Congress party 
and, after returning to Kashmir, 1 will strive to setup an organization which 
supports national ideology.' 
There is little doubt about Sheikh Abdullah's pro-Congress leanings right from 
the start of his political career. Admirations of Congress had been already voiced by him. 
But for the first time, he publicly declared that the freedom struggle of Kashmir would 
not only ideologically draw from the Congress but also follow its policies in dealing with 
the dual imperialism of Dogra-British alliance. Quite expectedly, this statement was 
received in the state with divergent reactions; while some Pandit leaders, who had always 
been apprehensive of the "Pan-Islamic" designs of Muslim Conference, labeled it a 
'deceptive strategy', others welcomed it as 'a giant step towards nationalist politics.' 
With this armouncement of Abdullah the freedom struggle in Kashmir went ahead from 
being a movement against the Dogra ruling house to a movement against both the Dogra 
government of the state and the colonial government of India. 
In their attempt to bridge the inter-community gap, the Kashmiri leadership was 
supported by some famed leaders of India. As early as 1931, Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal, 
while presiding over a meeting of the All India Kashmir Committee, refused to believe 
that the unrest in Kashmir was a communal strife.'^ When some Kashmiri Pandits visited 
him and asked him to mediate on their behalf with the Maharaja, he 'exhort[ed] them to 
go back to Kashmir, unite with Kashmiri Muslims and then [jointly] present their 
demands to the Maharaja.''''^ Mahatma Gandhi also could not reconcile with the 
allegation that in Kashmir 'Hindus and Muslims were unable to live peacefully 
Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 46. Emphasis mine. 
Ibid. 
AI-Fazal, AmusllO, !931. 
Ibid.. August 20, 1931. 
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together' .^ ^ Similar views were aired by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Sir Tej Bahadur 
Sapru.'^ ** Iqbal participated in the 1935 session of the Muslim Conference and suggested 
that the Kashmiri people 'would not be successful in [their] mission unless [they] 
patch[ed] up [their] internal differences.''^ '^  Nehru repetitively encouraged the Pandits to 
'give up their narrow communal outlook and think of their own welfare in terms of the 
welfare of Kashmir as a whole.'""^ Although most of the Pandit leaders never paid heed 
towards such suggestions, there were some who were thinking in terms of the national 
interest, and were not unaware of a clash of interests if they kept harping on the tune of 
community concerns. 'It is nationalism,' wrote Bazaz in a letter to Mahatma Gandhi, 
'that will save our country and our community because neither the Hindus nor the 
Muslims can wipe out the one or the other from the country.'"^' 
While the Muslim leadership and some Pandit leaders were establishing links 
with the nationalist leaders to seek political guidance, a section of Pandits were trying to 
use their inOuence in getting concessions. In connection with the employment, these 
Pandits tried to put pressure on the Darbar through Tej Bahadur Sapru. In a letter to 
Sapru, the Pandits demanded that they should receive guarantee of services for thirty 
years similar to what the Anglo-Indian community was enjoying in British India. But 
Sapru promptly desisted from encouraging them to go ahead with such a demand and 
'consider[ed] the demand of this character to be very unsound in principle and veiy 
difficult to work.'"'^ Nehru also advised them 'not to seek any special protection or 
weightage or reservation of seats in the State services, no special electorate or the like.' '"'^  
He suggested to them that 'they w[ould] get far more enough through the goodwill and 
cooperation with other communities.''°'* 
Times of India, November 7, ] 931. 
'^^ See pp. 13-14 of this chapter. 
Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar, p. 41. 
'"" Letter from Nehru to Bazaz, July 7, 1936, in P.N. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, Srinagar, 2005, p. 182. 
'"' 'Letter from Bazaz to Gandhi', May 8, 1934 (Private Collection of Bhushan Bazaz, New Delhi), quoted 
in Chitralekha Zutshi, p. 240. 
'"- 'Letter from T.B. Sapru to Pt. Kashyap Bandhu', dated May 15, 1934, Allahabad, Sapru (Private and 
Personal) Papers, NMML, Delhi. 
'°^ 'Letter from Nehru to Bazaz', July 7, 1936, P.N. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, p. 182. 
'"' Ibid. 
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While the Kashmiri leadership was trying to deliberate on things concerning not 
only the state of Jammu and Kashmir but India as a whole, the Indian leaders were also 
projecting an idea of integrated India which constituted regions and peoples of the British 
India and the princely states. Nehru, in an article to the Hamdard made clear that: ' 
'Kashmir's destiny is intertwined with that of Hindustan because if Hindustan 
gains independence the Kashmir will definitely ask for its share... The fate of the 
8 crore people of princely states cannot be separated from the people of British 
India. \n fact, both peoples are riding in the same boat. If Kashmiris would only 
recognize that Iheir education, economy and culture was in the hands of an 
irresponsible government, then nothing could keep them from attaining their 
rights.' 
During late 1930s a change in trend is clearly visible in the Muslim Conference's 
politics. In 1936, Abdullah and Bazaz extended an invitation to Nehru but owing to his 
preoccupations he declined. However, he wrote to Abdullah and Bazaz and expressed his 
hope the unity among the Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir, for which they were trying 
their best, would usher an era of political, economic and social emancipation. 
However, Muhammad Ali Jinnah visited Kashmir for the first time in 1936. The Muslim 
Conference organized a grand reception in his honour.'^^ Addressing the Conference, he 
suggested that being the majority community it was the duty of Muslim leaders to see 
that not only the rights of minorities arc secured but they should be considered wheels of 
the poUtical vehicle.'" 
Over years the policies of the Muslim Conference had irked the Maharaja; now 
that they were being supported by the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League, 
who were challenging the very foundations of the imperialist and autocratic regimes in 
India, he had more than sufficient reasons to direct his rage towards the leaders of the 
Muslim Conference. By 1936, the demand of the responsible govermDent had acquired 
great strength. The repeated vetoing of resolutions by the nominated members of the 
'°^  'Pandit Jawahadal Nehru's Advice to the Youth of Kashmir', Hamdard, Srinagar, June 27, 1936. 
'* Hindustan Times, June 30,1936. 
"" Abbas, p. 148. 
'°^  Ibid, p. 180; Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar. p. 48. 
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Assembly frustrated the elected members. Therefore, the members sought to win public 
support to press the government make the Assembly responsible to the people. 
Accordingly, 8"^  May 1936 was observed throughout the state as the Responsible 
Government Day. Simultaneously, the leadership went for another mass contact 
program, this time led by Ghulam Abbas, who toured through nook and corner of the 
Valley and the .lammu province, acquainting people with tenets of civil disobedience 
and principles of non-violence.'"' Shortly afterwards, in an unexpected incident Sardar 
Budh Singh, the most popular Sikli leader resigned from the Assembly in October 1936 
and was followed by the resignation of all the elected members (with the exception of 
one Amar Nath Kak) of the Assembly in November.'" The resignation of all the elected 
members demonstrates the shared disillusionment of the leadership, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim, from the Dogra state. 
In 1937, Sheikh Abdullah met Nehru in Lahore wherefrom both went on a tour to 
the Noi1h West Frontier Province; Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan also accompanied them 
from there. It was here that Jawaharlal Nehru suggested opening of membership of the 
Muslim Conference to non-Muslims so that the campaign against the ruler could gain 
more strength,"" As remarked by Ghulam Abbas, 'when he [Abdullah] returned, he 
seemed to be a changed man; from across the border he brought home the liquor of 
nationalism from the "hangover" of which he never recovered.'"^ This meeting is usually 
seen as a turning point in the history of the freedom struggle of Kashmir. After this 
incident Abdullah embarked on an open mission of propagating the idea of nationalism. 
In this process he took considerable help liom the political and journalist genius of P.N. 
Bazaz. In June, 1938, Abdullah, in his capacity of being the president of the Muslim 
Conference, convened a General body meeting. It was here that he declared his intention 
of changing the name of Muslim Conference into National Conference."'' 
'°'Saraf,p, 5 k). 
""Abbas, pp. 148-49. 
'" Hassnain, p. 85. 
"'Ibid., p. 88. 
"^  Abbas, pp. 159-60. 
'"Ibid., p. 168. 
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Before the Working Committee, on 28"' June 1938, Sheikh Abdullah put the 
following resolution 115 
'Whereas in the opinion of the Working Committee the time has now come when 
all the progressive forces of the country should be rallied under one banner to 
tight for the achievement of the responsible government, the Working Committee 
recommends to the General Council that in the forthcoming session of the 
Conference the name and constitution of the organization be so altered and 
amended that all such people who desire to participate in this political struggle 
may easily become the members of the Conference irrespective of their caste, 
creed or religion.' 
Certain members, notably Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad and Mirza Afzal Beg, 
opposed this resolution because of their apprehensions that such a move would not be 
successful in inducing the reactionary non-Muslims to join the movement; contrarily, it 
would probably lead to disaffection within the Conference itself. However, they had to 
surrender before the firm decision of Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders supportive of the 
change in nomenclature."^ There appeared also the speculation that after the conversion 
of Muslim Conference into National Conference, the organization would be subordinated 
to the Indian National Congress. To remove such apprehensions the opposing leaders put 
some conditions before the members who advocate the name in nomenclature which they 
readily accepted. These included (i) The struggle for the religious, political, economic 
and administrative grievances of Kashmiri Muslims would be at the top of the National 
Conference's agenda, (ii) Sheikh Abdullah would neither follow the Congress politics in 
toto nor will the party support the Congress in any way, (iii) At no cost would the 
National Conference indulge in any criticism or opposition of the Muslim League, the 
'sole representative party' of Muslims in India, and (iv) Every community of Kashmir 
would participate in the struggle against Maharaja Hari Singh and would have their share 
in the responsible government."^ Eventually, in a special session of Muslim Conference 
held on lO"" and ll"" of June, 1939, under the presidentship of Ghulam Muhammad 
"^ Bazaz, IlisloiyofSlniggle, pp. 161-2. 
"'Ibid., p. 161. 
"^ Abbas, pp. 177-78. 
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Sadiq, the conversion of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference into the All 
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference was formally put into effect throvv'ing its 
membership open for every adult residing in the state without any distinction of gender, 
religion, race, caste or class.'"^ 
Meanwhile, in April 1937, Gopalswami Ayenger replaced Colonel Colvin (after 
five years of his term of the office) as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. An 
officer of the I.C.S. and an orthodox Brahman, he was appointed on the advice of the 
Viceroy.'" During his term of the office the state went through a serious crisis. During 
the tenure of Colvin the recommendations regarding the employment of Muslims in 
government services had been implemented. Ayenger, soon after his arrival in Kashmir, 
not only began to violate the recommendations but even declared the Glancy Commission 
Report as null and void.'^" 
About this time a Cow Protection Agitation was started allegedly at the behest of 
Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya in Jammu. The cause of the agitation was the order of the 
Srinagar High Court to reduce the punishment for cow-killing from 7 years imprisonment 
to a year.'^' In Kashmir, Pandit Shiv Narain Fotedar, the president of the Kashmiri Pandit 
Yuvak Sabha, in order to incite communal trouble, declared that "the Hindus revere the 
covi' in the same manner as Muslims revere Hazrat Muhammad.''^^ The Muslims could 
not tolerate drawing this analogy. This led to rioting in both the provinces. Another 
incident took place in Poonch but the prompt visit of a deputation of Sheikh Abdullah, 
Bazaz and Budh Singh averted the trouble.'^^ Almost all the contemporary writers are at 
consensus that the instigations causing these incidents had been engineered by 
Gopalswami Ayenger and there is enough evidence to show that this indeed was the 
case.'^'' Furthermore, Ayenger was not only averse to the Muslim Conference but 
continued, even intensified, his anti-Muslim policies after the conversion of the Muslim 
Conference into National Conference. How the National Conference countered the Dogra 
(j.H. Ktian, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, pp. 376-8. 
' " Hassnain, p. 103; Abbas, pp. 157-8. 
""Ibid., p. 158. 
'"' Hassnain, p. 86. 
122 Martand, ime S, 1937. 
''^Saraf,p. 517. 
'-" See Islah, June 8 and June 15, 1937. 
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repression during the coming years, how it engaged itself in the anti-colonial struggle 
within the broader framework of the national movement of India, and how alternate 
political discourses within Kashmir sprung up and played their role shall be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
I l l 
Chapter 5 
Towards Freedom: Dissensions and Dilemmas 
As in the case of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim Conference was also 
dubbed as an organization of middle and upper class Muslims out to serve their own 
interests. Prem Nath Bazaz, the celebrated leader of the freedom struggle and author of 
several books on the subject, writes about the Muslim Conference: 'Its [Muslim 
Conference's] histoiy is nothing but the record of the struggle of the middle and upper 
class Muslims for the achievement of their class rights.'' This statement coming from an 
individual who has always been unequivocally identified with the freedom struggle of 
Jammu and Kashmir—a person who is, not wrongly, seen as the 'ahead-of-his-times' 
Pandit leader of the 20"' century Kashmir—seems surprising. It seems unfair in that it 
tends to make us believe that the Muslim Conference was driven by class interest of its 
leaders and whatever they strived for, at the end of the day, benefitted only them; it 
totally ignores the mass base of the organization which it certainly exhibited at many 
times. The memorandums its leaders submitted, the mediation it did with the Maharaja on 
behalf of the people of Kashmir, the pressure it exerted on the Kashmir Darbar for the 
introduction of reforms (more importantly the Legislative Assembly, the electorate, 
reform in taxation, etc. which affected every individual of Jammu and Kashmir), the 
processions and rallies it organized, the speeches delivered and resolutions passed in its 
sessions, the campaigns it launched for the attainment of responsible government for the 
benefit of all, the legislations its members passed or attempted to pass in the Assembly, 
makes it difficuh to agree with this view. In fact, the said author's works are themselves 
so much occupied with the description of the contributions of the Muslim Conference 
that this very statement appears self-contradictory. 
Bazaz, Hisloiy of Struggle, pp. 157-8. This statement is similar to what Anil Seal, a protagonist of the 
Cambridge School, opines about the Indian National Movement. To him the Indian national leadership 
represented a body of individuals seeking their class interests and was linked with the colonial structure 
through a patron-client relationship; the united front they put against the British sought nothing but a share 
in the power structure. Thus, according to him, the National Movement signified not the voice of the nation 
but of the competitor-collaborator class. See, Anil Seal, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in India', Locality, 
Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870 to 1940, (ed.) J. Gallagher, G. Johnson and Anil 
Seal, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 1-27. 
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Similarly, the over-emphasis on the contributions of the National Conference has 
often resulted in undermining the role played by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim 
Conference as a nationalist organization. This sweeping relegation of the Muslim 
Conference to the domain of "communal" organizations seems problematic. More often 
than not, the writers of Kashmir's history of the freedom struggle have looked at the 
National Conference from a nationalist perspective and either partially or fully ignored 
the role played by the Muslim Conference in the same direction. The Muslim Conference 
is usually seen as a body that brought about the politicization of Kashmiri Muslims 
within the realm of their religious identity but that it could not achieve much as far as 
'national' awakening is concerned. 
Contrary to what the certain histories of Kashmir would have us believe, the 
overnight transformation of a "communal" movement into a "national" struggle (due to 
the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference) is not 
corroborated by the facts. The event may be considered to have symbolically changed the 
character of the movement. But the fact is that even though the Muslim Conference 
leadership used religion as a tool for mobilization—in the same way as Tilak did in 
Maharashtra—nowhere do we find any evidence that its policies were directed against the 
non-Muslims. Conversely, as would be quite clear from the previous chapter, hs 
members continually attempted to persuade other communities for a joint fight against 
the princely order. Although the organization had been founded as a representative body 
for the Muslims of the state and strictly speaking, initially its constitution offered 
membership to Muslims only, yet the inclusion of many Pandit and Sikh leaders 
subsequently goes on to prove that it was inclusive in character. 
After the third session of the Muslim Conference in November 1934, Sardar Budh 
Singh, while accompanying Sheikh Abdullah to Jammu, exhorted him of the pitiable 
condition of non-Muslims of the Jammu region. Sheikh Abdullah is said to have declared 
that 'he will stand for the sufferers and establish the National Conference.'^ Whether he 
actually made reference to the term 'National Conference' is unclear because the meeting 
took place in 1935 and the formation of the National Conference was not even remotely 
" Sardar Budh Singh, Jagir Shahi ka Postmortem, pp. 107-8, quoted in Hassnain, p. 83. 
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visible then. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to mention that during the next couple of 
years the Muslim Conference considerably geared up to educate the people regarding 
their shared miseries as well as interests. In the sixth annual session of the Muslim 
Conference Sheikh Abdullah brought to the notice of the people that: 
'Some Muslims erroneously think that all the 8 lakh non-Muslims living in the 
state lead a life of ease but they are mistaken. In reality only a few thousand 
among them are prosperous while, all others, like you, have suffered immensely 
at the hands of the irresponsible govt, and are also steeped in deep ignorance, 
heavy taxes and debts and starvation.' 
In the same session he declared that the demand of responsible government was 
not only 'for 80 lakh Muslims but [for] all the 100 percent state subjects.''' For the 
attainment of the responsible government for all what was needed was that the people 
'must cease to think in terms of Hindus, Sildis and Muslims and ... build a common 
national front, by universal suffrage, on the basis of joint electorate.'^ In a similar tone 
Sardar Budh Singh wrote: 'It is madness to think that the demand for Responsible 
Government is a religious demand. No religious body or communal organization can 
singly achieve it. It is a national demand and is, therefore, common to all.'^ In fact, the 
Hamdard, with Bazaz working behind it, also stated, much in contradiction to the above-
discussed statement of the same author, that the 'Muslim Conference, which though by 
nomenclature a communal organization, could well be equated with any national body 
fighting for a country's liberation and for people's fundamental rights.'^ These public 
statements came prior to the foundation of the National Conference and do not go well 
with the projection of Muslim Conference as a communal organization aimed at the 
mitigation of Muslims' demands at the cost of minorities. 
Finally, the manifesto known as the 'National Demand', compiled and presented 
to Maharaja Hari Singh in August 1938, by a group of Hindu, Muslim and Sikli leaders of 
' 'Presidential Address of Sheikh Abdullah, Sixth Annual Session of Muslim Conference', 1938, 
Miintakhab Dastawaizat, p. 449. 
''Ibid., p. 451. 
^Ibid. 
'' Sardar Budh Singh, 'Zamindari Nizam-i-Hukunial ke Khwab ki Taabir', Hamdard, July 13, 1938, p. 35. 
'^ Hamdard, My Z\, 1938. 
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the Muslim Conference, undoubtedly explodes the notion that nationalism and nationalist 
politics began in Kashmir after the establishment of the National Conference. The 
'National Demand'^ sought to restructure the administration from top to bottom and even 
presented a model for that. It proposed a model of responsible government to be 
established in Kashmir, of course, under the aegis of the maharaja but the Ministry would 
be responsible to the Legislature; the legislature, in turn, would consist entirely of elected 
members from the constituencies. The privy purse of the maharaja would not come under 
the jurisdiction of the legislature. The elections to the legislature would be based on joint 
electorate. Besides guaranteeing the protection of their religious, cultural and linguistic 
rights, seats would be reserved for minorities in the proposed legislature. The manifesto 
also demanded that adequate representation be provided to labour, trading and landlord 
classes. Besides, it demanded that the age-old practice of prohibiting the recruitment of 
non-Dogra classes in the army be abolished forthwith. Thus, the document envisaged a 
society based on equal treatment of all the individuals of Jammu and Kashmir without 
differentiating them on the basis of caste, class or religious affiliation. The National 
Demand also decried the Government's policy of extending subsidies and other amenities 
to outside capitalists and contractors, and also the heavy appointments (on top slots) from 
outside the state. The 'heavy appointments' ostensibly pointed towards the appointment 
of British officials on top positions in the state. The first session of the newly-formed 
National Conference, in 1939, ratified the National Demand.^ Thus, by the time the 
National Conference was established, community politics had already been subsfituted by 
a more forceixil assertion of national identity. 
In February 1938 the AISPC held an emergency convention in Navasari in 
response to the Calcutta resolution of the Congress Working Committee which stated in 
clear terms that 'the states should form their own polifical organizations that need not be 
called Congress Committees.' What the Congress Committee believed was that the 
States' people lacked mass action. It is quite intriguing why the Congress was still 
adamant on its non-interventionist approach even after it wielded considerable power 
through its ministries in many provinces. This resolution was bound to infuriate the 
' The National Demand document is reproduced in Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, pp. 316-8. 
' Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, p. 318. 
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states' people's leaders and they did not hesitate in criticizing this escapist attitude of 
Congress. Several States' leaders, notably Prem Nath Bazaz, C. Rajagopalachari, Jai 
Narayan Vyas and P.L. Chudgar severely criticized the Congress approach. This 
appeared almost as a break of the AISPC from the Congress but due to Pattabhi 
Sitaramayya's intervention the resolution expressing disappointment against the Congress 
policy in scornful words was moderated. 
For the States' people the years 1938 and 1939 proved crucial as far as the 
Congress attitude was concerned. The mounting pressure from the States' people's 
leaders and from within the Congress itself (from Nehru, Sitaramayya, Jayprakash 
Narayan, etc.) compelled it to publicly declare its active support to the people's cause. 
Consequently, a resolution passed at the Haripura session, originally drafted by the 
States' People's Conference in its Navasari Convention, declared that:'' 
'The Congress stands for the same political, social and economic freedom in the 
States as the rest of India and considers the States as an integral part of India, 
which cannot be separated. ''Purna Swaraj" or Complete Independence which is 
the objective of the Congress is for the whole of India inclusive of the States, for 
the integrity and unity of India must be maintained in freedom as it has been 
maintained in subjection. The only kind of federation that can be acceptable to 
the Congress is the one in which the States participate as free units enjoying the 
measure of democratic freedom as the rest of India.' 
This Resolution only partially changed the Congress policy of non-interference, 
for it again emphasized that the 'burden of carrying on the struggle for freedom must fall 
on the people of the states.' It, however, allowed Congressmen, in their individual 
capachies, to assist the peoples' leaders. Furthermore, the Congress Committees in the 
states would function under the control of the Congress Working Committee but won't 
launch any political agitation in the name of the Congress.'^ The Congress policy, as a 
whole, still remained friendly towards the states' rulers much to the disappointment of a 
section of Congressmen—the Socialist group comprising Nehru, J.P. Narayan, Yusuf 
'°R.L. Handa, pp. 190-91. 
•Harijan, 1-cbruary 26, 1938', Gandhi, The Indian Slates' Problem, Ahmadabad, 1941, p. 401 
''ibid., pp. 402-03. 
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Mehrali and others—who were seeking an annihilation of these "relics of the Middle 
Ages."''^ Nehru, in clear terms, declared in a speech at London that 'there cannot be a 
federation vjith. fascist cells dotted all over the country.' 
Interestingly, the next session of the Congress in 1939 at Tripuri was presided 
over by Subhas Chandra Bose, who had so far supported the non-interference, and even 
criticized, along with Gandhi, the Congress Working Committee's resolution protesting 
against the Mysore government's atrocious policies towards its subjects, had by now 
changed his stand. This session, not only reiterated the Haripura Resolution but also 
made certain modifications in fevour of the states. The Resolution read: 
The Congress welcomes the awakening of the people of Indian states in many 
parts of the country, and considers this as a hopeful prelude to a larger freedom, 
comprising the whole of India, for which the Congress has laboured. The 
Congress supports the demand for responsible government and civil liberty in the 
States, and expresses its solidarity with these movements for freedom and self-
expression, which arc integral parts of the larger struggle.' 
The Resolution also expressed the hope that the political awakening, that was 
taking place in the states, may, in near future, 'lead to a relaxation or to the complete 
removal of the restraint which the Congress imposed upon hself.'"^ This resolution 
clearly bore out that the Congress may soon completely shun its age-old non-interference 
principle. 
A lot had change since 1931 when Gandhi, while commenting on the communal 
trouble in Kashmir, had put the whole responsibility of the unrest on the shoulders of the 
British govermnent who had 'held the Princes as prisoners in their palaces and states' 
with the result that 'Indian Princes [wejre not free to take time by action to deal with the 
difficulties with their subjects.'''' The (over-)emphasis on the bigger picture of British 
colonialism, in a way, sometimes led to ignoring the wrong-doings of princes at their own 
' ' Harijan, May 21, 1938, Indian States' Problem, p. 408. 
'"' 'Speech of Jawaharlal Nehru in London', dated October 21, 1938, Selected Works of Nehru, p. 193. 
'^  Harijan, March 18, 1939, Ibid., p. 479. 
" Ibid., p. 480. 
Times of India, November 7, 1931. 17 
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level. Now, after being convinced that the dogma of non-intervention had failed to induce 
the princes in introducing reforms within their states, he could see 'every Indian Prince 
[as] a Hitler in his own state' who could 'shoot his people without coming under any 
law.''^ This statement of Gandhi came after several persons were killed in Travancore as 
a result of firing at a meeting organized as a part of the civil disobedience campaign 
launched by the State Congress on 26* August, 1938.'^ The Rajkot incidents, which led 
Gandhi to go for a fast, and a withdrawal in the wake of absolutely no success, certainly 
made him wary of the Princes' attitude towards the problems of their subjects. By this 
time, incidents of similar nature had happened in states like Orissa, Limbdi, Kashmir, 
Hyderabad, Ranpur, Cochin, etc.^ ° From now on the Congress leaders would not only 
actively support the States' people's leaders but also participate in the movements. 
On February 15*-17"' 1939, the lASPC held its session in Ludhiana which was a 
historical event of far-reaching consequences for princely states in general and for 
Kashmir in particular. Nehru presided over the session. In line with Gandhi's previous 
stand vis-a-vis the States' problem, Nehru, despite being in favour of states' people 
during the preceding decades, also justified the "wisdom of the Congress" in adopting the 
cautious approach since the States' people were 'unprepared'; now that they were 
'prepared and ready', the Congress considered it its 'right and privilege' to aid them in 
the fight against imperialism.^' Nehru declared that now that the States had combined in 
their struggle against the British imperialism, it no longer represented many different 
struggles for independence but 'one mighty struggle for India's independence.'^^ He 
challenged the validity of treaties that the princes and the British had entered into without 
peoples' consent and asked the latter to rise against those bonds of slavery. He tried to 
infuse new vigour among the States' leaders by asserting that 'the Indian State system 
[was] doomed even as the British Empire, which ha[d] so long protected it, [was] 
'^  'Unfortunate People of Travancore', Harijan, October 7, 1939, Collected Works of Gandhi (Electronic), 
pp. 381-82. 
" Selected Works ofJawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 9, New Delhi, 1976, pp. 141-42. 
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"' 'Nehru's Presidential Address at the All-India States' People's Conference Session, Ludhiana, February 
1939', Nehru, Unity of Mia, pp. 27-30. 
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doomed.'^^ Although Nehru had been criticizing the princes' policies for long, talking 
about their extinction in front of states' representatives—the popular leaders—was a new 
dimension. 
For the first time, as many as 34 leaders from Kashmir participated in the session. 
Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Kashyap Bandhu could not, however, attend it because of 
their confinement. The leaders exhorted the delegates of the repressive measures adopted 
by the government in Kashmir. Nehru severely condemned the Notification 19-L '^* and 
admired how the unity of Muslims and non-Muslims in Kashmir had helped steer the 
movement on national lines, of which the 'National Demand' document was a proof 
Based on the demand for responsible government in Kashmir, the Conference adopted 
the demand for all the States. 
Shortly after this session, on 24"' February, Sheikh Abdullah was released from 
jail after completing his term of sentence. Sheikh Abdullah, along with Bazaz, Kashyap 
Bandhu, Maulana Sayyid Masoodi and Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad attended the annual 
session of the Congress at Tripuri (1939). By now the Kashmir leadership had begun to 
identify themselves with the people of other States in a common fight against princes and 
the imperialism which was instrumental in perpetuating the princes' rule. Maulana 
Masoodi, in one of the meetings, took to task the 'Chamber of Princes... composed of 
Rajas and Nawabs' who had united to 'suppress the eight crore people living in the 
Indian States.'^^ Thus, it was the 'duty of these eight crore people to unite and demand 
responsible government from the princes.'" This position, as taken by the Kashmir 
leadership of not only criticizing the Dogra government but also other princes, underlines 
a new approach adopted by the States' people amid speculations that the autocratic 
governments were not to stay for peipetuity. 
In line with this new approach the National Conference became increasingly 
involved not only in the anti-Dogra struggle but also in the national struggle. This 
^^  Ibid., p. 34. 
^* For details, see Chapter 3. 
" Nehru, Unity of India, p. 41-2. 
"^^  Hassnain, p. 96. 
^'Ibid. 
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became evident in the very first session of the newly-formed National Conference held 
on September 3, 1939, at Anantnag (Isiamabad)^^ under the presidentship of Sheikh 
Abdullah. He declared, 'We are proud that among the people of 561 states, our state 
subjects have prepared a new formula for responsible government, which has become 
popular in other states also.'^^ Warning the government that the Federation scheme 
cannot be implemented without the consent of the people, he asserted that, 'the Princes 
who claim that the state subjects are not fit for reforms suffer from inferiority 
complex...The proposed Federal Scheme introduced by the British after the 1935 Act, 
considers the people living in the states as animals and as such this Scheme is being put 
into force against their wishes, simply to bind them into slavery.' 
Around this time the Second World War broke out, and as Britain was a party to 
it, India was naturally going to be affected. Incidentally, the annual session of the 
National Conference coincided with the Viceroy's announcement of India as a party to 
the Britain's declaration of war on Germany. The Congress, considering the situation, 
thought it expedient to use it as for bargaining to the advantage of India. The Congress, 
simiilar to what had happened during the World War I, assured the Viceroy of full 
Congress support subject to the conditions that a genuine responsible government be set 
up in the centre immediately, and after the war a constituent assembly be set up to 
determine the political structure of a free India. Linlithgow rejected these offers; instead 
his statement of 17 October 1939 repeated the much-talked-about offers of Dominion 
Status in an indefinite future.^' In spite of several attempts by the Congress to persuade 
the Viceroy, he did not change his stand and consequently, Congress ministries, accusing 
Britain of dragging India unnecessarily into war without the consent of its people, 
resigned on 29-30 October 1939. Besides the issue of war, the Congress ministries were 
*^ Renamed as Anantnag during the Dogra rule as part of the 'Hinduizing' project of changing names of 
places to suit the 'Hindu' tastes. Thus, Islamabad became Anantnag and the Takht-i-Sulaiman hill became 
Shankaracharya hill. 
Hassnain, p. 102. 
'" Ibid. 
''SumitSarkar, pp. 375-76. 
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getting unstable due to the problem of alienation of workers, kisans and all Left elements 
within the party?^ 
In 1937 the All India Muslim League, after being virtually defunct for some time, 
had been revived by Muliammad Ali Jinnah. In the post-1937 period the gulf between 
Congress and League became more apparent. While the policies of Muslim League, as 
opposed to that of Congress, were very much responsible for this disunity, no less 
responsible was the Congress attitude towards League, The League leadership, at an 
unofficial level, approached the Congress for an agreement over the provincial ministries, 
which was rejected by the latter apparently due to the weak position of the League at that 
time. Nehru declared in a letter to Jinnah in January 1937: 
'In the final analysis there are only two forces in India today - British 
imperialism and the Congress representing Indian nationalism... the Muslim 
League represents a group of Muslims, no doubt highly estimable persons, but 
functioning in the higher regions of the upper-middle classes and having no 
common contact with the Muslim masses and few within the Muslim lower 
middle class.' 
This humiliating declaration of Nehru was more than what an obstinate Jinnah 
could stomach. He embarked on a mission of winning over Muslim masses to his side 
and was successful to a great extent in this venture. Under his leadership, by the end of 
1938, the League had achieved a good reputation and its membership had increased, 
according to official figure, to hundreds of thousands. '^* In March 1940, the Muslim 
League passed its famous Lahore Resolution, which formed the basis of Pakistan—the 
"homeland for the Muslims of India." The Resolution demanded,^^ 
'It is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no 
constitutional plan will be workable n the country or acceptable to the Muslims 
unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically 
•'' ibid. 
" R,P. Dutt, India Today, p. 468. 
Ibid. The strength gained by the League would become clear enough during the elections of 1946 when 
the Muslim League's victory in elections was spectacular. 
Quoted from Gandlji-Jinnaii Talks, Text of Correspondence and Other Relevant Matter, July-October, 
1944, preface by C. Rajagopalacharya, New Delhi, 1944, pp. 36-7. 
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contagious units are demarcated into regions wiiich should be so constituted with 
such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the 
Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Westem and Eastern 
zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the 
constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign. The session...authorizes 
the Working Committee to frame a constitution in accordance with these basic 
principles...' 
Although the resolution did not mention the word 'Pakistan', it enunciated the 
Pakistan scheme. Under this scheme the League demanded for the Muslims a separate 
state—^North-West and North-East India comprising of six provinces, namely Sind, 
Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam. The scheme 
of Pakistan is usually traced back to the 1930 session of All-India Muslim League when 
Sir Muhammad Iqbal, in his presidential address, suggested the reorganization of the 
north-west pai1 of India for a Muslim Confederation. It came to be construed as a gesture 
of dividing India into a Muslim-India and a Hindi-India.^^ In 1937, Iqbal, in a letter to 
Jinjiah, reiterated his stand and urged upon the need to 'redistribute the country and to 
provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities...' The better alternative 
origin to the concept of Pakistan may be traced to the Rehmat Ali group's pamphlets 
published in 1933 and reissued in 1934. In fact, they specifically mentioned the word 
'Pakistan', including even Kashmir in their scheme. The pamphlet entitled Now or Never, 
circulated at a time when the foundation of a federation was on cards, clearly demarcates 
"Hindu nation" as distinct from "Muslim nation". The pamphlet stated that, 'Our 
[Muslims'] brave but voiceless nation is being sacrificed on the altar of Hindu 
nationalism.' It argued that the Muslim representatives in the Round Table Conferences 
had committed an 'inexcusable blunder and an incredible betrayal' by agreeing to the 
'Hindu nationalism...to the perpetual subjection of the "ill-starred" Muslim Millat of 
India.' It also clearly dissociated the concept from the one which had been proposed by 
Iqbal in 1930. According to the pamphlet, while Iqbal had proposed 'the amalgaination of 
four out of the five...provinces into a single state, forming a unit of the all-India 
"'' Times of India, November 16, 1931. 
•"^  'Letter from iqbal to Jinnah, June 21, 1937', G. Allama (compiled), Pakistan Movement: Historical 
Documents, Karachi, 1969, pp. 129-3. 
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Federation' what they were proposmg was that 'all those provinces should have a 
separate federation of their own outside India' with its own laws and customs and where 
Muslims could be the 'masters of [their] own destiny and captains of [their] own souls.'^^ 
This call for a Muslim state went unheeded for long with the League and other Muslim 
delegates to the Round Table Conference dismissing the idea as "student's pipe dream".'^ ^ 
But as the events unfolded, this 'pipe dream' became the dream of the Muslim League 
and its followers. 
With Pakistan demand made public and the British clamouring for Indian support 
in the war, the situation in the Viceroy's camp underwent bit of a change. Linlithgow's 
'August Offer' came on 8 August 1940 and it promised Dominion Status to India but in 
an unspecified future, a post-war body to devise a constitution, immediate expansion of 
the Viceroy's Executive to include more Indians, and a War Advisory Council.'^ *' In 
essence his "offer" made it clear that the British would not transfer responsibilities to any 
system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements 
in India's national life.'" This 'large and powerful element' was obviously the Muslim 
League which was not ready to bargain for less than what it demanded. Therefore, the 
situation entered into a stalemate which would not be solved till a settlement between the 
Viceroy, the Congress and the Muslim League would not take place. In the meantime. 
Congress held its session in Ramgarh in September 1940. Besides opposing the 
imperialist war, the resolution of civil disobedience, after much reluctance by Gandhi, 
was passed.''^ 
While the whole country was facing a war-like situation, although the war was 
still distant from India, Kashmir was going through another round of controversies. The 
conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference, although conceived as a 
stride towards inter-community unity and a step further towards responsible government 
had not, however, come without a price. Immediately after this historic event took place, 
a section of Muslims, predominantly orthodox, began to spread rumours to malign the 
*^ Rehmat Ali, Muhammad Aslam Khan and Others, Now or Never, Ibid., pp. 103-110. 
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image of the leaders subscribing to nationalism. They depicted it as the Kashmiri 
leadership's betrayal to the Muslim 'nation' and a plot in which Neliru was the political 
guru of Sheikh and Congress was the wire-puller. 
Day in and day out Sheikh Abdullah, in order to strengthen the struggle, was 
getting closer to Congress. A section of Muslim Conference leaders, who had agreed to 
convert the Muslim Conference into National Conference on the condition that 'in no 
way [would they] sacrifice their independent attitude at the altar of any outside 
organization',''^ began to feel that Sheikh Abdullah had accepted Nehru as his political 
guru and the future policies of the National Conference would not really be its own but 
those of Nehru and the Congress as a whole.'''' hi a series of events. Sheikh Abdullah 
violated the conditions set by the members. He issued press statements in the Tribune 
newspaper Lahore on his every visit to Lahore praising the Congress policies. Although 
the opposing leaders were still cooperating, and in the inaugural session of National 
Conference the changed policy of Congress towards the State was appreciated, but they 
could not tolerate the criticism of Muslim League, which Abdullah had lately started.'*^ 
Dissensions grew over time but another controversy was underway which was to have 
serious consequences. 
The maharaja, repoiledly under the influence of Gopalaswami Ayenger, 
announced the introduction oi Devanagari script and promulgated the Arms Act, 1940. 
From now on 'the common language could be easy Urdu, but for the purpose of reading 
and writing both the Devanagari and Persian script [were to] be given equal status.' As a 
blow to the competition now put up by educated Muslims the Prime Minister declared 
that, 'It shall be necessary for the school teachers to know both the scripts. If they do not 
know one of the two scripts, it will be their duty to learn the other scripts to a satisfactory 
standard within one year. Henceforth, no one will be appointed in the aforesaid schools 
until he is acquainted with both the scripts.''"' The National Conference felt that the 
introduction of Devanagari would divide Hindus and Muslims but in order to avoid any 
'^ Rashid Taseer, Tehreetc-i-Hiiriyat-i-Kashmir, 1931-39, Vol. 1, Srinagar, 1978, pp. 59-1. 
'* Abbas, p. 179. 
'^  Ibid., pp. 181-2. 
'"^  Hassnain, pp. 104-5; Abbas, p. 104. 
124 
communal discord, Sheikh Abdullah suggested that the Muslims had no problem with the 
introduction but that as 'nationalists they ought to have a single script.'''' Interestingly, 
his thrust would now be on Hindustanf^ as a corollary to Gandhi's formula of 
popularizing Hindustani which could be written in both Devanagari and Nastaliq Persian 
scripts. 
The Arms Act 1940 was intended for unarming every individual of the state 
except for Hindu Rajputs, who could keep guns and fire arms. Muslims of Kashmir had 
already been deprived of this privilege long ago. Now the government felt that only the 
Hindu Rajputs were their collaborators. In response to a strong reaction by the National 
Conference, the maharaja came up with a press note which stated that the Hindu Rajputs 
could not be stopped from keeping guns and firearms because of the prevalence of gun 
worship among the Hindu Rajputs of Jamnui and that 'placing legal restrictions on 
anything used in religious ceremonies is interference in religion.' 
It was decided to take up the question of the Arms Act and Devanagiri script in 
the coming session of the Assembly. But in spite of the protest of several members 
against both these impositions, the group led by Sheikh Abdullah was not prepared to 
oppose the introduction of Devanagari.^'^ The adamancy on both sides consequently led 
to serious arguments and counter-arguments and linally the dissentions which had crept 
in from some time led to a split in the National Conference. Abdullah and Abbas parted 
ways, leaving National Conference in a severe crisis. Thus, in its infancy the National 
Conference was faced with the challenge of disorder in its ranks and exit of some of its 
popular leaders. 
Shortly after this split Abdullah invited Nehru to visit Kashmir. Nehru arrived in 
Kashmir along with Maulana Azad and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Klian on 29"' May, 1940. 
Besides the factor of absorption of Kashmir's struggle into the national movement of 
India, the timing of their visit, Abdullah visualized, would recover the Conference from 
CRR (Political Department), lOL, Fortnightly Reports on the Political Situation in Kashmir State for the 
year 1942, report for the first half ofMay 1942, File no. R/1/1/3789, quoted from Mridu Rai, pp. 276-77. 
•'* R.L. Handa, p. 255. 
'•'^  Arms Rules, Sambat 1998, 1941; Adminslrative Report of 1941. 
'"Abbas, p. 183. 
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the setback that it faced in the wake of exit of several popular leaders. Around the same 
tinae, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah again emerged on the scene and attempted to revive the old 
Muslim Conference. Nehru and others toured the city in a boat-procession. Most of the 
contemporary sources tell us about the enthusiasm among the people which they showed 
by quoting their presence on the banks of River Jhelum. However, Abbas, who had left 
the Conference recently, gives his version thai the Muslim Conference (of Mirwaiz) sent 
a message to Abdullah suggested him not to include Maulana Azad, whom they 
considered a "traitor", in the boat procession. Abbas denies that the people were 
enthusiastic at all; rather the followers of National Conference were greeting the 
procession all along. In fact, the author goes on to say, the people raised slogans of 'Islam 
zindabad', 'Pakistan zindabad' and Quadi-e-Azam zindabad'.^' The quitting of several 
leaders, both Muslims and non-Muslims from the Conference, would have certainly led 
to a reduction in its membership and following, but to assume that in a short period of 
time the whole population of the city would have turned hostile to Sheikh Abdullah is 
illogical. Thus, what Abbas says about the boat-procession, although, not wholly wrong, 
appears highly exaggerated. Evidence of clashes taking place between the factions of 
Mirwaiz-led Muslim Conference and Abdullah-led National Conference do, however, 
show that the discord had taken roots deeper than what one might expect. 
Nehru addressed two meetings arranged by the National Conference and a couple 
of meetings arranged by the Yuvak Sabha. Here he could see the 'self-imposed restraint' 
of Kashmiri people and could not help admitting that 'Kashmir was astir and the masses 
were on the move. That had been a common experience for me in many parts of India 
during the past twenty years. But it as an uncommon experience on that scale in an Indian 
State. Considering the brief life of this movement I was surprised to find how vital and 
widespread it was, although I saw it during a period of quiescence.'" Sensing this 'vital 
and widespread' movement of people Nehru was convinced that the Pandits, most of 
whom had played a reactionary role in the preceding years, had no choice but to join the 
Muslims in the struggle. He warned them 'not to fall into the trap into which minorities 
"Abbas, 210-1. 
" Nehru, Unity of India, p. 228. 
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easily fall.'^ '^  He also opposed the demand of special safeguards as insisted by Pandits. 
He maintained that 'the idea of special safeguards for a minority group was full of perils 
for that group. For such safeguards led to dependence on extraneous help and weakened 
the group's spirit of self-reliance...'^'' 
At this juncture we find mention of the All India States Muslim League stepping 
into the politics of Jammu and Kashmir. Founded in 1937, the organization may be 
considered analogous to the All India States' People's Conference, except that there is 
not much known about the former. In Kashmir, it circulated a handbill in 1940 in the 
wake of Nehru's visit to Kashmir. It demanded from Nehi'u an explanation on his stand 
when Kashmir was suffering from serious repression during 1931-32 and afterwards. 
However, if Nehru was to be blamed for not involving himself in the rescue of the people 
of Kashmir during their hour of need, so was the Muslim League. 
Besides the enthusiasm and the tremendous hope that the Kashmiri leaders and 
the people felt due to the visit of Nehru and other Congress leaders, the event also 
became a point wherefrom the polarization of Muslims into two groups—"nationalist" 
and "anti-nationalist"—became firm such that no reconciliation seemed possible in 
future. Ghulam Abbas, greatly disappointed by the "betrayal" of Sheikh Abdullah, 
revived the old Muslim Conference in 1941. In contrast to Mirwaiz, who had also 
attempted to renew the old Muslim Conference and about which we only hear during the 
incidents related to the boat-procession, Chatidhary Ghulam Abbas had a large following 
among the masses. He had started his career long before Abdullah but Abdullah had rose 
to prominence in a short period of time due to his better ability to translate popular 
grievances into political action. Being a resident of Jammu, Abbas's sphere of influence 
was more concentrated in the Jammu province and, as later events were to illustrate, 
would command greater influence among the people of Mirpur, Poonch and Rajouri 
districts of Jammu. 
Ibid., p. 232. 
55 Bazaz, History of Struggle^ pp. 543-5. 
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Thus, these two parties would now remain more or less limited to regional 
domains—one popularizing the idea of Kashmir as a nationalist dream, and dubbing the 
Muslim Conference a 'communal' organization; the other feeding its followers on the 
theory of betrayal by the National Conference to the Muslims of Kashmir. None, 
however, advocated the communal theory that the Hindus and Muslims were enemies of 
each other. In Kashmir the strange trend of relative inter-community harmony and 
extreme intra-community rivalry existed, and more than communal harmony the rivalries 
dictated the political discourses. Thus, while earlier Abbas was the one of the leaders 
professing nationalism,^^ his disillusionment with Sheikh Abdullah led him to break away 
from Abdullah-led National Conference, revive the All-Jammu and Muslim Conference 
and even enlist in the Muslim League camp later. Although h was the Muslim 
Conference which got transformed into National Conference, therefore, its "revivaf 
seems to be a misnomer. But what makes it a revival is the fact the several Muslim 
leaders, who formed the core group of the Jammu lobby of Muslim Conference plus a 
few from Kashmir proper, joined the new group and revived the old constitution; it, 
however, remained more influential in Jammu than in Kashmir. Mirwaiz, who had 
relinquished politics alter his political eclipse, extended a helping hand to Abbas which 
the latter accepted on the condition that the Mirwaiz would return to the government his 
600-rupees-khilat. On the request of the Mirwaiz, Abbas organized rallies in Srinagar. On 
IS"' June 1941, at Jama Masjid, the Muslim Conference was formally revived, with 
Abbas as president and Qureshi M. Yusuf as General Secretary." The new Muslim 
Conference could now claim to be the rival of the National Conference. From what is 
described in his autobiography, it is not difficult to say that Abbas, the chief protagonist 
of this organization, did see Muslims and Hindus as two nations but was of the belief that 
they could co-exist. He seems to be highly critical of nationalism. But this nationalism, as 
he later on goes to elaborate in his memoir, was not the nationalism which is understood 
by the common usage of the word. Rather he was critical of what he perceived to be the 
'majoritarian nationalism' of Congress which, he believed, 'was leading to subordination 
of the interests of the Muslims of Kashmir and the indigenous character of the struggle to 
56 See his address to the fourth session of MusHm Conference (25* - 27* October 1935), cited in Hassnain, 
p. 84. 
" Abbas, p. 97. 
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the policies of outside organizations especially the Congress; he could not afford to be 
party to it.' Later, he became increasingly associated with the Muslim League politics 
and was a member representing Jammu and Kashmir in the lesser-known All-India 
States' Muslim League. 
Even then, undeniably Abdullah's following was far greater than any other leader 
could claim presumably due to his socialist leanings—although not avowedly so. From 
1935 onwards this trend is clearly visible in the sessions of the Muslim Conference, and 
later the National Conl'erence. Both Muslim Conference and National Conference 
exhibited inclination towards a socialist pattern of society where the peasants, cultivators, 
labourers and workers, who formed the core of the economic system of the state, would 
not be deprived of their basic rights and where an overall economic prosperity would 
prevail. Since these classes constituted the bulk of the population, the issue of their 
emancipation from the handicaps they had been suffering from during the Dogra rule 
assumed greater importance than other matters. Thus, Muslim Conference leaders toured 
towns and far flung villages to meet these downtrodden classes and discussed things with 
them. On the basis of these discussions, the leadership drew a model which, apart from 
establishing a democratic political structure, sought to revolutionize every aspect of the 
Kashmir's social and economic setup. 'Naya Kashmir' or 'New Kashmir'—as this model 
came to be known—embodies the zenith of a long drawn-out struggle aimed at the 
liberation of masses from deprivation (discussed later in the chapter). The socialist 
leanings of the Kashmir leadership (Abdullah, Bazaz, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, 
Mirza Afzal Beg - to name a few) is more than obvious in the choice of the flag for 
National Conference - red background depicting revolution and a plough in the middle, 
representing the peasant. 
The roots of the Left movement in Kaslimir may be traced back to mid-1930s 
with the inaugural of the Hamdard'm 1935 by Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew and, later, the visit 
of Kunwar Muhammad Ashraf to Srinagar in 1937. K.M. Ashraf, a trusted colleague of 
Nehru and Secretary of the Indian National Congress, was on his mission 'The Need for 
Greater Contacts with Muslims' as enunciated by Nehru in 1937 as a sub-project of the 
'Mass Contact' program formulated by the Faizpur Congress (1936) in order to reach out 
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to masses.^^ The Muslim mass contact program was also devised in the wake of 'growing 
influence of Jinnah and the revived MusHm League'. The second session of the 
Kaslimir Youth League, founded a year back, was presided over by K.M. Ashraf. This 
organization did not, however, survive for long and was merged, along with many other 
small organizations such as the Kashmir Congress League, into the National Conference 
in 1939. In August 1937 a workers and labourers organization known as 'Mazdoor and 
Kisan Sabha' was formed in Srinagar and immediately after its foundation it spearheaded 
an agitation in the Silk Factory demanding enhancement in wages and mitigation of 
other grievances.''' However, the Left element within the National Conference had been 
present there for quite some time, and tlie merger of these organizations further 
strengthened them. 
Thus, by the time the National Conference held its second session in 1940, the 
Left element had become well-established within the organization. The BaramuUa 
session of National Conference, held in September 1940 and presided over by Sardar 
Budh Singh, declared in clear terms that 'no scheme of responsible government would be 
acceptable to the nation in which the tillers of the soil are not allowed to enjoy the fullest 
fruits of their labour; for this there can be no other way than this viz., those alone should 
possess and own the land who till it.' This resolution was actually moved by Prem Nath 
Bazaz and adopted by the session. Another resolution pertained to the remittance of debts 
of those peasants who had cleared the principal amount of their debts but the compound 
interests had been lingering on.^ ^ 
In line with this policy, the National Conference prepared a manifesto and 
presented h to the Maharaja in March 1943. The document entitled 'Naya Kashmir' was 
adopted by the National Conference in its 1944 session. The document, in essence a 
socialist manifesto, envisaged a social order free from landlordism, autocracy and 
^^  S. Gopal, (ed.) Selected Works ofJawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 8, New Delhi, 1978, p. 123. 
Horst Kruger, (ed.) Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf: An Indian Scholar and Revolutionary 1903-1962, 
Berlin, 1966, pp. 112-13, quoted from Mushir-ul-Hasan, 'The Muslim Mass Contacts Program: Analysis of 
a Strategy of Political Mobilization', Richard Sisson and Stanly Wolpert (ed.), Congress and Indian 
Nationalism, Berkeley, 1988, p. 201. 
*" Hamdard October 9, 1937, p. 11. 
"'ibid., November 6, 1937. 
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deprivation of the peasant and labour class. It framed a constitution for the future 
Kashmir, chalked out an economic planning programme and suggested steps to be taken 
in removing the educational backwardness of the people of Kashmir without making any 
distinctions, whatsoever. It sought to purge Jammu and Kashmir of unemployment, 
deprivation and poverty, provided for a detailed economic planning with state control, 
declared right to own land, right to education, right to life and protection, right to free 
medical aid, equal pay for equal work, clearance of sahukari debts, abolition of jagirdari 
and forced labour, adult franchise, securing the rights of minorities, abolition of 
trafficking of women and the like. In short, it dealt with almost every aspect of society. 
The reforms suggested in the document were certainly revolutionary in nature. But the 
biggest loophole in the document was the provision of carrying out all these reforms 
under the aegis of the Maharaja''^  which, in essence, would amount to undoing the 
reforms itself. Even then, the document illustrated the foresight and spirit of planning 
among the Kashmir leadership. 
Even though it would seem that the visit of Nehru would've led to a complete 
settlement of Hindu-Muslim differences, the fact is that it could not create this situation 
to any large extent. The Pandits were still of the view that the Muslim Conference and the 
National Conference were two sides of the same coin. They considered the claims of 
National Conference of safeguarding the rights of minorities as mere political rhetoric, 
and in its garb, according to them, the organization was cariying forward a sort of 
majority nationalism in which the rights of the minorities were ignored. Thus, there was 
no remarkable change in the membership of non-Muslims in the National Conference. In 
spite of the conversion, which also led to alienation of several Muslim leaders from the 
organization, the feeling of insecurity still remained among several non-Muslim leaders. 
Th ere is sufficient evidence to show that although the new direction was given to the old 
Conference by changing its nomenclature, it still did not succeed in removing the 
perception of majority of non-Muslims regarding the freedom struggle. '^* If in the 'British 
India' a considerable portion of Muslims were suffering from a similar kind of 
uncertainty, they were still vigorously carrying forward the struggle against the colonial 
^^^  For details, see Naya Kashmir: Political and Economic Planning (Urdu), Srinagar, 1944 
Biizaz, History of Struggle, p.m. 
131 
power. But in Kashmir, despite the assurances from the Muslim leadership—in fact, 
considering the 'National Demand'—the minorities not only continually remained 
suspicious about the intentions of the Muslim leadership, but they ahogether, save a few 
leaders, abandoned the freedom struggle. By 1943, popular Pandit leaders—Bazaz, 
Kashyap Bandhu and Jia Lai Kilam—had left the National Conference. 
Thus, on the one hand, Sheikh Abdullah lost the support of many Muslim leaders 
and, on the other hand, he failed to convince the Pandits. This happened in spite of his 
frequent assertion that his belief in nationalism did not mean he was anti-Muslim; he was 
Muslim first and Muslim last.''^  Even his opposition to Pakistan demand could not induce 
the Pandits to eschew their reactionary attitude. Opposed to the idea of bifurcation of 
India he argued that such an idea was 'fantastic, absurd, unworkable and anti-national.' 
Although the letter 'K' in 'Pakistan', as visualized by Rehmat Ali et.aL, corresponded to 
Kashmir, the Lahore resolution of the Muslim League undoubtedly did not include 
Kashmir as the component of the sovereign states it demanded. This is corroborated by 
the fact that the Muslim League neither took any interest in the Kashmir affairs nor 
rendered any substantial support, moral or political, to the Kashmiri leadership during the 
pre-1940 period. Apart from the visit of Jinnah to Kashmir in 1936, we do not hear of any 
utterances from him regarding Kashmir. The Muslim League's position vis-a-vis 
Kashmir or princely states in general, was, as late as 1944, one of non-intervention. 
Jinnah quite plainly made his position clear on his vish to Kashmir in 1944 by stating that 
'... it is not the policy of the Muslim League to interfere with the administration of this 
State or the grave and serious issues that face the Maharaja and his Government, as 
between him and his people...'^'' He, however, affirmed that he was very deeply 
concerned about the Muslims of the State who were grinding under poverty.^^ 
More than this statement, his position is explicit from the correspondence that 
took place between him and Gandhi during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks (1944). The 
questions Gandhi posed were whether the term 'Pakistan' bore the original meaning (the 
''^ Hamdard,My9, 1939. 
^^ Political Department, JKA, File No. E-206, 1940. 
'''' Bazaz, History ofSlniggle, p. 206 
' ' Ibid. 
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one Rehmat Ali had coined) and what would be the fate of the MusHms under princes? 
Jinnah's reply was that 'the word "Pakistan" is not mentioned in the resolution and it 
does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the 
Lahore resolution.' Regarding the States Jinnah unambiguously replied that 'the Lahore 
resolution is only confined to British India.''''^ This position of the Muslim League 
explains why Jinnah did not show much interest towards Kashmir which was not only a 
Muslim-majority state but also geographically adjacent to the proposed Pakistan. 
In contrast to Jiimah's stand, Nehru openly put forward his views regarding the 
future of Kashmir. In the Sopore session of National Conference, held in August 1945, 
which was attended by Maulana Azad, Abdul Gaffar Khan, Mian Iftiqar-ud-Din, Jai 
Narayan Vyas, Asaf Ali and Kanya Lai Vaidya, Nehru declared in clear terms:^° 
'Kashmir has to become independent. But when? The answer is when Hindustan 
attains independence. The question of the independence of Kashmir is linked 
with the independence of India. Kashmir cannot make its one-half inch of 
mosque by staying independent. W can, if it so wishes, remain independent, but in 
the present world situation, that would be a very dangerous step. For this reason, 
inevitably this mulk will have to stay connected to Hindustan.' 
This position was already recognized by Abdullah-led National Conference. 
Abdullah stated that the future and fate of Kashmir was connected with the freedom 
struggle of India. According to him, if the apprehensions, that were looming due to an 
uncertain situation in the whole of India, could be solved by the principle of self-
determination, then that should be included in the agenda of the Indian National 
Congress.'' Nehru's statement was criticized by Prem Nath Bazaz. For him this appeared 
as a signal of a future chaos for both Muslims and non-Muslims of Kashmir. What he 
saw in this speech was a politician threatening people to join India (independent or post-
69 ; 
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independent) or face consequences. Therefore, as Bazaz suggested, the Pandits needed a 
right leader, else he visualized a gloomy future of Pandits in Kashmir. 
It is noteworthy to mention here that Bazaz, a Gandhian and an admirer of Nehru 
during early 1930s, later became their bitter critic in Kashmir. One of the probable 
reasons of his antagonism towards Gandhi and Nehru was the undermining of the 
problem of states by the Congress till late 1930s. Another reason seems to be the 
dismissive reply of Gandhi to Bazaz's query about the line of action the Pandits should 
take keeping in view the political situation in Kaslimir during early 1930s. He states that 
Gandhi told him that 'Seeing that Kashmir is predominantly Musalman it is bound one 
day to become a Musalman State. A Hindu prince can therefore only rule by not ruling 
i.e., by allov^dng the Musalmans to do as they like and by abdicating when they are going 
manifestly wrong.'" Being a staunch Royist, Ba/az was particularly critical of dragging 
religion into politics. He did not believe even for a moment that the people's struggle in 
Kashmir was the result of communal differences; rather it was a people's struggle against 
an autocratic ruler who just happened to be Hindu. He was of a belief firm that the people 
of the Indian sub-continent are one nation and could not be divided on the basis of their 
religion alone.''^ For him 'both Gandhism and Jinnahism [were] revivalist and reactionary 
creeds.' He argued that "Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah awakened nationalistic sentiment among 
Muslims in the same way and on a similar basis as the Mahatma did among the 
Hindus.'^ -^ 
By 1946, the all-India political atmosphere was filled with uncertainty. 
Negotiations between the Congress and Muslim League had repeatedly failed. Gandhi-
Jinnah talks in 1944, with which the people of the whole country had pinned their hopes, 
did not bear fruit. What Jinnah wanted was that the confederation of the states that he 
demanded be conceded before the independence from the British. Gandhi insisted on the 
acceptance by the League of the Rajaji formula which, according to him, was the 
'^  Hamdard, Srinagar, August 10, 1945. 
'^ 'Gandhi's Letter to Prcin Nath Bazaz,' May 15, 1934 (Private Collection of Bhushan Bazaz, New Delhi), 
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•^^  Bazaz, Azad Kashmir, p. 20. 
134 
substance of the Lahore Resokition. But the condition Gandhi put was that a plebiscite be 
held in the regions that the League conceived as Pakistan. Jinnah, on the other hand, was 
neither ready for plebiscite nor could he wail till the actual transfer of power took place 
from Britain to India.*"' 
The next phase of efforts to arrive at a consensus started between the Congress 
and the League in June-July 1945 in Simla. The Simla Conference also broke down due 
to the protest of the Congress against the setting up an all-Indian Executive Council 
composed of Muslims and 'Caste Hindus.' llie Congress saw it as an attempt to reduce 
its status to 'caste Hindu' paity while the League wanted an absolute right to choose all 
77 
the Muslim members of the Council. 
The elections of 1946 went on to show the massive support that the League now 
commanded among Muslims. It won—in total contrast to the elections of 1937—all the 
30 reserved constituencies in the centre, and 442 out of 509 Muslim seats in the 
provinces.^^ Thus, by now, the Muslim League had emerged as the biggest competitor of 
the Congress and its ability to bargain for the demand of Pakistan enhanced. From March 
to July 1946 the Cabinet Mission, with Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A.V. 
Alexandra as its members negotiated with the Indian leadership over the issue of 
independence of India. Rejecting the six-province demand of League, the Cabinet 
Mission Plan provided for a 'three tier structure' according to which the provinces would 
be grouped into tkee categories: one section (Section A) consisting of Hindu-majority 
provinces, the second group (Section B) consisting of Muslim-majority provinces of the 
north-west and the third (Section C) consisting of Bengal and Assam. A constitution 
would be framed by the recently elected provincial assemblies for the whole of India. The 
princely states were to be given adequate representation at the Central Constituent 
Assembly. Unexpectedly, Muslim League accepled the Cabinet Mission Plan while the 
Congress, though initially willing, later rejected the plan apparently on the issue of 
N.W.F.P. and Assam where it had recently won majority of seats and which, according to 
For details, see Gandhi-Jhwah Talks. Text of Correspondence and Other Relevant Matter July-October 
/P^-/, New Delhi, 1944. 
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Nehru, would not agree to join either Section B or Section C. Congress only agreed to 
participate in the Constituent Assembly.''^ 
Since Britain had by now realized that it could not continue its rule over India, the 
Prime Minister, Atlee, declared on 20 February 1947 that power would be transferred by 
June 1948. The inability of the Indian leadership to arrive at a consensus finally paved the 
way for Mountbatten Plan on June 3. The Plan fixed the date of transfer of power as 15 
August 1947. According to the plan, Bengal and Punjab were to be partitioned; Muslim-
majority provinces were given the choice to join the existing or a new and separate 
Constituent Assembly for Pakistan; and a referendum would be held in N.W.F.P. 
In the meantime, the Maharaja after being handed over the 'Naya Kashmir' 
document, appointed Mirza Afzal Beg as his Minister for Public Works while a Hindu 
member of legislature was appointed as Minister for Education. Afzal Beg resigned in 
1946 as a result of a tussle between the government and the National Conference. Soon 
after his resignation Sheikh Abdullah declared that the dyarchy as inaugurated in 
Kashmir in 1945 was a complete failure and that the popular ministers were mere 
puppets.**' As the matters came to a head—most importantly, due to the option of 
independence for princes as announced by the Cabinet Mission Plan—Sheikh Abdullah 
launched the 'Quit Kashmir' movement on the 13* of May, 1946. Before a large 
gathering Sheikh announced that:^ ^ 
"I announce it to the world that the descendants of Gulab Singh have no right to 
rule this land. We were not even asked at thai time when the British sold this land 
to him. Now, when the British have to quit India, we tell Hari Singh to quit 
Kashmir. We will collect fifty lakhs by contribution and tell him to vacate this 
land". 
''' Sekhar Bandyopadliyay, pp. 453-4. 
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time and, thus, he entered into a 'Standstill Agreement' with Pakistan while India was 
reluctant to enter into such an arrangement. 
On the other hand, Kashmiri leadership was also divided on the issue of 
accession. They were concerned about the aspirations of the people, the form of the 
government that would be established after the accession, and their relation with the 
dominion the state would decide to accede to. The Muslim Conference led by Chaudhary 
Ghulam Abbas, which had by now acquired considerable following in the Jammu 
province especially the Poonch, Rajouri and Kishtwar areas, wanted to join Pakistan. In 
1943, Abbas had categorically stated that 'Kashmir Muslim Conference is a part and 
parcel of the All-India Muslim League.'''* The Kashmir Kisan Conference had already 
made its stand clear by declaring that 'We believe that so long as it is not decided who 
the future rulers are to be, we can neither support Akhand flindustan nor side with the 
demand of Pakistan. Our first task is to do away with the prevailing social and economic 
inequality and injustice and lay foundations of a new and just order of society.' ^ Bazaz, 
although against the division of India on religious lines, was nevertheless in favour of 
Kaslmiir's accession to Pakistan as 'Kashmir [was] predominantly Muslim...it was, 
therefore, just and rational as well as democratic that it should be allowed to accede to 
Pakistan.''^" 
Sheikh Abdullah, although not uncertain of joining India seemed as much skeptic 
about the status of Jammu and Kashmir in the future political structure. On October 5, 
1947, he addressed a mammoth gathering at Hazratbal shrine where he publicly declared, 
. . . . 07 
m no uncertam terms, his mtentions: 
"Our aim is to establish a people's government in the Jammu and Kashmir State. 
The old regime of the Dogra Maharaja must go and should be replaced by the 
people's raj. If four million people of the State are bypassed and the State 
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'" 'Presiding Address to the Session of Kashmir Kisan Conference," May 1946, Fazili, Socialist Ideas and 
Movements, 1980, p. 92. 
'*" Bazaz, Azad Kashmir, p. 16-17. 
'" Quoted fi-om Hassnain, p. 148. 
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declares its accession to India or Pakistan, I shall raise the banner of revolt and 
we shall start our struggle. We want complete freedom to decide our fate. Of 
course, we will opt for thai Dominion, where our own demands for freedom are 
recognised. We cannot join those who say that the people must have no choice. It 
will be the representatives of people who will decide as to whether we should 
join India or Pakistan". 
In another speech a few days later he reiterated his stand that, 'Accession is of 
little importance. Freedom is more important. We do not want to join either Dominion as 
slaves. I warn the government of India and Pakistan that if the Maharaja decides to join 
either of these without consent, we shall rise in revolt against such a decision.' Thus, 
while Sheikh had been following the policies of the Congress all along 'since its 
viewpoint conformed to [his] ideology' and was highly critical of Jinnah and Muslim 
League,^^ he was also ambivalent about the accession issue. His position was probably an 
outcome of the stand taken by MusHm Conference which was clearly in support of 
joining Pakistan. If Slieikh had made a direct statement of joining India—which, in any 
case, was the option he had chosen as he had already discarded the Pakistan scheme, and 
independence was not an option—this would have certainly led to serious crisis in 
Kashmir. Therefore, he seems to have resorted to political manoeuvring. 
One issue which probably nobody anticipated, or chose to ignore, was the fete of 
Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Maharaja's inability to arrive at any decision or if 
people were given the choice of expressing their will. As the events unfolded, this 
stalemate precipitated into a serious crisis. From 15' August onwards several events took 
place in the State about which there are numerous viewpoints. The contested standpoints 
make it challenging to arrive at an objective conclusion because the objectivity of all 
these perspectives is in itself disputed. The controversial viewpoints pertain to events that 
happened, in that order: the Poonch revolt and massacre of Muslims there, the armed 
invasion of tribal men from Pakistan, the signing of the Instrument of Accession by the 
Maharaja on 26'V27"^ October 1947 and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir with India, 
^^A%i(//t/, October 9, 1947. 
See, for example, Sheikh Abdullah, blames of the Chiiiur. p. '17. 
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and the occupation of a part of Jammu and Kaslimir by the tribal invaders.""^ Several 
scholars and writers have written so far on the issue of accession and the events 
preceding and following it, but the presentation of these events is very confusing. An in-
depth understanding of these crucial events demands a systematic and unprejudiced 
reading. For thai purpose the access to primary sources, especially archival material, of 
the said period is of utmost importance which, unfortunately, is not being provided to the 
researchers in the National Archives of India or the Archives of the States. 
'"^  For these differing and contesting perspectives, see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict - India, 
Pakistan and the Unending War, New York, 2003; Navnita Chanda Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, 
Washington, 2006; Alastair Lamb, Incomplete Partition. For a more recent and rather dispassionate 
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